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Abstract 
 
 
This study examines the political life of Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmad al-Fatih Al 
Khalifa, the fifth ruler of the Al Khalifa dynasty and the third of that family to rule 
Bahrain. It is a political biography, examining the tactics used by Shaikh Abdullah 
and his family to fend off threats from various foes. Those tactics ranged from direct 
military combat, to entry into temporary protector-protégé relationships, to playing off 
one foe against another. His ability to employ such tactics effectively enabled him and 
his family to neutralize or defeat their foes.  This study examines local statecraft 
tactics through the case study of one of the Gulf‘s greatest nineteenth century 
statesmen. It also looks at the reasons that resulted in Shaikh Abdullah‘s political 
downfall. Those reasons were domestic and external factors that the Shaikh seems to 
have either ignored or been unable to fully address. That inability and/or shortcoming 
in addressing those factors would have cost any Gulf ruler his rulership, not just 
Shaikh Abdullah, as similar aspects prevailed in the other Gulf shaikhdoms. The study 
examines the life of a political leader whose achievements have been played down, 
even neglected, by most modern historians in Bahrain and the Gulf. The reason for 
this neglect lies perhaps in the natural desire of the current ruling branch of the Al 
Khalifa family to discourage any potential future claim to the throne by the 
descendants of Shaikh Abdullah, who have lived in exile from Bahrain ever since 
Shaikh Abdullah‘s overthrow in 1843.1 
 
  
                                                          
1
 Except for a brief period of time when there was reconciliation between the two family branches that 
lasted between 1863-1869. Then the family of Shaikh Abdullah returned to Bahrain but their 
involvement in the 1869 civil war resulted in their permanent exile from that time. 
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Glossary 
 
Abd  Slave in Arabic 
AH   Anno Hegirae. It is used in the Islamic Calendar which starts after the Hijra 
(immigration) of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) to Mecca.  
Awal  One of the historic names of Bahrain. 
Bani Utbah (Utub)   A tribal confederation of the ten families or tribes––the Al 
Khalifa, al-Fadhil, al-Sabah, al-Ghatam, al-Zayed, al-Roumi, al-bin Ali, al-
Jalahma, al-Mua'awda, al-Nisif––also known as the Utub. 
Banya  Hindu Indian merchants who traded in the Arabian Gulf region. Many of 
them worked as agents for the British East India Company / British 
Government of India in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
Bin  Arabic for ‗Son of‘. 
Bint  Arabic for ‗Daughter of‘ 
Buggalow   A type large ship, native to the Gulf region and used for both commercial 
and military purposes. 
Buteel  A type of local midsize war vessel used by Gulf Arabs in the nineteenth 
century, known for its speed and maneuverability and was often used for 
scouting. 
Diyah  A sum of money paid to the family of a murdered by the family of the 
murderer in order to avoid more bloodshed, commonly known as ‗blood 
money‘. 
Emir Arabic for ‗Prince‘, often used as a title for a Ruler. 
Farij/Fariq Gulf Arabic for ‗neighborhood‘; plural: Firjan. 
Ibn A variant of Bin (‗Son of‘), which can also be used to refer to a more 
distant ancestor than the direct father.  
Imam Classical Arabic for ‗leader‘. After the rise of Islam, it came to mean 
‗religious leader‘. Orthodox Muslim rulers who desired to be portrayed as 
leaders of their people in both politics and religion used this title, most 
notably the Al Saud.   
Khadim  Arabic for servant 
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Khor  Arabic for ‗lagoon‘. 
Majlis al-Shura   Arabic for ‗consultative council‘.  These councils were used by 
Arab Gulf rulers in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. A majlis was 
where a ruler, his family, and other tribal chiefs and notables would 
congregate to discuss a matter of concern and to find resolutions for it.  
Mamluk  A polite Arabic term for a slave 
MT Dollars   Maria Theresa Dollars (or Thalers): silver coins that were the most 
commonly used currency in the wider Middle East region, including the 
Arabian Gulf, during the nineteenth century.  
PRPG Political Resident in the Persian Gulf: the senior British political 
representative in the Gulf region. 
Rukum A costume awarded by the Persian Government to people considered loyal     
friends or vassals. 
Sabaya An Arabic term used for women and children who are captured in war and 
are susceptible to being treated as war booty.  
Shaikh In classical Arabic this word means ‗elder‘, but also it later took on new 
meanings. In the Arabian Gulf, it was and still is used for three types of 
people: a member of a ruling family, a tribal leader, and a religious leader.   
Sirbaz Persian soldiers. 
SNOPG  Senior Naval Officer of the Persian Gulf: the title of the commander of 
Britain‘s Gulf squadron (initially belonging to the Bombay Marine, later the 
Indian Navy, later again the Royal Navy). 
Sultan  An Arabic regal title corresponding to ‗King‘ or ‗Emperor‘. Its original 
meaning in classical Arabic was ‗power‘ and/or ‗authority‘.  
Trucial Coast    The name of the western coast of the UAE until 1971. 
Utub    See Bani Utbah above. 
Wakil   Agent (spelt as Vakil by the Ottomans and Persians). 
Zakat The Islamic equivalent of tithe. Saudi rulers often demanded it from others 
rulers of the Gulf and was often considered a sign of subordination.  
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Transliteration and Terminology 
 
 
The transliteration of Arabic and Persian terms and names in this thesis follows that 
used by IJMES (the International Journal of Middle East Studies). Diacritical marks 
have been omitted because of software limitations. Names of places and people were 
spelled according to the contemporary British useage. Both terms for naming the Gulf 
region––the ―Arabian Gulf‖ and the ―Persian Gulf‖––are used in this thesis. The title 
of Imam for the Saudi rulers of the first Saudi state has been used according to the 
tradition of the local historians of the region who addressed them with such a title.  
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction:  
Local Political Statecraft and Mechanisms of Political 
Survival for Arab Gulf Shaikhdoms in the First Half 
of the Nineteenth Century 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In the late eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth, before the British 
Empire assumed responsibility for the defence of the Gulf shaikhdoms, along with 
control of the rulers‘ external (and sometimes internal) political affairs, the rulers had 
to rely on their own means for the protection and preservation of their dominions. 
Many of today‘s royal and ruling Gulf families—most notably the Al Khalifa of 
Bahrain, the Al Said of Oman, the al-Sabah of Kuwait, the Al Nahyan of Abu Dhabi, 
and the al-Qawasim (al-Qasimi) of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah—had established 
their authority and managed to protect their territories before the political ascendancy 
of the British in the Gulf region. The practice of local statecraft for self-defence, 
combining warfare with diplomacy, has been largely overlooked by contemporary 
academic historians, who tend to concentrate on the history of the area after the firm 
establishment of British hegemony in the late nineteenth century: the era of the Pax 
Britannica (the ‗British Peace‘). A close study of the mechanics of local statecraft in 
the days before Pax Britannica would give anyone researching into the history of the 
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Gulf a broader basis for his or her analysis. It would enable him or her to appreciate 
more of the elements contributing to the establishment of dynastic authority in those 
shaikhdoms—the foundation that, coupled with other external factors such as the Pax 
Britannica and oil wealth, later enabled the establishment and formation of the 
modern states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Some researchers have 
examined this period of history from the same perspective as this study, but they do 
not go into the level of detail offered here of how local rulers confronted external 
threats and how they safeguarded their domains.
1
 For observers to understand the 
political origins of today‘s GCC states, and how their historical evolution affected and 
still affects their modern political and socio-economic structure and political stances, 
they should be aware of the early histories of the ruling families and the way in which 
they managed to establish their respective states. Such a knowledge is important for 
historical and political observers and analysts, as without it they will not have a full 
understanding of the modern political structure of the Gulf states and their societies 
then and now. This study is intended to supply some of that knowledge. 
This study focuses on the history of Bahrain and its ruling family, the Al 
Khalifa. This family first established itself as a ruling dynasty in Qatar in the mid-
1760s, annexing the islands of Bahrain in 1783. The islands were formerly governed 
by an Arab shaikh, a Persian protégé who acknowledged the suzerainty of the Persian 
Empire over his dominions both in Bahrain and in Bushire on the Persian littoral. As 
the British did not begin to exercise direct military and political hegemony over 
                                                          
1
 Good examples of these studies include the works of James Onley and Sulayman Khalaf. For further 
details, see James Onley, ―The Politics of Protection in the Gulf: The Arab Rulers and the British 
Resident in the Nineteenth Century‖, New Arabian Studies 6 (2004), 30–92; James Onley, ―The 
Politics of Protection: The Gulf Rulers and the Pax Britannica in the Nineteenth Century‖, Liwa: 
Journal of the National Center for Documentation and Research 1 (2009), 25–46; and James Onley 
and Sulayman Khalaf, ―Shaikhly Authority in the Pre-Oil Gulf: An Historical-Anthropological 
Study‖, History and Anthropology 17 (2006), 189–208. 
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Bahrain until 1868, the Al Khalifa had to defend themselves and their dominions from 
several external threats for more than a century––yet little is known about how they 
did this. It is therefore important to shed some light on the Al Khalifa‘s strategies, 
tactics, triumphs and setbacks in this regard. 
2. Background 
Many shaikhs and rulers in the Gulf have played a key role the defence of their 
family‘s dominions, preserving the integrity of their polities. In the case of Bahrain, 
Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmad Al Khalifa (Ruler 1795-1843) was the most-tested and 
most accomplished in diplomacy and war.  He was an important political and military 
figure in the Gulf from 1795 until his death in 1849. During 1810-43, he was one of 
the most powerful rulers in the Gulf.  Great though his importance is, he has been 
almost completely neglected, if not ignored, by modern historians. One reason for this 
neglect is that the pre-Pax Britannica period is less popular with historians, since 
there are fewer historical records to draw upon. Another reason that might have 
contributed to Shaikh Abdullah‘s modern-day obscurity is, dynastic politics in 
Bahrain. The long political career of Shaikh Abdullah ended with his overthrow by 
his grand nephew, Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa. A family feud ensued—a political 
and military struggle between the Shaikh, his sons and supporters on one side, and his 
grand nephew‘s family and supporters on the other. This conflict ended with 
reconciliation only several years after his death. His sons and grandsons returned to 
Bahrain, only to be expelled from it permanently when they organised, and failed to 
bring to fruition, a political scheme to win back the rulership of Bahrain.
2
  The 
subsequent downplaying and neglect of Shaikh Abdullah‘s role in Bahraini history by 
the current ruling branch of the Al Khalifa and by Bahraini historians could lie in the 
natural desire of the King of Bahrain to discourage any potential future claim to the 
throne by Shaikh Abdullah‘s descendants, who have lived in exile from Bahrain since 
the nineteenth century. 
                                                          
2
 Although this dissertation is on the life of Shaikh Abdullah himself, I felt it necessary to give the 
reader a historical glimpse of what happened to his sons, to appreciate the significance of the 
outcomes of the coup against him as well to maintain good historical flow. 
Abdulaziz Al Khalifa Chapter I  
 
  4 
 
3. Subject of the Study 
Shaikh Abdullah was an excellent military commander and a shrewd diplomat. These 
skills enabled him to play a crucial role in the defence and preservation of his 
dominions and the political position of his family. During his long political career, he 
played a key role in military confrontations and diplomatic manoeuvres, thwarting 
several foes who threatened his dynasty‘s existence. Those foes included Imam Abdul 
Aziz bin Muhammad Al Saud and his son Saud of the first Saudi state; Sayyid Sultan 
bin Ahmad Al Said of Oman and Zanzibar and his son Sayyid Said; the notorious 
warlord Rahma bin Jabir al-Jalahma; Emir Turki bin Abdullah Al Saud and his son 
Faisal; the ambitious and rogue tribal Shaikh Isa bin Tarif al-bin Ali; and the Egyptian 
General, Khorshid Pasha, who was sent by his overlord, Muhammad Ali Pasha, the 
Ottoman Viceroy of Egypt, on an expedition into Eastern Arabia. He also faced 
persistent Persian threats and encroachments aimed at subduing Bahrain and its 
dependencies. 
With so many foes and so many victories, it cannot be denied that Shaikh 
Abdullah played a paramount role in the efforts and achievements of the Al Khalifa 
family. Such a character must be of great importance and interest to any keen 
historian, but his illustrious and profound role has often been neglected by modern 
historians. This study aims to rectify this neglect and to accord the Shaikh appropriate 
acknowledgement of his role in the history of Bahrain, and of the Gulf region in 
general, in the first half of the nineteenth century. 
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4. Political and Socio-Economic Conditions of Nineteenth 
Century Gulf Shaikhdoms and the Al Khalifa Shaikhs in 
Particular 
 
It is important to examine and have a clear understanding of the Political and Socio-
Economic Conditions that the Gulf Shaikhdoms and its rulers in the nineteenth 
century. Such an examination of the aforementioned conditions in respect to the Al 
Khalifa family and Shaikh Abdullah in particular would be very beneficial in helping 
to understand the motives that prompted the Shaikh and some members of his family 
to take certain courses of action. The economic resources available to the Gulf 
Shaikhs, their families and peoples were very scarce at the time.
3
 Most of the 
economic activities at the time centered on pearl fishing and exportation, the 
exportation of dates, shipping and ship building.
4
 Bahrain had a similar scope of 
economic activities. However, Bahrain also had another economic source that was not 
widely available to the other Gulf Shaikhdoms. It had comparatively rich agricultural 
lands that provided the population with sustenance and numerous foodstuffs.
5
 Hence 
the population of Bahrain at the time had more protection against famines compared 
to their other Gulf brethren in times of economic hardships. In addition it to that it 
provided the Al Khalifa Rulers with a valuable source of income in resource limited 
                                                          
3 James Onley, ―The Politics of Protection in the Gulf: The Arab Rulers and the British Resident in the 
Nineteenth Century‖, New Arabian Studies 6 (2004), 33–34 
4 Onley, ―The Politics of Protection‖, 34; Hala Fattah, The Politics of Regionl Trade in Iraq, 
Arabia, and the Gulf, 1745-1900, (Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1997), 63-90; Thomas M. Ricks, 
―Slaves and Slave Traders in the Persian Gulf, 18th and 19th Centuries: An Assesment‖ in The 
Economics of the Indian Ocean Slave Trade in the Nineteeenth Century, ed. William Gervace 
Clarence-Smith (London: Frank Cass and Company Ltd, 1989), 60-64. 
5
 Nelida Fuccaro, Histories of City and State in the Persian Gulf: Manama since 1800, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 24-29. 
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Gulf. According to Kemball it provided the Ruler and his family with an annual 
income worth nearly £25,000.
6
  
     Nonetheless attention had to be given to Bahrain's greatest economic resource at 
the time, namely pearling. According to a report in 1818 the annual revenue that the 
Ruler of Bahrain received from the pearl trade was estimated at £157,500.
7
 That 
coupled with its agricultural and ample fresh water resources and its strategic location 
in the Gulf made it a natural entrepôt for trade and commerce. These economic 
numbers might seem small in the eyes of a modern observer. Notwithstanding note 
has to be taken to how relative those numbers compared with the other Gulf Shaikhs 
and Oman at the time. For example in 1874 Bahrain's exports was nearly equivalent to 
that of Oman and the trucial states combined.
8
 Hence it can be safely presumed that 
the Ruler of Bahrain at the time had relative economic wealth compared with his other 
neighbors in the Gulf and Arabia.  
     Nevertheless, such economic prosperity in a resource limited and economically 
poor region as was the Gulf at the time naturally attracted a lot of unwanted attention 
and envy from his neighbors. Therefore, as shall be seen in this thesis, the Shaikhs of 
Bahrain had to contend with both the Omanis and the Saudis, the major regional Arab 
powers at the time, to defend their economic wealth. They also had to contend with 
various Persian encroachments on their domains. Understandably, and in the faces of 
such danger the Shaikh Abdullah and his family had to use their economic resources 
                                                          
6
 Lt A.B. Kemball, Asst. PRPG, ―Memoranda on the Resources, Localities and Relations of the Tribes 
Inhabiting the Arabian Shores of the Persian Gulf‖, reprinted in Records of Bahrain, Primary 
Documents 1820-1960, Vol I 1820-1868 (Cambridge: Archive Editions, 1993), 100. 
7
 Captain Robert Taylor, , ―Extracts from Brief Notes Containing Historical and Other Information 
Connected with the Province of Oman; Muskat and the Adjoining Country; the Islands of Bahrein, 
Ormus, Kishm, and Karrack; And Other Ports and Places in the Persian Gulf‖, reprinted in Records 
of Bahrain, Primary Documents 1820-1960, Vol I 1820-1868 (Cambridge: Archive Editions, 1993), 
90. 
8
 Onley, ―The Politics of Protection‖, 34. 
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wisely to have the necessary armed force to protect themselves and those same 
resources that afforded their wealth. They had to hire armed retainers in order to 
enforce their power and superiority within their domains and followers. Naturally that 
differentiated them from other tribal Shaikhs who only lead with the consent of their 
followers and often lacked the coercive power to enforce their will.
9
 They naturally 
also used such resources to be generous with their allies and peoples. Such generosity 
was needed to allow them to enjoy a decent level of popularity. Such popularity was 
important for any Shaikh, and especially the Shaikh Abdullah and his family in their 
precarious situation, to further his legitimacy and influence.
10
 The wealth the Al 
Khalifa had combined with the legitimacy and influence it must have brought them 
naturally enabled them to fight off their enemies. It enabled them to have a large fleet 
to defend their territories in addition to recruit a large number of armed tribal 
followers. However, when military confrontation with the enemy was seen as too 
risky if not futile they always had an option to buy him off. In other words they could 
apply to submit to their foe and become his protégés with the condition of paying him 
an annual tribute. Shaikh Abdullah and his family sometimes had to resort to such an 
option with the Omanis and the Saudis despite their former's victories against the 
latter in 1810, 1811, 1816, 1828. They also used such a tactic to deal with the 
Egyptians in the 1839 Egyptian Crisis.  
 
     However such economic prosperity also brought internal trouble for the Al 
Khalifa. It seems to have created internal jealousy and greed among them, especially 
in the younger generation at the time, to get even ever larger portion of economic and 
                                                          
9
 Onley, ―The Politics of Protection‖, 41; Peter Lienhardt, The Shaikhdoms of Eastern Arabia, ed. 
Ahmed Al-Shahi (London: Palgrave, 2001), 209-210. 
10
 Lienhardt, The Shaikhdoms of Eastern Arabia, 31 & 229.  
Abdulaziz Al Khalifa Chapter I  
 
  8 
 
political power. Such rivalry within Shaikhly families in Eastern Arabia and the Gulf 
seems to have been a natural occurrence.
11
 Notwithstanding, it seems that it was 
abundance that at first enabled the heads of the family from 1766-1835 to withhold 
the family together was what caused greed and rivalry within the later generations. 
Apparently the sons of Shaikh Abdullah in the later reign of their father seem to have 
desired a larger share of power and wealth than what their other family members were 
willing to allow. Those family members and hence their tribals allies must have seen 
that the actions that the young Shaikhs were taking was jeopardize their political and 
economic position. No matter how powerful or able a Shaikh was at the time, 
including Shaikh Abdullah, he would not have been able to sustain his rulership 
without the support of his family.
12
 In consequence it was Shaikh Abdullah's inability 
to remedy the folding of the aforementioned situation that in the end caused him to 
lose his rulership.  
 
5. Literature Review 
Of all the modern literature on Bahraini history, a single book is dedicated to 
examining the political significance of Shaikh Abdullah. This is Abd Allah bin Ahmad 
Muharib Lam Yahda [Abdullah bin Ahmad: A Restless Warrior], by Shaikha Mai bint 
Muhammad Al Khalifa. Yet even this is sketchy on the Shaikh‘s life and political 
significance. Most of it is concerned with different episodes in the Shaikh‘s life, 
extracted (almost verbatim) from various primary sources such as the Records of the 
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Bombay Government (1856) and the Gazetteer of The Persian Gulf (1908-1915) by 
John Lorimer. It also draws on accounts of traditional local historians such as al-Tajir 
and al-Nabhani in addition to other more modern works. The book does not offer an 
analysed perspective of the life and political career of Shaikh Abdullah. Nonetheless, 
it should still be credited as the first modern historical work with the bold object of 
addressing the life of Shaikh Abdullah and his key role in shaping the political 
structure of the Arab states of the Gulf. 
Another noteworthy work that acknowledges Shaikh Abdullah‘s life is by 
James Onley. His article, ―The Politics of Protection in the Gulf: The Arab Rulers 
and the British Resident in the Nineteenth Century‖ (2004), examines the 
relationship between the local Arab rulers and the British Political Resident in the 
nineteenth century. Onley sheds light on some of Shaikh Abdullah‘s diplomatic 
manoeuvres to safeguard his dominions (Onley calls them ‗protection-seeking 
tactics‘). The article proves that Shaikh Abdullah was an able tactician, and Onley‘s 
examination of Shaikh Abdullah
13
 succeeds in illustrating the complexities faced by 
local Arab rulers of the period. However, Onley examines only one aspect of the 
Shaikh‘s political life—the relationship between the Shaikh‘s political situation and 
that of the British. Another of his works deals with the politics of local rulers at the 
time, The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj: Merchants, Rulers, and the British in 
the Nineteenth-Century Gulf (2007).
14
 The work mainly discusses the network of 
local agents and collaborators built by the British to further their interests in the Gulf, 
especially Bahrain. The book gives us a unique glimpse into the roles played by such 
agents and their effects on relations between local rulers and the British. 
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Nevertheless, it does not examine very deeply the political and military tactics that 
the local ruler used in protecting his domain from external threats. 
There are few other historical works about the century preceding British 
ascendancy in the Arabian Gulf and the evolution of today‘s tribal/political polities. 
But none of them delve very deeply into the dynamics of local statecraft or explain 
how the local rulers protected their polities for the most part without direct help of a 
great power like Great Britain. Among the historians covering upon the early 
historical formation of the Arabian Gulf states is Ben J. Slot, who concentrates 
mainly on the history of Kuwait‘s formation into a polity. His book, The Origins of 
Kuwait (1991),
15
 explores the early history of Kuwait before it was settled by the 
Utub in the early nineteenth century. However, his account gives the reader only a 
brief (but good) scan of the early history of Kuwait and its settlement by the Utub. It 
does not examine in much detail the intricacies and dynamics of protecting the polity 
against external threats or the dynamics of local statecraft that accompanied it. 
Another work edited by Slot, Kuwait: The Growth of a Historic Identity (2005)
16
, is 
similar to the work above in that it opens with an article by Slot which discusses the 
historical beginning of Kuwait under the Utub. Another article in the book is written 
by Ulrich W. Haarmann, which covers the early historical resources of Kuwait.
17
 
Notwithstanding, the rest of the book does not tells us much of local statecraft or 
self-defence in the first half of the nineteenth century. Slot also wrote The Arabs of 
the Gulf, 1602-1784 (1993).
18
 The work starts with the situation after the ending of 
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Portuguese power in the region. It covers the competition among the Omanis, 
Persians, British and Dutch to dominate the region. Only Chapter 9 examines the rise 
of the Arab shaikhdoms on both the eastern and western littorals of the Gulf after the 
waning of Persian influence after the death of Nader Shah. Though the book is very 
informative, it still gives no in-depth examination of the mechanisms the local rulers 
used to safeguard themselves and their domains. 
Other historical works that have dealt with this period and theme include 
those of Willem Floor and Frederick F. Anscombe. Anscombe‘s work is mostly 
concerned with the Ottomans in the Gulf and the way in which local Gulf polities 
emerged as independent countries after ridding themselves of Ottoman hegemony 
and seeking the protection of the British. This can be seen clearly in his book The 
Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar (1997).
19
 He 
focuses the period from the late nineteenth century till the early twentieth and 
examines how the local rulers of the eponymous states, mere shaikhdoms at the time, 
managed to switch their allegiance from the Ottomans to the British. Therefore it 
does not cover the historical period that this study addresses, from the mid-
eighteenth century to the late nineteenth. Consequently, it understandably does not 
offer us a deep insight into the original formation of the dynasties that created those 
states, with the exception of Qatar which was under the control of the Al Khalifa. 
And it also does not give us information on their political exploits and self-defence 
measures before the ascendancy of the Ottomans and the British in the affairs of the 
Arab littoral of the Gulf. Floor‘s work is slightly different in its perspective. His 
book, The Persian Gulf: Rise of the Gulf Arabs (2007),
20
 discusses only the history 
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of the Arab shaikhdoms of the Persian littoral of the Gulf and their rise to power after 
the decline of Persian power and influence in that region. There is no deep 
examination of the mechanics of statecraft used by the rulers of those shaikhdoms to 
protect their polities. 
There is of course the notable work of J.B. Kelly, Britain and the Persian 
Gulf 1795-1880 (1968).
21
 Kelly offers a deep examination of the relationship of 
Great Britain with the local powers on both littorals of the Gulf at the time, giving 
the observer a good overall idea of some of the dynamics of local statecraft and the 
way that local rulers used military confrontations and political alliances to safeguard 
their domains. It is, for all that, a study about the relationship of Great Britain with 
those local powers, so that Britain‘s role is constantly in focus. Consequently, 
Kelly‘s work does not venture very deeply into the mechanics of statecraft used by 
local rulers around the Gulf at the time. 
Additional resources used in this thesis come from the writings of local Arab 
historians. Some of these historians such as Khalifa al-Nabhani, Nasser al-Khairi and 
Muhammad al-Tajir were not present as eyewitnesses of those events when they 
wrote their historical accounts in the 1920s. Nevertheless, they should not be 
discounted as they are the earliest Bahraini historians known to have written a 
documented account of those events from a Bahraini point, although the motive of 
each one of them was different. Al-Nabhani was commissioned to write his account 
on the request of the Al Khalifa ruling family. Thus it would be safe to say that his 
account represented the official view at the time of the history of the Al Khalifa in 
Bahrain. Nasser al-Khairi‘s account came as a reaction against the work of al-
Nabhani. Al-Khairi clearly states in the introduction of his book that one of the main 
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reasons that prompted him to write his account were the flaws that he said he found 
in al-Nabhani‘s account. Al-Khairi clearly expressed his great respect of al-Nabhani 
despite his disagreement with him and pointed out that quality of work that was 
produced by al-Nabhani was not what would have been expected from a man of his 
calibre.  Al-Tajir on the other hand also states in the introduction of his book that he 
read both of al-Nabhani‘s and al-Khairi‘s account and tried in writing his account to 
remedy the flaws in both of them. Nonetheless, al-Tajir acknowledges that he 
received significant help from al-Khairi in writing his account and thanks him for it 
in his book‘s introduction. It should also be noted that a reader can easily notice that 
al-Tajir almost copied large parts of al-Nabhani and al-Khairi‘s account and he 
clearly points this out a few times of his text. Perhaps it should also be added that al-
Nabhani and al-Khairi were Sunnis were Sunnis and al-Tajir was a Shiite and such 
different backgrounds for each of them could have affected the way they wrote their 
history. All three men based their works on the local oral tradition that was carried 
down about the incidents they documented. Al-Nabhani and al-Khairi in particular 
sought the accounts of various Al Khalifa Shaikhs to incorporate in their work. 
However, it seems that al-Khairi was more critical than al-Nabhani as his account 
usually points to the negative as well to a positive side of an issue and it seems that 
he did not just depend on the oral tradition he heard from the Shaikhs. Another local 
historian whose work was used in writing this thesis was the work of Uthman bin 
Abdullah Ibn Bishr. Ibn Bishr was an official historian of the Saudi Ruling family 
and wrote his historical work in the 1850s. It would be safe to say that Ibn Bishr 
based his account heavily on the Ruling family‘s official account of its history and 
that included their interactions and the conflicts they had had with the Al Khalifa and 
the rest of the Utub. From Oman we have the work of Humayd bin Muhammad Ibn 
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Ruzayq. Similar to Ibn Bishr, Ibn Ruzayq was the official historian of the Al Said 
ruling family of Oman and Zanzibar. Thus, his account is derived mainly from their 
point of view of how various historical events happened and developed. Abdulaziz 
al-Rasheed from Kuwait also wrote his history of Kuwait in the 1920s and his book 
is beneficial in obtaining information about the early history of the Al Khalifa family 
before their immigration from Qatar to Zubarah. He was not an official historian of 
the al-Sabah ruling family in Kuwait but his account was also based on the local oral 
historian tradition. Lastly we have the account of Shaikh Muhammad bin Ahmad al-
Thani. His account, like the other above mentioned accounts, was based on local oral 
history and was documented in the 1950s. Some might argue that such 
documentations of local oral history cannot be reliable as primary sources that are 
based on sources that documented events as they happened. Nevertheless, no one can 
say that those accounts are completely unreliable. It is important to take into 
consideration that they represent the only local historical account available of the 
historical events of the Gulf in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Hence, it is 
important to use them to counterbalance the viewpoint seen in accounts that are 
based on the documentation of events by the British officials present in the Gulf at 
the time when they happened.  If some may argue that some of those local historians 
might have been biased to the ruling families it could be retorted that those same 
officials could have been biased to the interests of their government. The cultural 
barrier also would have resulted in a local historian interpreting an event in a 
different manner than the way a British official would have interpreted it. Therefore, 
for all the above mentioned reasons, it was important to integrate those local 
historical accounts in this thesis. Instances where those accounts agreed and 
disagreed with the accounts documented in the letters, reports, and correspondence 
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of British officials who were present in the Gulf at the time are pointed out in this 
thesis.   
6. Primary Resources 
This study draws upon British, Arabic, Ottoman and Dutch sources, with the bulk of 
the primary sources coming from the British East India Company archival records: 
namely, the Government of Bombay records in the Maharashtra State Archives in 
Mumbai and the India Office records in the British Library in London. These records 
range from correspondence between British officials in the Gulf and India and the 
local Shaikhs to reports written or compiled by British officials. Chief among this 
latter group are the exhaustive books by John G. Lorimer and Jerome A. Saldanha, 
all published in the early twenieth century, as well as the much shorter reports by 
Warden, Hennell, Disbrowe, Seton, Stannus, Willoughby, Brucks, and others 
published in the first half of the nineteenth century. The main obstacle found in these 
publications is that very few of them cover the Al Khalifa and Bahrain before 1820. 
Their coverage of 1820-1850 is much better, but it is not as extensive as the late 
nineteenth century onwards. Notwithstanding, the subject of this study, Shaikh 
Abdullah bin Ahmad, died in 1849 and this leaves a not very large number of British 
documents to work with. Other primary sources used in this thesis is a report that 
was written in 1756 by Baron Otto von Kniphausen for the Dutch East India 
Company in addition to an Ottoman document mentioning the arrival of the Utub 
(tribe of Shaikh Abdullah) to Basra in 1701. Other works that were included were the 
account that Niebuhr has written during his travels in the Gulf region in the 1750s 
and an account written by local Bahraini Cleric, Yusuf bin Ahmad al-Bahrani, who 
was an eye witness to an assault waged by the Utub against Bahrain in 1701.  
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7. Significance and Aims 
This study is intended to be different from the works mentioned above. It 
distinguishes itself from the works of Mai Al Khalifa, James Onley, and traditional 
historians by studying the life and career of Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmad from two 
distinct perspectives. 
First, this is the first study to provide a detailed, comprehensive account of 
Shaikh Abdullah‘s life based on a synthsis of local historical accounts, combined with 
historical records from British records in both Mumbai and London.   
Second, this is the first study to analyse the importance of the political role 
played by Shaikh Abdullah and his family––a role that has been downplayed until 
now.  It is the first to highlight his achievements and the methods he used to reach his 
goals as he played a crucial role in the regional politics of his time. His successes 
helped secure and solidify the position of political power that his family had achieved, 
enabling them to protect their domains from larger regional powers such as the Saudis 
in Najd or the Al Said of Oman, as well as from other local rivals. It is also the first to 
examine his skills in political negotiation and diplomacy to protect himself and his 
dominions from the grave threat of the much larger political forces of Persia and the 
troops of Muhammad Ali Pasha, Viceroy of Egypt.  Finally, it is also one of the first 
studies to shed light on the importance of local statecraft mechanisms used by local 
rulers to protect themselves and their polities from external threats. 
Nonetheless, the limited availability of primary sources, both Arab and 
foreign, has hampered this study. Most historical sources come from the British who 
kept a close eye on Shaikh Abdullah, and carefully examined the regional events of in 
the Gulf. As any researcher on Gulf history will notice, the availability of British 
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primary sources on the Gulf (especially on Bahrain) increases dramatically in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, particularly its closing decades. British material 
regarding the period before 1850 (and especially before 1820) is quite scarce in 
comparison to later periods. Even so, that should not stop researchers from trying to 
examine that period in depth, discerning and reconstructing the sequence of events, 
and analysing their importance to the historical development of the region.  
The study is also the first to explain the reasons for Shaikh Abdullah‘s 
political downfall in 1843 –– a downfall that is surprsing, given his long and 
successful political career. He fell for a variety of reasons –– all connected with,the 
nature of the local politics prevalent among the tribal societies of the Gulf at the time. 
As anyone acquainted with the history of the Gulf region will know, the majority of 
inhabitants of the scattered towns of the time were ‗sedentary Bedouins‘. Even the 
ruling families had Bedouin roots.  Those townsmen maintained (and still maintain) 
many of the Bedouin values of their ancestors despite living in towns and working in 
various professions to achieve their livelihoods. Many of those Bedouin values 
affected and influenced their ways of thinking, their actions and ultimately their 
politics. Thus, elements such as family feuds, the fear of loss of prestige and anger at 
personal insults were influential factors in politics. As this study will show, those 
elements were central to the political downfall of Shaikh Abdullah. His inability to 
restrain the insolence of his numerous sons created a rift between him and his family 
on the one hand and between him and his subjects and tribal allies on the other. This 
enabled his ambitious grand nephew to challenge him and ultimately to overthrow and 
exile him and his sons. The relative ease with which the Shaikh was overthrown, 
bearing in mind the numerous and dangerous foes and challenges that he had earlier 
succeeded in overcoming, is a classic case of how any disregard of the tribal and 
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social values of the time could make any ruler, no matter how powerful, pay a terrible 
price. This study then examines the numerous futile attempts of the Shaikh to retrieve 
his political power until his death in 1849. 
The aim of this study, then, is twofold: first, to shed light on the mechanics of 
local statecraft of war and diplomacy used by the local rulers to protect themselves 
and their domains and, second, to give due credit to Shaikh Abdullah‘s important 
political role in the politics of the Gulf region. Knowledge and appreciation of such a 
role will greatly enhance the understanding of any historian or observer studying the 
history of the Arabian Gulf in the first half of the nineteenth century. 
8. Outline 
Chapter II examines the origins and history of the Al Khalifa family, from the late 
1500s until the death of Shaikh Abdullah‘s father, Shaikh Ahmad bin Muhammad Al 
Khalifa in 1795. Its intention is to give the reader a sound historical background for 
the later chapters as well as an insight into local/tribal state formation in the 
eighteenth century Gulf. It leans towards a descriptive rather than an analytical 
perspective, although analysis does appear where appropriate. The chapter highlights 
the tribal origins of the patriarchal founder of the family, Khalifa al-Kabir, and his 
descent from the tribe of Jumaila. It describes his family‘s emigration from their 
ancestral lands in central Arabia to the shores of the Arabian Gulf, where they joined 
the Bani Utbah (Utub) tribal confederation before settling in the area that would 
become known as Kuwait. It examines the rise to precedence of the founder‘s son, 
Shaikh Muhammad, in Kuwait and his decision to relocate to the town of Zubarah in 
Qatar in the 1760s. Shaikh Muhammad established a power base that enabled him to 
turn Zubarah from a small and unknown town into a regional commercial hub, 
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eventually making it the capital of a new shaikhdom after defeating the Al Musallam 
family, the previous rulers of Qatar and vassals to the powerful Bani Khalid tribe. The 
chapter then examines the rule of his son, Shaikh Khalifa bin Muhammad, and the 
growing prominence that Zubarah gained during his reign. This prominence attracted 
unwanted attention and aggression from the Persian Governor of Shiraz and his 
deputy Shaikh Nasr Al Mathkoor, and their followers in Bushire and Bahrain. The 
chapter looks at the growing tensions between the Al Khalifa and the Persians that 
resulted in a bloody showdown at the Battle of Zubarah in 1782 during Shaikh 
Khalifa‘s absence on a pilgrimage to Mecca, thrusting the crisis upon the shoulders of 
his brother, Shaikh Ahmad, who managed to defeat the Al Mathkoor in a land battle 
near Zubarah. Shaikh Ahmad eventually decided to seize the opportunity that his 
victory granted him, launching a successful campaign against Bahrain in 1783, 
ousting Shaikh Nasr Al Mathkoor‘s forces and adding the isles to his family‘s 
domains. The chapter concludes with the death of Shaikh Ahmad in 1795 and the 
beginning of the reign of his eldest son Shaikh Salman, assisted by his brother Shaikh 
Abdullah, who is the subject of this study. 
Chapter III covers the period of 1795-1821. It examines Shaikh Abdullah‘s 
role as the junior co-ruler of Bahrain and dependencies with his brother, Shaikh 
Salman, the senior co-ruler. It illustrates how local rulers and magnates at the time 
made and broke political alliances in a very volatile regional environment. It also 
reveals how political alliances were based on the principle of pragmatic interests of 
political players, none of whom hesitated to befriend past enemies when 
circumstances dictated. Shaikh Abdullah faced various external threats and 
challenges, described here. His problems started with the first, and successful, 1801 
Omani invasion of Bahrain under the command of Sayyid Said bin Sultan Al Said, 
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who captured Bahrain from the Al Khalifa family. Shaikh Abdullah and his family 
managed to oust them in 1810 with the help of their new allies, the Saudis, only to fall 
victims to those same allies. However, the Shaikh and his family quickly recovered 
and managed to inflict a crushing naval defeat on the Saudis and their allies in 1811. 
The chapter then discusses how Shaikh Abdullah and his family faced a second 
invasion attempt in 1816. It was made by Sayyid Said bin Sultan Al Said, who had 
among his allies the Al Khalifa‘s greatest enemy, Shaikh Rahma bin Jabir al Jalahma. 
Shaikh Abdullah, the Al Khalifa and their allies managed to inflict a signal defeat on 
the invaders and succeeded in repelling the threat. The chapter then shows how the Al 
Khalifa, Bahrain, and its dependencies, became entwined with the expanding British 
Empire when they agreed to sign the General Treaty of 1820 which was under the 
pretext of banning piracy in the Gulf. The chapter ends with the death of Shaikh 
Salman in 1821. 
Chapter IV focuses on Shaikh Abdullah‘s role from 1825 to 1834, when he 
was senior co-ruler with his nephew, Shaikh Khalifa bin Salman, the junior co-ruler. 
It discusses the need for a local ruler to attain military superiority over his foes in 
order to secure his domains against external military threats. Threats were always 
looming, as political alliances shifted and regional circumstances changed. Shaikh 
Abdullah faced three major external threats during this period. First, he had to 
eradicate the archenemy of his family, the infamous warlord Rahma bin Jabir al-
Jalahma. The Shaikh finally neutralised that threat by launching an attack in 1826 in 
which Rahma was killed. The Shaikh‘s second threat was posed by Sayyid Said bin 
Sultan Al Said, Sultan of Oman and Zanzibar. Shaikh Abdullah finally succeeded in 
putting an end to Omani ambitions for Bahrain when he was able to rout Sayyid 
Said‘s troops at the Battle of Gazgaz during their invasion of Bahrain in 1828. The 
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third threat that Shaikh Abdullah‘s had to face during that period was the resurgence 
of the Saudis under Emir Turki bin Abdullah and his son Faisal. He must have 
realized that he could not deal with that threat while he was still in conflict with 
Sayyid Said. This probably prompted him to react to Saudi aggression by trying to 
appease them and showing them signs of homage. He continued this policy until he 
was able to establish a permanent peace agreement with Sayyid Said. The purpose of 
that agreement, as well as to safeguard Bahrain from any future Omani invasion, was 
to block any alliance by the Omanis and Saudis against the Utub of Bahrain. Once 
that was achieved, Shaikh Abdullah took a more militant stand against the Saudis. His 
strategy involved nearly constant naval blockades of the Saudi ports of Qatif and 
Uqair while engaging the enemy in sporadic land battles on the Arabian mainland. 
That policy ensured that the Saudis remained preoccupied with the safety of their 
possessions on the mainland, diverting them from their ambition to seize Bahrain. The 
chapter ends with the death of Shaikh Abdullah‘s nephew and co-Ruler, Shaikh 
Khalifa bin Salman, in 1834. 
Chapter V examines the period between 1834 and 1842, when Shaikh 
Abdullah was assisted in the rulership of Bahrain and its dependencies by his grand 
nephew, Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa bin Salman. The chapter starts with an 
analysis of Shaikh Abdullah‘s methods for dealing with threats from other local 
rulers. It then examines the difficulties that a local ruler at the time had to face when 
contending with domestic issues such as tribal insurgency and the dynastic and 
political intrigue that came with it. The chapter also discusses the local rulers‘ options 
for dealing with threats from much larger political forces—the British, Persians and 
Ottomans. The analyses are intended to give the observer a clear picture of the 
methods used by local rulers of the day to deal with such challenges. 
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The chapter gives the reader an idea of the misdemeanours of the sons of 
Shaikh Abdullah. It reveals how their irresponsible actions caused recurring troubles 
and embarrassments for their father and led to Shaikh Abdullah‘s overthrow. It goes 
on to examine Shaikh Abdullah‘s techniques in maintaining his warfare policy against 
the Saudis by keeping them at bay. He made them preoccupied with the defence of 
their dominions on the Arabian mainland in order to keep their ambitions for Bahrain 
and Qatar at bay. There is a description of Shaikh Abdullah‘s sons‘ conspiracy against 
him and its profound and troubling implications. The sons escaped to Qatar when 
their conspiracy was discovered, but once they had arrived, they conspired with the 
maternal uncle of three of them, Shaikh Isa bin Tarif Shaikh of the al-bin Ali tribe, to 
start an armed revolt in Qatar, where other tribes, including the al-bu-Ainain, joined 
them. This prompted Shaikh Abdullah to send his grand nephew, Shaikh Muhammad 
bin Khalifa, on an expedition against them. They met at the Battle of Huwaila, where 
the rebels were defeated, their allied tribes expelled and Shaikh Muhammad bin 
Khalifa‘s prestige and influence over the sons of Shaikh Abdullah‘s sons much 
enhanced. Nonetheless, the defeated rebels maintained a constant threat to Shaikh 
Abdullah and the maritime trade of Bahrain from their places of exile in the ports and 
on the islands of the Gulf. 
Chapter V continues with a discussion on Shaikh Abdullah‘s way of dealing 
with the threat of Persian encroachment on Bahrain in 1838. The Prince Governor of 
Shiraz sent him a message, calling upon him, as a ―Persian subject‖, to pledge 
allegiance to Qajar Shah of Persia. Shaikh Abdullah thwarted this threat through a 
series of tactical manoeuvres. First, he ended the hostilities between himself and the 
Saudi Emir and agreed to pay a small annual tribute. The Emir, as a quid pro quo, 
agreed to supply Shaikh Abdullah with any troops that the latter required if the 
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Persians did indeed attack Bahrain. The agreement between the Shaikh and the Emir 
also stipulated that the Shaikh would not be obliged to help the Emir in any endeavour 
the latter might undertake against the Sultan of Muscat and Zanzibar. A most probable 
reason for that clause was that the Sultan was an in-law to the Prince of Shiraz and the 
Shaikh might have sought to enable himself to defy the Persian demands and 
neutralise any possible Persian alliance with Sayyid Said. 
Finally, the chapter examines Shaikh Abdullah‘s strategy for dealing with the 
1839 Egyptian campaign in Eastern Arabia. The Shaikh was on the horns of a 
dilemma. On the one hand, Khorshid Pasha (the Egyptian commander) demanded that 
Shaikh Abdullah announce his allegiance to Muhammad Ali Pasha, the Ottoman 
Viceroy of Egypt. On the other hand, the British Resident in the Gulf forbade the 
Shaikh to enter into any treaty with the Egyptians without the Resident‘s advice and 
consent. The Shaikh, who must have felt that the Resident was meddling in his state 
affairs, responded that it was his business, and not the Resident‘s, whether or not he 
entered into treaties with other regional powers. He added that if the British insisted 
that he not enter into any treaty or alliance with the Egyptians, they should be willing 
to guarantee him protection against the latter. The Shaikh was unable to obtain such 
guarantee from the Resident, which prompted him to enter into an alliance with the 
Egyptians on terms beneficial to himself. Shaikh Abdullah successfully played on the 
Egyptian fear that he might enter into an alliance with Persia instead of with them. 
One of the negative outcomes of this episode was that it brought upon the Shaikh the 
anger and resentment of the British Resident in the Gulf. This would manifest itself 
later on, as the Resident would refuse to help Shaikh Abdullah when the latter was in 
dire need of assistance—an episode examined in Chapter VI. 
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Chapter VI examines the period between 1842 and 1849. It reveals more of the 
dynamics of dynastic struggle and tribal insurgency. Threats from within could 
undermine the authority of any ruler, no matter how powerful or successful in 
countering threats from foreign enemies and foes. It was in this period that the 
excesses of the Shaikh‘s sons caused a rupture in the internal cohesion of the Al 
Khalifa family. Many members of the family apparently feared that the political 
situation in Bahrain would deteriorate if, after the death of Shaikh Abdullah, one of 
his sons took over as ruler. One of these was Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa, Shaikh 
Abdullah‘s grand nephew. This political climate enabled Shaikh Muhammad to unite 
most of his immediate family and clan in his cause to overthrow his grand uncle. 
After numerous battles and several twists and turns, Shaikh Muhammad was able to 
oust Shaikh Abdullah and his sons, establishing himself as the absolute ruler of 
Bahrain and its dependencies. Later, the British Resident‘s resentment against Shaikh 
Abdullah, described above, manifested itself when he refused to restrain some 
malcontent Utubs, who resided on the Persian littoral, from joining the cause of 
Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa. The British, who were unsympathetic to the cause of 
Shaikh Abdullah, tried to foil his attempt to ally himself with the Persians. Shaikh 
Abdullah did not give up: he tried to enter into an alliance with the tribal Shaikhs of 
the Trucial Coast, but the British foiled that attempt too. The Shaikh then entered into 
an alliance with the Saudis but Shaikh Muhammad foiled that. 
Shaikh Muhammad tried more than once to reach reconciliation with his grand 
uncle but to no avail. Shaikh Abdullah‘s best chance of defeating Shaikh Muhammad 
was to enter into an alliance with his old foe, Shaikh Isa bin Tarif, Chief of the al-bin 
Ali tribe, even though both Shaikh Abdullah and Isa bin Tarif had their own political 
agendas, as we shall see. Shaikh Muhammad managed to defeat this alliance at the 
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battle of Umm Suwayya, where he faced the allied troops of the Shaikh Abdullah‘s 
sons and Isa bin Tarif, who was slain. The allies were surprised by an unexpected land 
attack from Shaikh Muhammad before the arrival of Shaikh Abdullah at the 
battleground. News of this defeat came as a shock to Shaikh Abdullah—according to 
Lorimer, it came as ―the death blow of Shaikh Abdullah's hopes.‖22 After this battle, 
Shaikh Abdullah went to Muscat to seek the help of his old foe, Sayyid Said. He died 
there, bringing to an end a life full of political challenges and intrigue. 
Chapter VII is the concluding section of this dissertation. It highlights the 
most important themes and elements of the political life of Shaikh Abdullah, and 
illustrates the importance of those themes and elements and their effects on the 
modern history of Bahrain and the Gulf region in general. Of course, such 
implications are important for any historian who seeks to analyse, from a historical 
perspective, the political dynamics that created the modern geo-political structure of 
the Arabian Gulf region. 
  
                                                          
22
 J.G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia, vol. I, historical, part II 
(Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing, 1915), 878. 
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CHAPTER II 
Early History and Foundation of the Al Khalifa 
Family as a Shaikhly Dynasty, 1600s-1795 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter addresses the origins, history and rise to power of the Al Khalifa, the 
Royal Family of Bahrain. It provides the reader with an overall historical background 
to the family and its acquisition of political power and ascendancy in the eighteenth 
century. The chapter examines tribal and economic relations and their effect on the 
formation of political/tribal power at the time. It studies the tactics used by a 
contender aspiring to establish political power for himself and his family—for 
instance, deliberate intermarriage with a carefully chosen tribe could increase a 
contender‘s chances of power and provide the support and manpower needed to 
achieve the family‘s ends. The chapter highlights the way in which a local ruler could 
use local geopolitical circumstances to his advantage, and how economic rivalry and 
competition for trade could trigger armed conflict between local rulers—conflicts that 
expanded the territory of some at the expense of others. Shaikh Abdullah‘s story is a 
fascinating example of how a familial/tribal polity was established in the nineteenth 
century Gulf. This is important for any Gulf historians studying the formation of the 
current Arab Gulf states, as many of the original polities formed in this way were 
transformed into the modern GCC states we see today. 
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The chapter examines how the Al Khalifa managed to establish the roots of 
their current political position in Bahrain and the Gulf region in general. It tracks the 
movements and exploits of the heads of the family, starting with their migration from 
their ancestral home in Central Arabia to the shores of the Arabian Gulf in the late 
1600s and ending with their conquest of Bahrain in 1783. The conquest was led by 
Shaikh Ahmad bin Muhammad Al Khalifa, known as Ahmad al-Fatih (the 
Conqueror), whose victory established Al Khalifa rule in Bahrain, a rule that still 
prevails there. The exploits of the Al Khalifa family heads discussed here include: the 
formation of the al-Utub (or Bani Utbah) tribal alliance and the establishment of 
Kuwait; the migration of Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa al-Kabir (progenitor of the 
Al Khalifa family and father of Shaikh Ahmad) with other sections of the al-Utub 
from Kuwait to Qatar; the establishment there of the town of Zubarah as a commercial 
hub; and the eventual takeover of the peninsula by Shaikh Muhammad and his allies. 
The chapter also discusses the reign of Shaikh Khalifa bin Muhammad bin 
Khalifa al-Kabir, describing how the prosperity of Zubarah at this time made it a 
regional entrepôt and attracted unwanted attention from Persia and regional rivals. It 
goes on to examine the events that led to the attack on Zubarah by Shaikh Nasr al-
Mathkoor, a vassal of Persia who ruled Bahrain and the town of Bushire on the 
Persian coast, and his repulse by Shaikh Ahmad. Finally, the chapter shows how 
Shaikh Ahmad, his brother‘s successor, launched a counterattack on Bahrain from his 
base on Qatar. The success of his attack enabled him to incorporate Bahrain into his 
family‘s domains and firmly established the rule over Bahrain that has continued to 
the present day. 
The conquest of 1783 is a very important historical event, as it effectively 
placed the strategically-located islands of Bahrain under Arab hegemony. Had these 
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islands remained Persian at that time, the geopolitical structure of the Gulf region 
would have been very different today. From a historical perspective, Persian retention 
would probably have had made the spread of British influence in the Gulf region 
much more difficult. From a more contemporary perspective, it would have put the 
Arab states of the Gulf in a much more precarious geopolitical position vis-à-vis Iran 
than it is today. 
2. Origins of the Al Khalifa 
Al Khalifa is a patronymic derived from one of the heads of the family named 
Khalifa. Who was Khalifa and what is his tribal origin? What compelled him and his 
family to leave their ancestral homeland in the Arabian interior and move to the 
shores of the Gulf? According to local and family tradition, Khalifa, known in 
Bahrain as Khalifa al-Kabir (the Great), was a great-grandson of the famous Shaikh 
Faisal al-Jumaili, best known as a poet.
1
 Faisal al-Jumaili ruled the town of al-Haddar 
in the region of al-Aflaj, a large fertile valley 330 Km southwest of Riyadh.
2
 Aflaj 
means ―water that runs from natural springs‖ while the name of the town that he 
ruled, al-Haddar, means ―roaring torrent‖. The area had been known as very rich and 
fertile from ancient times and had the largest ‗lake‘ in the Arabian Peninsula. The 
abundant fertility of this area can be seen from the etymological roots of some of the 
place names. For example, there is an area known as al-Gheel (roughly ―foamy soil‖) 
and a couple of asyah (plural of saih), the local name for ―surface-running ground 
water‖. Another interesting fact about the al-Aflaj area is that the famous traveller and 
                                                          
1
 Nasser Al-Khairi, Qalaid il Nahrain Fi Tarikh al-Bahrayn [The Necklaces of Pearl in the History of 
Bahrain] (Bahrain: al-Ayam Publishing Establishment, 2003 [c.1924]), 212;  
Mai Al Khalifa, Muhammad bin Khalifa al-Ustoorah wal Tarikh al-Muwazi [Muhamad bin Khalifa 
the Legend and the Corresponding History] (Beirut: Dar al-Jadid, 1996), 778; the complete genealogy 
of Shaikh Khalifa al-Kabir is Khalifa bin Ahmad bin Muhammad bin Faisal bin Tammam al-Jumaili. 
2
 Ali Abahussain and Abdullah Al Khalifa, al-Ba ra n „  ra al-Tarikh al-Juz‟a al-Thani (Bahrain 
Through the Ages, Vol II) (Bahrain: The Historical Documents Centre, 2008), 211. 
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Vizier to King Abdulaziz Al Saud, Abdullah Philby, visited al-Aflaj and believed it to 
have been a Phoenician area, having found what he identified as the remains of 
Phoenician graves. 
Another noted fact about the ancestral homeland of the Al Khalifa is that the 
family carried certain place names from there and gave them to places in Qatar and 
Bahrain. Riffa in Bahrain is a good example, named after an area of the same name in 
al-Haddar. Even Qatar, once under the dominion of the Al Khalifa, has an area called 
Al Badea whose name exists in al-Haddar too. The Al Khalifa also named their chief 
fort in Zubarah Sabha, after their ancestral fort in al-Haddar, whose remains can still 
be seen today.
3
 
The ancestors of the Al Khalifa family, then, lived in a large, rich, fertile oasis 
that provided them with comforts denied to neighbouring tribes. Why, then, did they 
leave their ancestral homeland and go out to face an uncertain destiny on the shores of 
the Arabian Gulf? Many hypotheses exist, and historical accounts differ greatly, 
sometimes even contradicting each other. The Bahraini historian Khalifa al-Nabhani 
acknowledges that the reasons prompting the family of Khalifa al-Kabir to migrate 
from their ancestral homeland are ―unknown and mysterious‖.4 
One account holds that the area experienced a severe and prolonged drought, 
causing famine and making life very difficult in al-Aflaj.
5
 This is not readily 
acceptable, as al-Aflaj was considered one of the most fertile areas in Central Arabia, 
so even very difficult conditions are unlikely to have prompted the shaikhs of the area 
to leave while a large section of the population stayed behind. 
                                                          
3
 Mai Al Khalifa, Muhammad bin Khalifa, 239-243; Abahussain and Al Khalifa, Abdullah, al-Ba ra n 
„  ra al-Tarikh, 209. 
4
 Khalifa Al-Nabhani, Attuhfah Annabhaniya Fi Tarikh Al Jazira Al Arabya [The Nabhani Masterpiece 
in the History of the Arabian Peninsula] (Beirut: Dar Ehyaa al-uluum, 1986 [c.1922]), 82. 
5
 Mai Al Khalifa, Muhammad bin Khalifa, 244. 
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Another theory can be found in the account of the Bahraini historian Nasser 
al-Khairi. He proposes that the family of Khalifa al-Kabir migrated because of the 
instability of the region of Najd, a very troublesome and volatile region before it came 
under the political control of the Al Saud family. Many Arabian clans there disliked it 
and sought to migrate to safer, more peaceful lands like the Gulf coast, Iraq and 
Syria.
6
 However, this explanation is not entirely satisfactory, as Najd was a 
troublesome region even during the times of Khalifa al-Kabir‘s ancestors. So what 
compelled him, his brother, kinsmen and followers to emigrate? 
Other historians propose different reasons. The prevalent explanation is that 
the impetus to migrate arose from internal disputes within the Jumaila tribe. 
Apparently, those disputes escalated to armed conflict within different factions of 
Jumaila and their allies, including al-Duwasir. The histories of Mai Al Khalifa and 
Abdulaziz al-Rasheed, partially derived from various local oral accounts, claim that 
those disputes prompted the migration. According to these accounts, Khalifa al-
Kabir‘s branch quarrelled with, and defeated, another branch of Jumaila. The losers 
sought revenge by allying themselves with a clan of the al-Duwasir tribe called Al 
Hasan.
7
 That alliance managed to defeat Khalifa al-Kabir‘s branch and forced them to 
face a new reality. Their choice was to remain in al-Haddar, under new conditions that 
they might have seen as demeaning, or to migrate. They chose the latter. Both these 
historians rely on the narration of Shaikh Ibrahim bin Mohammed bin Khalifa Al 
Khalifa, son of the fourth ruler of Bahrain. This explanation may tie in with the 
drought theory: if a drought and famine had indeed occurred, it might have limited the 
                                                          
6
 Nasser Al-Khairi, Qalaid il Nahrain Fi Tarikh al-Bahrayn [The Necklaces of Pearl in the History of 
Bahrain] (Bahrain: al-Ayam Publishing Establishment, 2003 [c.1924]),  211-212. 
7
 Mail Al Khalifa, Muhammad bin Khalifa al-Ustoorah wal Tarikh al-Muwazi, 245; Abdulaziz al-
Rasheed, Tarikh al-Kuwayt [The History of Kuwait] (Beirut: Dar al-hayat, 1978[1926]), 107. 
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normally abundant resources of the fertile valley and hence helped intensify the 
internal al-Jumaila disputes. 
3. Migration to the Gulf and Formation of the Bani Utbah 
(al-Utub) Tribal Alliance 
Nobody can set an exact date for the migration of Khalifa al-Kabir and his family, 
ancestors of the Al Khalifa, to the shores of the Gulf, nor is there a reliable detailed 
account of their entry into a compact that formed the tribal alliance known as Bani 
Utbah or al-Utub.
 8
 Nevertheless, most historians agree that the migration happened in 
the second half of the seventeenth century.
9
 The path of migration took the heads of 
the family out of the central plateau of Najd to the oasis region of Hasa in Eastern 
Arabia. From there they travelled to the peninsula of Qatar.
10
 They remained there for 
several years, the probable period of the establishment of Bani Utbah tribal 
confederation. The Utub included tribes that were present in the region before the 
arrival of Khalifa al-Kabir and his family, and paramount among them was the al-bin 
Ali tribe.
11
  
                                                          
8
 Abahussain and Al Khalifa, Abdullah, al-Ba ra n „a ra al-tārīk al-juz‟a al-thani, 202; Mai Al 
Khalifa, Muhammad bin Khalifa, 246-247; Muna Ghazal, Tarikh al-Utub; Al Khalifa Fi Al Bahrayn, 
1700-1970 [The History of the Utub: The Al Khalifa in Bahrain, 1700-1970] (Bahrain: al-Mitb‘ah al-
Sharqiyah, 1991), 41. 
9
 There is evidence which can be found in local oral historical accounts and traditions and in a poem 
attributed to Faisal al-Jumaili the distant agnatic ancestor that suggests otherwise. In his poem Faisal 
denunciates his adversaries who forced him and his clan to leave their ancestral home in al-Haddar 
and he describes his lament that when he arrived in Iraq no one knew who he really was and did not 
afford him the appreciation and respect that he felt he deserved. The aforementioned lament of Faisal 
is a very common cultural theme of the predicaments that Arab nobility had to face when fortune 
turns against them and they are forced to migrate to new lands. The aforementioned evidence 
suggests that the immigration of the ancetors of the Al Khalifa took place in the 1580s under the 
leadership of Faisal himself and first headed to Iraq. However the historical details become unclear 
after that only starts to resurface in the early 1700s. Nevertheless such evidence needs to be 
researched and studied more to be verified. 
10
  Ibid 
11
 Ibid 
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Francis Warden claims that the formation of the Bani Utbah alliance took 
place in Kuwait in the year 1716 AD.
12
 However, this contradicts other accounts such 
as that of Yousif al-Bahrani (1696-1772), a Shiite cleric born and resident in Bahrain. 
Al-Bahrani claims in his book Lu'alu'at al-Bahrayn that the Utub attacked Bahrain in 
1112 AH (1701). This compelled the Shiite Shaikh of Islam in the island to ask help 
from the Huwala
13
 to repel those attacks.
14
 Al-Bahrani's account is confirmed by an 
Ottoman document that also dates to the year 1701. The Ottomans describe the Utub 
as a large force of nearly 2,000 households who owned nearly 150 ships armed with 
light artillery.
15
 It is a fair deduction that these two accounts clearly indicate that the 
Utub tribal alliance was firmly established by the late seventeenth century. According 
to the Ottoman account, the Utub left for Basra after their conflict with the Huwala 
and stayed there for an unspecified but short while before moving to and settling in 
the area known today as Kuwait.
16
 Hence, the earlier account of Francis Warden is 
probably more accurate about the date of the establishment of Kuwait than it is about 
the formation of the Bani Utbah tribal alliance. The Bahraini historian Nasser al-
Khairi places the arrival of the Utub at Kuwait in the year 1120 AH (1708). Another 
Bahraini historian, Muhammad Ali al-Tajir, does not place an exact date on the 
arrival, but he does note that it was in the early twelfth Hijri century, which would 
make it in the early 1700s. However, both historians disagree on whether Shaikh 
                                                          
12
 Francis Warden, ―Historical Sketch of the Uttoobee Tribe of Arabs‖; (Bahrein;)”, in Arabian Gulf 
Intelligence, Selections of the Records of the Bombay Government, no. xxiv, new series. Ed. R.H. 
Thomas (Bombay: Bombay Education Society Press, 1856; reprinted Cambridge:  The Oleander 
Press, 1985), 362.  
13
 A common term used for Arab tribes that lived on the Persian littoral of the Gulf. 
14
 Yousif al-Bahrani, Lu'alu'at al-Bahrayn Fi al-Ijazat Wa Tarajum Rejal al Hadith [The Pearl of 
Bahrain in Licences and the Biographies of Men of the Hadith] (Bahrain: Fakhrawi Bookshop, 2008 
[c.1768] ), 425. 
15
 Ottoman document: Journal 713, Hukim 2518, 1113 AH (1701 AD), Mission Booklet 111; Letter of 
Ali Pasha Governor of Basra to Ottoman Sultan as cited in Ali Abahussain, ―A Study of the History 
of the Utub‖, Al-Watheeka 1 (July 1982), 25-42; Quoted in B. J. Slot, The Origins of Kuwait (Leiden: 
E. J. Brill, 1991), 70. 
16
 B. J. Slot, The Origins of Kuwait, 71 
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Ahmad bin Muhammad, father of Shaikh Khalifa al-Kabir, was alive and one of the 
Utub leaders at the time of the settlement according to al-Tajir,
17
 or whether it was 
Shaikh Khalifa al-Kabir himself, not his father, who was one of the Utub leaders 
overseeing the settlement of Kuwait according to al-Khairi.
18
 Shaikh Khalifa al-Kabir 
in turn would have two sons, Shaikh Muhammad, who founded the dynasty, and 
Shaikh Fadhil, who founded the Al Fadhil family known in Bahrain today.
19
 
The evidence cited above allows us to deduce that the heads of the Al Khalifa 
family migrated from their Central Arabian ancestral home, al-Haddar, to the regions 
of Hasa and Qatar in Eastern Arabia in the second half of the seventeenth century. It 
was there that they participated in the formation of the al-Utub tribal alliance, which 
established itself as a regional naval power. From there they migrated to the upper 
Gulf after clashes with other regional powers such as the Huwala Arabs. They tried to 
settle in Basra in Ottoman Iraq for a short while before they decided to leave; finally 
settling in Kuwait, a then barren and empty region, but one that afforded them a good 
                                                          
17
 Muhammad al-Tajir, Aqd al-laʼal fi tarikh  wal [The Necklace of Pearls in the History of Awal] 
(Bahrain: al-Ayam Publishing Establishment, 1994 [1925]), 101. 
18
 Al-Khairi, Qalaid il Nahrain, 212. 
19
 Bashar al-Hadi, Al Fadhil al-Utub Wa Dawruhum al-Siyassi wal Ijtimaei fi al-Khaleej al- ra i  ‟ala 
Madaa Thalathat Quroon 1700-2000 [Al Fadhil al-Utub and their Political and Social Role in the 
Arabian Gulf 1700-2000] (Bahrain: unknown Publisher, 2009), 20 and 32-33. Although the field of 
genetic geneaology is still young but it helped to further assure this agnatic relationship. There 
currently exists Y DNA genetic tests that compares between genetic the Y chromosomes of two 
males to establish if they have an agnatic relationship or not and if yes how far back in time..The 
author of this thesis whose full name is Abdulaziz bin Muhammad bin Hasan bin Ali bin Muhammad 
bin Khalifa bin Salman bin Ahmad al-Fatih bin Muhammad bin Khalifa al-Kabir took such a test as 
did his friend Muhammad bin Hamad bin Nasser bin Abdullah bin Hamad bin Nasser bin Hamad bin 
Mubarak bin Khalifa bin Mubarak bin Khalifa bin Fadhil bin Khalifa al-Kabir as well as Salah bin 
Ali bin Muhammad bin Mubarak bin Hamad bin Mubarak bin Khalifa bin Mubarak bin Khalifa bin 
Fadhil bin Khalifa al-Kabir. The test confirmed that the three participants were agnatic cousins who 
shared a common ancestor roughly ten to twelve generations ago. The testing was done by Family 
Tree DNA (FTDNA) company. The results of the two individuals can be accessed through two 
public databases found at: 
    http://www.familytreedna.com/public/Bani_Utbah_al-Utub/default.aspx?section=yresults,,  
    http://www.familytreedna.com/public/Arab_T/default.aspx?section=yresults and at 
http://www.familytreedna.com/public/Y-Haplogroup-K2/default.aspx?section=yresults. Kit number 
for Abdulaziz Al Khalifa is E5174, Kit number for Muhammad Al Fadhil is M7046 and Kit number 
for Salah Al Fadhil is 233525.  There are also results for other Utbi families in the Bani Utbah 
FTDNA project such as those of the Ruling family of Kuwait, the al-Sabah, al-Ghatam, al-Jalahma, 
al-Zayed, al-bin Ali, and al-Roumi. 
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naval base, in the early 1700s. The years between then and the mid-1700s were not 
very eventful ones for the Al Khalifa family, who were apparently heavily engaged in 
maritime commerce and the pearl trade. Those business activities and the relative 
stability offered by the port of Kuwait enabled the family to amass a very large 
fortune. That, coupled with their lineage, enabled them to enjoy a great deal of 
political power and influence within Kuwait. This is confirmed by a report made for 
the Dutch East India Company in 1756 that describes Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa 
al-Kabir as being wealthier than the paramount Shaikh in Grien (as Kuwait was 
known at the time), Mubarak bin Sabah.
20
 It also states that both Shaikhs had equal 
power and authority over the Bani Utbah in Grien.
21
 Nevertheless, as the historical 
narrative reveals, Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa al-Kabir did not remain in Kuwait 
for long after 1756, as he emigrated with his nephew Shaikh Khalifa bin Fadhil bin 
Khalifa and many followers to Qatar. At the time, Qatar was under the control of the 
al-Musallam family, vassals to the Bani Khalid in Hasa.
22
 It was in Qatar that Shaikh 
Muhammad succeeded in establishing the Al Khalifa as a dynastic political force in 
the Gulf region. He established the town of Zubarah as a commercial hub and then 
wrested control of Qatar from the al-Musallam family. 
                                                          
20
 This Shaikh is not mentioned in the modern official history of the al-Sabah family in Kuwait as one 
of the early rulers, although the family tree of the dynasty shows him as one of the sons of Shaikh 
Sabah I, founder of the al-Sabah dynasty as the ruling family in Kuwait. 
21
 Tido von Kniphausen and Jan van der Hulst, as quoted and reprinted in Willem Floor, The Persian 
Gulf: The Rise of the Gulf Arabs, The Politics of Trade on the Persian Littoral 1747-1792, Chapter 
2: A Description of the Persian Gulf in 1756 [1756] (Washington DC: Mage Publishers, 2007), 34-
35. 
22
 Fa‘iq Tahbub, Tarikh al-Ba ra n al-Siyasi, 1783-1870 [The Political History of Bahrain, 1783-1870] 
(Kuwait: Manshurat Dhat al-Salasil, 1983), 44; see also Carsten Niebuhr, Travels Through Arabia 
and Other Countries in the East vol ii, Translated by Robert Heron (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Library, 2009 [1792]), 128. Niebuhr did not exactly say that the al-Musallam were rulers 
of Qatar but said: ―Between the Territories of the Schiech (Shaikh) of Lachsa (Hasa), and the 
dominions of the Sovereign of Oman, are a numerous tribe, denominated Al Musallim, and 
possessing several considerable towns, the names of which are unknown to me.‖ 
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4. Immigration to Qatar: Establishment of Zubarah and 
Dynastic Power 
Why Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa al-Kabir migrated from Kuwait to Zubarah 
cannot be stated with absolute certainty. Traditional historical accounts vary. A 
possible reason, according to al-Nabhani‘s account, was that he was annoyed by the 
continued aggressions of the Bani Ka‘ab Chiefs, who ruled Muhamarah on the 
Persian littoral opposite Kuwait.
23
 Another possible reason is that Shaikh Muhammad, 
who had become a very rich and powerful man in Kuwait, had political ambitions that 
he felt he could not achieve by staying in Kuwait, so he chose to migrate. A new area 
would enable him to achieve his objectives and ambitions without damaging the 
family and tribal bonds between him and the al-Sabah family. Francis Warden differs, 
giving the reason for the migration decision as the desire of the Al Khalifa family 
head, who was also head of the mercantile branch of the Bani Utbah in Kuwait, not to 
share his accumulated wealth with the other Utub Chiefs in Kuwait. Allegedly, this 
prompted him to leave for Qatar where he managed to establish himself as an 
independent political chieftain.
24
 Whatever the real reason or reasons driving Shaikh 
Muhammad to go to Qatar, it can be said with a fair amount of certainty that the 
migration took place after 1756. Shaikh Muhammad chose to relocate to an 
unspecified location near Zubarah, which at the time was a small town on the 
northeastern coast of Qatar, and make it his new home. 
The inhabitants of Zubarah and its neighbouring towns and villages were a 
mixture of various tribes and clans. The largest and most prominent among them was 
the tribe of al-bin Ali, descending from the ancient Arabian tribe of Bani Sulaim, but 
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 Al-Nabhani, Attuhfah Annabhaniya, 82. 
24
 Warden, ―Historical Sketch of the Uttoobee Tribe of Arabs‖, 362-363. 
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also part of the Bani Utbah. They had emigrated from Kuwait at an earlier time and 
settled in Zubarah. The chief of the tribe at the time was Amr bin Juma‘a bin 
Muhammad bin Ali.
25
 After settling in Zubarah, Shaikh Muhammad apparently 
succeeded in gaining popularity and the respect of its inhabitants, and this was 
probably what prompted the tribes in and around the town to send him a delegation 
asking him to assume the role of chieftainship over them. Apparently, this offer 
worried Shaikh Muhammad, possibly because he feared that it would attract unwanted 
attention from and/or provoke the al-Musallam family who ruled Qatar at the time 
from their capital at Huwaila, also in northeastern Qatar. This family, as stated above, 
were vassals to the powerful Bani Khalid tribe that controlled most of Eastern Arabia 
at the time.
26
 It is probable that this fear caused the Shaikh to refuse the offer, but the 
people of Zubarah tried again. They seem to have pointed out that his vast wealth and 
prestige among the tribes was not unnoticed by the wary eyes of the al-Musallam. 
They argued that if he came to live with them, their union would make them a force 
that the al-Musallam would have to reckon with. Shaikh Muhammad then decided to 
seek the advice of his nephew Shaikh Khalifa bin Fadhil and his other kinsmen and 
followers. They advised him to accept the offer.
27
 It is quite possible that Shaikh 
Muhammad refused the initial offer made by them not out of fear of reprisals from the 
al-Musallam family, but because he was driven by another political motive—to test 
that the people of Zubarah really did want him as their Shaikh. He may have believed 
that immediate acceptance would have led them to take him for granted, so that he 
would have been unable to rally their support and obedience if he needed them in a 
dire political situation or in any endeavour that might have furthered his political 
interests and ambitions. 
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Shaikh Muhammad told the people of Zubarah that he accepted their offer 
under certain conditions. We have no historical record of the precise details of these 
conditions, but there is agreement that their purpose was the well-being and common 
interest of all parties involved.
28
 When Shaikh Muhammad arrived in Zubarah and 
became its Shaikh, he had a wife from the al-Sabah family with whom he had one 
son, Khalifa, as well as a wife from the al-bin Ali tribe with whom he had two sons, 
Ahmad—later known as Ahmad al-Fatih (Ahmad the Conqueror)—and Migrin. He 
now married a third woman, from the al-bu Kuwara clan, who gave him two sons, 
Ibrahim and Ali.
29
 It is highly likely that this polygamy cemented the relationship of 
Shaikh Muhammad with the people of Zubarah and its tribes through a strong bond of 
blood and family. 
Shaikh Muhammad probably realized that if he wanted to achieve any of his 
political ambitions he would need the tribal support that was then (and still is, largely) 
a very important political factor in the Gulf region. However, although he was an 
immigrant of noble lineage, he had no great tribal support in Qatar from his direct 
paternal line, so he would have raise it himself, by marrying into selected tribes. 
These tribes would be the ‗maternal uncles‘ of his sons and would thus have probably 
felt obliged, even if not willing, to fight for him. In this way, he created a strong base 
of tribal support that would later be of valuable benefit to him and his successors. 
Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa al-Kabir had five sons and a few daughters (his 
nephew, Shaikh Khalifa bin Fadhil, had five sons too), though we are sure neither of 
the number of his wives, nor from which tribes they came.
30
 The progeny of the two 
men grew into two families, with today‘s Al Khalifa springing from Shaikh 
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Muhammad bin Khalifa al-Kabir, and today‘s Al Fadhil from Shaikh Khalifa bin 
Fadhil bin Khalifa al-Kabir. During the lifetimes of these two men, both families were 
under the leadership of Shaikh Muhammad. 
According to al-Khairi, Shaikh Mohammed bin Khalifa adopted the policy of 
development in Zubarah. He funded the construction of a Grand Mosque and several 
smaller mosques. He also built and funded schools and constructed hostels for 
merchants arriving for trade in Zubarah.
31
 It is probable that his personal charisma and 
character made Zubarah an attractive centre of commerce, pearl trading and learning, 
and people from all over Qatar and Eastern Arabia sought to live there. With this 
impetus, Zubarah grew from a relatively small, unknown town to a large commercial 
hub in the region.
32
 Not surprisingly, this caught the unwanted attention of the al-
Musallam, but Shaikh Muhammad, who appears to have been both cunning and wise, 
must have realized that diplomacy and shrewdness would achieve his goal. He 
probably pretended to submit to al-Musallam authority and kept paying them an 
annual tribute, showered them with gifts and fostered (at least on the surface) 
excellent relations with them. At the same time, he wasted no opportunity to sow 
discord among them and even deceive them when necessary.
33
 
The Shaikh probably used all of these tactics to buy the time for his town to 
grow in population and prosperity, and to increase his own financial ability and 
strength. That increased ability most likely enabled him to attract allegiance and fealty 
from an ever-increasing number of Qatari tribes. It was probably when he felt that his 
political position was secure that he built a formidable fort, which he named Sabha 
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after his family‘s ancestral fort in al-Haddar34 (the Zubarah fort also became known as 
Murair
35
). Shaikh Muhammad also dug a water channel, guarded by fortified walls 
and watchtowers, to provide Zubarah with a secure and direct connection to the sea.
36
 
His apparent purpose was not only to make the town safe and secure its trade and 
livelihood, but also to prepare it for a long-term siege. The secured water channel 
would have made any land siege of Zubarah difficult while allowing small boats to 
smuggle provisions into the town with relative ease. The fort and its supporting 
outworks were completed by 1766 (1182 AH). 
It was probably when Shaikh Muhammad had gained sufficient confidence in 
his strength that he dared to defy the al-Musallam family and suspend his annual 
tribute. The political situation in Hasa at the time might well have bolstered his 
decision, as internal conflict and quarrels over chieftainship had destroyed unity and 
weakened the powerful Bani Khalid tribal confederation, overlords of the al-
Musallam family.
37
 The al-Musallam would have been unable to call upon the Bani 
Khalid for support, being forced to rely solely on their sources and allies in Qatar to 
combat any threat. Shaikh Muhammad‘s tribute suspension naturally angered the al-
Musallam, who threatened him with grim consequences if he did not stop his 
insurrection. The Shaikh remained defiant and the situation quickly turned hostile as 
armed conflict erupted between the al-Musallam of Huwaila and the Al Khalifa and 
their allies in Zubarah.
38
 After a strenuous conflict, which the details of do not appear 
in written historical accounts, a final showdown took place near a town called 
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Sumaisma, north of modern-day Doha.
39
 It was in that battle that Shaikh Muhammad 
was finally able to destroy the forces and power of the al-Musallam family. After his 
victory, Shaikh Muhammad declared himself the ruler of Qatar and demanded 
submission and homage from the local shaikhs, all of whom acknowledged him and 
submitted to his authority.
40
 This victory firmly established Shaikh Muhammad bin 
Khalifa al-Kabir as the founder of the Al Khalifa dynasty and ruler of Qatar. Zubarah 
served as the capital, becoming the political centre of a new shaikhdom whose ruler 
was interested in promoting its trade and commerce. See Figure 1.
41
 
However, Shaikh Muhammad‘s economic ambitions were not easily achieved, 
as an unexpected political obstacle blocked his way, the first of several challenges to 
the Al Khalifa family‘s authority throughout its political history. That threat did not 
come from strangers but from people of the Bani Utbah. It came from the Shaikh‘s 
own tribal confederation—the al-Jalahma family. 
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Figure 1: Dependencies of the Al Khalifa Family in Qatar 
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5. The Challenge of the al-Jalahma 
It is important to examine this early political challenge to the authority of the newly-
established Al Khalifa dynasty, as the challenge and its ramifications caused recurring 
political and military threats from Rahma, the notorious warlord and archenemy of the 
Al Khalifa. The seeds of this enmity were sown during the episode described in this 
section. 
Shaikh Muhammad‘s political success in establishing himself as the ruler of 
Qatar, coupled with his economic success in making Zubarah a commercial entrepôt, 
attracted the attention of his tribal cousins in Kuwait. After Shaikh Muhammad had 
left Kuwait, its politics rested in the hands of two families, the al-Sabah and the al-
Jalahma. Tension, generated by political and economic rivalry, appears to have grown 
between them. The conflict persisted until the al-Sabah expelled the al-Jalahma from 
Kuwait altogether. The al-Jalahma sought and acquired refuge from their kinsmen in 
Zubarah. A few years later, however, they apparently tried to compete with the Al 
Khalifa for political power.
42
 Under the command of their chief, Jabir bin Athbi al-
Jalahma,
43
 the al-Jalahma moved out of Zubarah, settling at Ruwais, to the northeast. 
They increased and strengthened their fleet there before starting to engage in hostile 
activities against Zubarah and the Al Khalifa with naval attacks and raids.
44
 
Aggression like this would naturally have affected Zubarah‘s commerce and 
prosperity and put in jeopardy all Shaikh Muhammad‘s efforts to achieve his political 
and economic status. Shaikh Muhammad and his family must have felt compelled to 
crush this new threat before it developed into an all-engulfing danger. The Al Khalifa 
amassed a large force and successfully counter-attacked the al-Jalahma. During a 
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fierce battle, many al-Jalahma men were killed, including their chief, Jabir bin Athbi, 
though his son Rahma managed to escape, along with some of his brothers.
45
 
Their victory over the al-Jalahma consolidated the Al Khalifa family‘s 
position as the chief political force in Qatar, but brought upon itself the animosity of a 
dangerous and resilient archenemy: Rahma, son of the rebel Jabir bin Athbi. As this 
dissertation reveals, Rahma would play an important role in the political and military 
challenges against the Al Khalifa family and Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmad al-Fatih in 
particular. Rahma is an important political icon, worthy of close examination by any 
student of the history the Gulf. 
6. The Rise of Zubarah 
With the al-Jalahma threat neutralised, Shaikh Muhammad resumed his efforts to 
advance the trade and commerce of Zubarah. The town, now the centre of a new 
shaikhdom, benefited commercially from some unexpected events that brought it, and 
the Shaikh, undreamed-of wealth. Zubarah was transformed into a very important 
town and regional trade hub, following the old Arab proverb ―The fortune of some 
people lies in the misfortune of others.‖ 
Basra, the richest port city in the Gulf region and a major trade hub, was 
struck by plague in the spring of 1773. According to some estimates and reports, a 
death rate of between 3,000 and 7,000 people a day ended more than 200,000 lives in 
Basra and its neighbouring areas.
46
 This figure would be astounding today; it was 
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even more so then, and Basra‘s position as a commercial hub was compromised. 
Worse was to follow. On 16 March 1775, Karim Khan Zand, ruler of Persia, invaded 
Iraq, sending an army under the command of his brother, Sadiq Khan, to capture 
Basra. The city held out for more than thirteen months, but capitulated in April 1776, 
inaugurating a Persian occupation of Basra that lasted until 1779.
47
 
Shaikh Muhammad must have realized that much of the business traffic that 
went into the port of Basra would need another hub for its business activities, so he 
promoted Zubarah as a promising alternative trading hub and business centre. His 
success quickly made Zubarah a major commercial centre, especially as the merchants 
apparently found Shaikh Muhammad‘s lax trade laws, as well as a virtually non-
existent tariff and tax policy, very attractive.
48
 A proverb coined at the time reflects: 
Kharab al-Basra  ‟amaar al-Zubarah (Basra‘s demise is Zubarah‘s Splendour).49 
Events on the Arabian mainland may also have helped Zubarah‘s prosperity 
and population growth. Uraier bin Dujain, chief of the Bani Khalid tribe, the major 
power in Eastern Arabia, campaigned against his enemies in Najd. The campaign 
caused much damage in many Najdi areas and prompted many of its inhabitants, 
among them some wealthy merchants, to emigrate to Zubarah.
50
 Shortly after the 
military campaign, its instigator died and a quarrel of succession erupted between his 
sons. This brought much instability to the area around Hasa, and many of its 
inhabitants, including scholars, poets, merchants and artisans, moved to Zubarah.
51
 
Even people from Bahrain, which at the time was ruled, along with Bushire on the 
Persian littoral, by the Al Mathkoor family headed by the Persian vassal Shaikh Nasr, 
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were attracted by the thriving economic and social conditions of Zubarah. Many 
immigrated or at least shifted a large portion of their business to it.
52
 All these factors 
helped Zubarah grow into a magnificent town, both commercially and culturally, and 
its ruler, Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa, to become very rich and powerful. As we 
shall see, this civic and personal success aroused jealousy and unwanted attention. 
7. Escalating Tensions 1777-1782 
Chief among those that envied Zubarah its success and splendour was Shaikh Nasr Al 
Mathkoor, Persian vassal and ruler of Bahrain and Bushire. Persia at the time was 
under the Zand dynasty, headed by Karim Khan Zand. Shaikh Nasr was by origin a 
Sunni Arab, descended from the Matareesh tribe whose roots were in Oman, but who 
had migrated to Bushire on the Persian littoral of the Gulf in about 1646. By the mid 
1700s, the Al Mathkoor family became Persian vassals, first to the Afsharid dynasty 
of Iran and then to the Zand dynasty, and were the rulers of Bushire. In 1753, Al 
Mathkoor added Bahrain to their dominions and agreed to pay the ruler of Iran, Karim 
Khan Zand, an annual tribute of 4,000 tomans.
53
 The Al Mathkoors took very little 
notice of the growing power of the Utub in Zubarah under the leadership of Shaikh 
Muhammad Bin Khalifa al-Kabir, and were not particularly alarmed at first by his 
1766 seizure of political control in Qatar. Possibly they were indifferent because they 
controlled the strategically and economically stronger dominions of Bahrain and 
Bushire. That unconcern vanished with the rapid rise of Zubarah as a commercial 
centre in direct contention with Bahrain; even Bahrainis had started to view Zubarah 
as preferable to Bahrain as a commercial hub. There can be little doubt that such 
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success inflamed the envy of the Al Mathkoor family, who most likely viewed 
Zubarah as an annoying and unwanted economic competitor. 
The wealth of Zubarah also caught the attention of Karim Khan Zand, founder 
of the Zand dynasty in Iran, who saw it as the possessor of the wealth he had tried to 
acquire by invading Basra. Those riches had evaded him and found a safe haven in 
Zubarah, so in 1777 he ordered his vassal, Shaikh Nasr Al Mathkoor, to invade 
Zubarah and add it to the dominions of the Persian crown. Shaikh Nasr launched a 
campaign to capture Zubarah in 1777, but failed completely and was forced to call the 
invasion off.
54
 His defeat did not quench his desire, and he was anxious to try again. 
He was hampered by Karim Khan Zand‘s death in 1779 and the ensuing civil war of 
succession among factions of the Zand dynasty. He made a couple of attempts 
between 1779 and 1781, but all ended in failure.
55
 This aggression must have 
increased the tension between the Al Khalifa and Al Mathkoor families, and it 
triggered, later on, a conflict that would end in a military showdown between the two 
families—a showdown whose outcome would have immense and profound 
geopolitical effects on the whole Gulf region. 
Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa al-Kabir, founder and head of the Al Khalifa 
dynasty, died in 1778 (1192 AH) after a long, eventful and successful life.
56
 He must 
have been a man of extraordinary calibre and ability to create a shaikhdom for himself 
and his family in a place where only two decades or so earlier he was a relative 
stranger from Kuwait. In that short period, he was able to make himself a chief, 
transforming a relatively unknown settlement on the shores of the Qatar to one of the 
most important commercial and cultural centres of its time. 
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8. Reign of Shaikh Khalifa bin Muhammad Al Khalifa, 
1778-1782 
Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa al-Kabir was succeeded by his eldest son, Shaikh 
Khalifa bin Muhammad Al Khalifa. Shaikh Khalifa is described by historians as a 
man of great integrity, intellect and sound character.
57
 He was a well-known religious 
scholar and a well-read, capable jurist of the Maliki school of jurisprudence in Sunni 
Islam as well as a famous poet and patron of literature.
58
 Such characteristics in the 
Shaikh would have naturally made him much beloved to his subjects and no less 
charismatic than his late father. In fact, while most people viewed him as a very pious 
man, others allegedly thought that he had the supernatural and paranormal powers 
associated with some Sufi mystics.
59
 During his reign, he continued to pursue his 
father‘s vision. Zubarah continued to grow and develop economically and culturally, 
its leaders capitalising on the chaos and instability that had struck Basra and Hasa by 
marketing the town as a suitable alternative commercial hub. The reign of Shaikh 
Khalifa also witnessed further clashes with Shaikh Nasr Al Mathkoor, who was 
repulsed on every occasion. 
These successes notwithstanding, another threat had emerged during the reign 
of Shaikh Khalifa bin Muhammad. It came not from the Gulf region, but from Najd, 
central plateau of the Arabian Peninsula. Wahhabism was an alliance between an 
ultra-conservative Hanbali shaikh, Muhammad bin Abdulwahab al-Tamimi, and a 
local shaikh in southeastern Najd called Mohammed bin Saud. Ibn Saud, founder of 
the Al Saud dynasty, was the ruler of a small town called Diriyah.Within a few years 
that religious/political alliance turned into one of the most formidable geopolitical 
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forces in the Arabian Peninsula.
60
 Shaikh Khalifa disapproved of Wahhabism from an 
ideological standpoint, although the political ramifications and threats that 
Wahhabism could bring upon his shaikhdom might have exacerbated his distaste for 
it. In one of his known poems, he criticised Wahhabism as: ―a Bida‟h (False or 
harmful innovation according to Islamic jurisprudence) that has been unheard of, 
which accuses of blasphemy all mankind, even monotheists (Unitarians)….‖ As 
history shall reveal, Shaikh Khalifa‘s criticism and fear of the Wahhabi movement 
were well justified.
61
 The religious/political movement of Wahhabism was to have a 
profound impact on the history and geopolitical structure of the Gulf region, the 
Arabian Peninsula and the Islamic world in general. 
At the end of 1196 AH (1782 AD), Shaikh Khalifa bin Mohammed went to 
perform the Muslim pilgrimage (the Hajj) to Mecca, leaving his brother, Shaikh 
Ahmad, as the deputy ruler of Qatar during his absence from Zubarah.
62
 During that 
time, a series of seemingly insignificant events triggered a major shift in the fortunes 
of the Al Khalifa family. The people of Zubarah needed to import goods from 
Bahrain, including dates, vegetables and fruits, as well as palm fronds and other 
products that grew on the islands but not on the barren peninsula of Qatar.
63
 Qatar-
Bahrain relations were already tense because of the aggressions of Shaikh Nasr Al 
Mathkoor, but now religion came between the two shaikhdoms, their rulers and 
inhabitants. The people of Zubarah and other subjects of the Al Khalifa in Qatar were 
permanently at odds with the Shia farmers and traders of Bahrain, many of whose 
people adhered to the tenets of the Twelver Shiite sect. According to some historical 
accounts, many Bahraini Shiites were extreme fundamentalists, maltreating Sunnis 
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who lived on the islands as well as those who came to Bahrain for trade or work.
64
 
The atmosphere must have been very tense, with frictions not only between the two 
shaikhdoms and their rulers, but also between the two communities. The scene was 
set for conflicts and turbulent clashes. 
In late 1782, Shaikh Ahmad, regent in Qatar, had a servant called Salim,
65
 a 
very close aide to the Shaikh, much beloved and trusted by him to undertake many 
tasks for his household. According to al-Khairi, Salim was Shaikh Ahmad‘s Chief 
Mamluk.
66
 Among his tasks was the purchase of goods from the islands of Bahrain, 
and one day Shaikh Ahmad sent Salim to buy some goods for him from the island of 
Sitrah in Bahrain.
67
 According to al-Khairi, who describes the inhabitants of Sitrah at 
the time as being ―fanatical‖ Shiites, Salim, who was buying supplies ordered by 
Shaikh Ahmad, seems to have got into an argument with one of them. It seems that 
the argument quickly escalated into violence and the Shiite seller rallied support from 
his fellow Shiites. A mob formed and attacked Salim and the men accompanying him. 
In the ensuing fight, Salim was murdered, his companions sustained substantial injury 
and their merchandise was looted. On their return to Zubarah, Salim‘s companions 
told Shaikh Ahmad what had happened. Allegedly, the Shaikh‘s fury prompted a vow 
to avenge Salim‘s death.68 
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There are two different accounts as to what happened. The first, by al-
Nabhani, states that the Shaikh immediately dispatched a small vessel filled with 
armed men to go to Sitrah and take revenge against the murderer of Salim. The 
warriors were accompanied by some of Salim‘s companions who would have known 
and recognized Salim‘s murderer. When the contingent landed in Sitrah, it tracked 
down the murderer and killed him—and five other Sitrah citizens. The murderer 
would naturally have cried for help from his fellow villagers, many of whom got 
involved as they tried to rescue him. The avenging party suffered no losses.
69
 
The second account, by al-Khairi, states that Shaikh Ahmad, although greatly 
upset at the news of Salim‘s death, decided not to take any drastic measures but to try 
to resolve the problem through diplomacy. He sent a delegation of notables on his 
behalf to Shaikh Nasr Al Mathkoor, who resided in Bahrain at the time. The 
delegation carried a message describing events in Sitrah, and a request for justice for 
Salim‘s murderer and the return of the looted goods. Shaikh Nasr was indifferent to 
this request and referred the case to one of his judges, a fundamentalist Shiite who, 
according to al-Khairi, discarded the testimonies of the Sunni witnesses and ruled in 
favour of the Shiite defendants. When the delegation returned to Zubarah and told 
Shaikh Ahmad, their news prompted a ―fit of rage,‖ as al-Khairi puts it. In his anger, 
Shaikh Ahmad made a decision that would have severe repercussions. He organised a 
contingent of armed men and ordered them to raid Sitrah. They obeyed his orders, 
killed some Sitrah men and plundered the area, returning to Zubarah victorious and 
laden with war booty. When news of this reached Shaikh Nasr, he was naturally 
infuriated.
70
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Shaikh Nasr‘s fury was probably compounded by his view of the Utubs of 
Qatar, under the leadership of the Al Khalifa family, as his inferiors. Up to that point, 
he had been the attacker, not the attacked. He apparently decided to put the Al Khalifa 
in their place, organising a major aggression against Zubarah unlike all that had 
preceded it. Shaikh Nasr assembled a large army and sailed to attack Zubarah. In that 
endeavour, he was assisted by the orders of the Persian Ruler, Ali Murad Khan, that 
the Shaikhs of Bandar Rig, Genowa and Dushistan on the Persian Littoral should 
supply Shaikh Nasr with troops. The troops, at least 2,000 strong, assembled in 
Bushire and sailed to help Shaikh Nasr.
71
 Shaikh Nasr‘s forces, under the command of 
his nephew, Shaikh Muhammad, reached the shores of Qatar at low tide.
72
 They 
anchored their fleet near Ushayrij on the northwestern coast of Qatar, whence Shaikh 
Muhammad Al Mathkoor marched with his troops (more than 4,000 soldiers 
according to some estimates)
73
 overland towards Zubarah. 
News of the Al Mathkoor campaign had reached Shaikh Ahmad in enough 
time for the people of Zubarah to prepare themselves for the approaching enemy. 
When the forces of the Al Mathkoor reached the outskirts of Zubarah, Shaikh 
Muhammad camped with his troops as if to lay siege to the city. He then sent a 
message to Shaikh Ahmad and the people of Zubarah, a peace offering with 
humiliating conditions for the Utub.
74
 The Al Khalifa tried to broker a peace deal with 
less harsh conditions, but Shaikh Nasr‘s nephew remained defiant. The showdown 
attracted the attention of other political forces and rulers of the Gulf. Apparently, 
some of them felt sympathetic to the Utub and tried to mediate between the two 
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warring factions. One such was the ruler of Julfar (now Ras al-Khaima), Shaikh 
Rashid bin Rahma al-Qasimi, who tried to convince Shaikh Muhammad Al Mathkoor 
not to demand such demeaning conditions, but in vain. Shaikh Muhammad persisted 
in demanding degrading and humiliating conditions not just from the Al Khalifa but 
also from the people who lived in their capital, Zubarah.
75
 One of these unrealistic 
conditions was that Shaikh Ahmad, his family, and the people of Zubarah should 
surrender unconditionally. He also demanded that they offer him some of their slaves 
and women as Sabaya
76
 for him and his troops.
77
 Such unrealistic and degrading 
demands would certainly have angered the Utubs and the people of Zubarah and 
would have had the opposite effect to the one intended. Instead of being cowed into 
submission, they would have become even more supportive of the Al Khalifa and 
vehemently determined to fight the troops of the Al Mathkoor. 
Was there any logical reason or explanation for Shaikh Nasr‘s and his 
nephew‘s unrealistic demands? It is very probable that Shaikh Nasr was not serious 
about them and wanted no peace-offering. Possibly he was not particularly concerned 
about the Sitrah incident. His real intention was probably to destroy Zubarah simply 
because it was a tiresome commercial rival to Bahrain. It is quite plausible that he 
thought of the destruction of Zubarah as a way to transfer its commercial traffic to 
Bahrain. As we have seen, Zubarah had become a major trade hub very rapidly and 
had attracted commercial traffic from the entire Gulf region, including Bahrain. 
Shaikh Nasr had tried to capture Zubarah earlier, under orders from Karim Khan Zand 
of Persia, but probably he was simply obeying orders and had no ulterior motive. This 
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attack seems to have been different. By late 1782, Zubarah had probably grown too 
rich and commercially attractive for Shaikh Nasr‘s taste, so that he was just looking 
for an excuse to invade it. The Sitrah incident and the great anger it generated among 
the Shia population in Bahrain might have been just the pretext that Shaikh Nasr was 
looking for. He took the opportunity to capitalise on public anger and recruit some of 
the populace as soldiers for an invasion. It is believable that all his conditions and 
demands hid his true intention—to destroy a rival commercial power by provoking 
the Al Khalifa into war. He was probably very confident of his forces and his ability 
to win the battle. Victory would have enabled him to capture and destroy the town and 
its port, stopping it from eclipsing Bahrain as a trading hub and commercial entrepôt. 
Shaikh Nasr seems to have failed to recognise, during previous encounters, the true 
strength of the Utub. His apparent mistakes—underestimating the Utub and 
overestimating his own capabilities—had dire consequences for him. 
9. Battle of Zubarah 
When all efforts for peace were exhausted, war loomed over Zubarah. Shaikh Ahmed 
and his people probably saw that it was useless to try to negotiate with Shaikh Nasr‘s 
nephew and were sure he was determined on conflict. The size of Shaikh Muhammad 
Al Mathkoor‘s force would have appeared daunting, but the consequences of failure 
on the fates of their women and children must have filled them with a zealous fighting 
spirit.
78
 Shaikh Ahmed placed some of his troops on the hilltops and high grounds 
around Zubarah, keeping the main battle forces under his command on the outskirts of 
Zubarah. People from all over Qatar came to the support of their Shaikh, probably 
boosting morale for Shaikh Ahmad‘s side while having the opposite effect on the 
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enemy.
79
 After a few initial skirmishes, Shaikh Nasr‘s army launched a full-out attack 
against the forces of the Utub on 15 November 1782 (9 Dhul Hijja 1196 AH).
80
 See 
Figure 2.
81
 
Shaikh Nasr‘s nephew, Shaikh Muhammad, could not have chosen a worse 
date for his attack. First, it was a Friday, the day of worship and prayer for Muslims. 
For Shaikh Muhammad, a Muslim, to select it would probably have made him look 
impious, if not outright vile. Such a bad image may have made the Utub more eager to 
fight him, and maybe his own side lost some of their respect for their leader. The 
chosen day may have been bad, but the chosen month was worse. The Arabic month 
of Dhul Hijja, the last month of the Islamic year, is one of the four Hurum (forbidden) 
months in which the launch of armed aggression is forbidden in the Islamic faith. 
Worst of all was that 9 Dhul Hijja is the Day of Arafat. Arafat is the mountain where 
Muslim pilgrims from all over the world gather to perform one of the most important 
obligations of Hajj: to pray to God and meditate calmly. It is the most important day 
of the pilgrimage and the one that directly precedes Eid al-Adha (also known as el Eid 
al-Kabir, the Great Eid). Shaikh Muhammad‘s timing probably had a negative impact 
on the troops of the Al Mathkoor and may have boosted the morale of the Utub, who 
would have felt that they held the moral ground—Shaikh Muhammad must have 
looked bad to his own men and his enemies alike. For some unknown reason, Shaikh 
Muhammad Al-Mathkoor seems to have been oblivious to this gaffe. 
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Figure 2: Battle OF Zubarahh 1782 
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When the two sides clashed, a vicious battle soon ensued. According to some 
historical accounts, Shaikh Ahmad and his men imprisoned the women of their tribe 
in a large warehouse filled with gunpowder and sprayed with oil. They kept a few 
men near the warehouse, telling them that if they saw the Utub defeated, they should 
set fire to the warehouse and then escape. The apparent purpose of this seemingly 
brutal act was to prevent the women and children from falling into the hands of the Al 
Mathkoor and their troops,
82
 a purpose that graphically illustrates the Utub fear for the 
fate of their women and children should they be defeated.
83
 Even those accounts that 
do mention the warehouse plan describe a battle of a very vicious nature between the 
two armies. According to local accounts, Shaikh Ahmad and his troops managed to 
hold their ground and fought with such ferocity and valour that they struck terror into 
the hearts of the soldiers of the Al Mathkoor.
84
 The course of the battle was certainly 
in Shaikh Ahmad‘s favour. His steadfast men succeeded in holding their ground, 
while their enemy, unable to break through the formations of the Utub, lost their 
fighting spirit quickly. It was probably at that moment that Shaikh Ahmad decided to 
deliver a killer blow. He ordered a section of his men, the al-bin Ali clan of nearby 
Fureiha, to strike Shaikh Muhammad‘s rear while the guardians of the high ground 
struck on either flank. Already in difficulty, the forces of Shaikh Muhammad were 
devastated by the savage, sudden attack and their formation disintegrated completely. 
Once they had they started fleeing in panic, the slaughter began. The troops of Shaikh 
Muhammad were far from their ships and this allowed the forces of the Utub to hunt 
them down and kill them.
85
 Chief among the victims of this bloodbath was Shaikh 
Muhammad himself, and many Al Mathkoor soldiers were killed before they could 
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reach their ships, moored near Ushayrij. Those that did reach them were transported 
to Bahrain. The Utub, led by Shaikh Ahmad and his family, had won a stunning 
victory.
86
 There is, however, something about the warfare style of the Utub that makes 
it strangely different from all their other battles. Their ferocity was seen only in that 
battle, and in no other did they seem so intent on actively killing fleeing enemies.
87
 A 
probable explanation for such behaviour is that the Utub felt gravely insulted by the 
degrading demands made by the Al Mathkoor regarding the former‘s women and 
children. That might have been the spur that drove them to fight their enemies 
viciously and mercilessly, in a state of frenzy. 
10. Aftermath of the Battle 
The Utub victory over the numerically superior and well-armed troops of the Al 
Mathkoor would have profound ramifications for the geopolitical structure of the Gulf 
region. First, it must have made the Utub realize how strong they really were. It seems 
that before that battle they had viewed their military strength as inferior to that of 
Shaikh Nasr. Nonetheless, their spectacular victory on that day may have made them 
realize their true abilities, while at the same time allowing them to believe that they 
could conquer the isles of Bahrain. Bahrain is a historically strategic location in the 
Gulf region, with fertile agricultural land, abundant wells, springs of fresh water, and 
one of the best pearl fisheries in the world. Such advantages made the capture and 
control of these islands very attractive and lucrative for any political power. The Utub 
were no exception. 
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Shaikh Nasr must have been shocked by the humiliating defeat of his troops 
and the death of his nephew. Naturally, he would have been very angry and bent on 
revenge. Even in his anger, he probably recognised that his military strength was not 
adequate to defeat the Utub without help. He sought aid from his Persian overlords, 
crossing to his domain of Bushire on the Persian littoral to seek the help of the Persian 
government. Shaikh Nasr contacted the governor of Shiraz, but as we shall see, his 
pleas would be ignored. Persia was in a state of turmoil, caught in a violent and 
devastating civil war and unable to help Shaikh Nasr. After the 1779 death of the 
powerful ruler and founder of the Zand dynasty in Persia, Karim Khan Zand, his 
relatives fought a vicious civil war over his succession. One set of belligerents 
included his brother Zaki Khan and his two sons Mohammed Ali Khan and Abul Fath 
Khan, opposed by his other brother, Sadiq Khan, in alliance with his nephew Ali 
Murad Khan. Among the other seekers of the Persian crown and a major player in this 
civil war was Agha Muhammad Khan Qajar, future founder of the Qajar Dynasty of 
Persia. Such a situation made Shaikh Nasr‘s stay in Persia a dangerous waste of time 
and energy, especially as he seemed unaware of the danger that was now looming 
over his domain in Bahrain.
88
 
As we have seen, Shaikh Ahmad and the Utub had realized their military 
power and ramped up their ambitions. They were now probably considering 
themselves equal to the task of capturing the rich, wealthy isles of Bahrain from the 
hold of the Al Mathkoor family. They would have seen the internal situation of Persia 
as an opportunity for them to seize the initiative and attempt a conquest of Bahrain. 
Even so, Shaikh Ahmad apparently decided not to make a hasty decision while his 
brother, Shaikh Khalifa, ruler of Qatar, was away. He never returned, dying in Mecca, 
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probably from an infectious disease, after he had performed the Hajj.
89
 When news of 
this reached Zubarah, Shaikh Ahmad was acknowledged as the new ruler of Qatar, 
third of the Al Khalifa dynasty to hold the post. He was ready to execute his invasion 
plan. After some consultations in what al-Khairi calls a Majlis al-Shura,
90
 Shaikh 
Ahmad and his men set down the plans to invade Bahrain and to capture it from the 
Al Mathkoor family. At the same time, they agreed that they would pay any tribute 
demanded by the Persian government,
91
 even though they probably knew that Persia‘s 
naval force was weak, with her maritime support dependent on the navies of the Arab 
shaikhs controlling the Persian littoral. More likely than not, the Utub were confident 
of their ability to defeat or at the very least to buy off such shaikhs. Why, then, were 
they so cautious?. A possible reason is that the Utub did not want to have to compete 
for Bahrain with any of the shaikhs of the Persian littoral, and that a refusal to pay 
tribute would bring one or more of these shaikhs against them, sailing under orders 
from their Persian masters. 
Persia‘s internal strife was certainly a major factor encouraging the Utub to 
attempt the capture of Bahrain. A second factor confirmed their decision: the internal 
situation of Bahrain itself. This is explained in the next section. 
11. The Conquest of Bahrain 
After Shaikh Nasr‘s defeat at Zubarah and his journey to Persia, the internal situation 
in Bahrain was one of instability and internal discord. The apparently long-running 
disputes and quarrels between segments of the population were now intensified, 
though the three major accounts seem confusing and contradictory. One states that the 
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problem was a quarrel between two different Shia factions that made up the bulk of 
the population of the islands at the time. The other states that it was a sectarian quarrel 
between a Sunni faction and a Shia faction. The third is similar to the first, but with 
different names for the belligerents and their urban centres. All accounts are presented 
in this section. 
The first account describes a quarrel between the two main Shiite factions of 
Bahrain. The Northern faction was under the leadership of the Al al-Shaikh family 
with its headquarters in the town of Jid Hafs, while the al-bin Ruqayyah family led the 
Southern faction, whose headquarters were in the town of Tubli.
92
 There was great 
inter-factional rivalry, with the Northern faction having a slight edge because of their 
numerical and financial superiority. The Northerners habitually acted aggressively 
towards the Southerners, and violent clashes were frequent.
93
 Shaikh Nasr‘s 
government was often too weak to stop the aggression of the Northerners against the 
Southerners, and anyway tended to ignore the problem, making no effort to establish 
peace and mutual respect between the two factions. Shaikh Nasr was probably more 
concerned with reaping the financial benefits of the pearl fisheries in Bahrain than 
with trying to bring about internal cohesion.
94
 
When Shaikh Nasr left Bahrain for Persia to seek help against the Utub, he 
appointed Sayyid Madan bin Sayyid Majid, head of the Al al-Shaikh family and the 
Northern faction, as the deputy ruler of Bahrain during his absence. The new authority 
probably heightened the Northerners‘ abusive, aggressive behaviour towards the 
Southerners. This extra aggression, as well as the perceived length of Shaikh Nasr‘s 
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absence, is probably what prompted Sayyid Salman al-bin Ruqayyah, leader of the 
Southerners, to contact the Utubs in Zubarah.
95
 In his message, he explained the 
internal situation in Bahrain to Shaikh Ahmad, encouraged him to invade and 
promised that his faction would be their faithful allies and offer all the help they could 
muster. When Shaikh Ahmad received the message, he called a council with his 
family members and trusted advisers. After some deliberation, the men attending the 
council reached a decision to invade Bahrain.
96
 
Shaikh Ahmad assembled an army and set sail, with a fleet under his direct 
leadership, from Zubarah, determined to conquer Bahrain. They arrived near the coast 
of the island of Sitrah at dawn and defeated its small garrison. His troops then set out 
to take the village of al-Nabih Salih, where Salman al-bin Ruqayya and his followers 
came out to greet and accompany them. When the news reached Bilad al-Qadim, the 
people were naturally alarmed and sent an envoy to Sayyid Madan, deputy ruler of 
Bahrain, to warn him about the invasion. Sayyid Madan wasted no time in assembling 
the garrison under his command before marching to confront the invading forces of 
the Utub. The armies met on a plain, near the area known today as Souq al-Khamis, 
for a bloody and violent showdown.
97
 A vicious battle took place and, according to al-
Khairi, Sayyid Madan showed remarkable courage. However, the battle turned in 
favour of Shaikh Ahmad and his forces. As defeat looked certain for his troops, 
Sayyid Madan made a last attempt at retaliation but in that offensive he was killed by 
Shaikh Ahmad‘s forces. The death of Sayyid Madan must have destroyed what 
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fighting spirit his troops retained, and all the survivors fled the battlefield. The 
defenders had been routed.
98
 
The second account gives sectarian tensions as the cause of internal 
squabbling in Bahrain. The Shiite faction was under the leadership of Hajji Madan
99
 
and based in the town of Jid Hafs. Their opponents were Sunnis, led by Shaikh 
Ahmad bin Muhammad Al Majid, with headquarters in the town of Bilad al-Qadim.
100
 
The Sunnis of Bahrain were allegedly oppressed by the Shiites and Shaikh Nasr 
himself, whose main preoccupation appears to have been with reaping the benefits of 
the pearl fisheries; he seems to have been indifferent to their grievances. This 
prompted the Sunni faction to send a messenger to Shaikh Ahmad in Qatar, 
encouraging him to invade Bahrain and rescue them from oppression.
101
 
The third account, by al-Tajir, is very similar to the first, but he names Sayyid 
Majid al-Jidhafsi (a Shiite) as the head of a faction whose headquarters were in Jid 
Hafs. He names Shaikh Ahmad bin Ruqayya al-Biladi (also a Shiite) as the head of 
another faction, headquartered at al-Bilad al-Qadim. He claims that the two men were 
maternal first cousins quarrelling over money and authority, but agrees with the first 
account that the man who led the battle against the forces of Shaikh Ahmad in 
Bahrain was Shaikh Nasr‘s deputy, Sayyid Madan al-Jidhafsi.102 It should be noted 
here that each of the three accounts might have a certain bias. It can be said that al-
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Tajir might be biased against Shaikh Ahmad and his men because of his own sectarian 
background. Al-Tajir came from a Shiite family in Bahrain and his historical account 
is the one most accepted by them. He implies that the Utub conquest was a harsh 
affair. Tahbub and al-Khairi, both Sunnis, depict the conquest as glorious, portraying 
Shaikh Ahmad as a noble leader who committed no unnecessary cruelties during his 
conquest of the islands. Their sectarian backgrounds may have influenced their 
judgements and consequently their accounts. The truth may lie between the two 
distinct accounts. Even so, it is necessary to say that al-Tajir relies heavily on al-
Khairi in writing his history of Bahrain, as he himself acknowledges at the beginning 
of his book.
103
 
After his victory over the forces of Sayyid Madan, Shaikh Ahmad proceeded 
with his forces in the direction of Manama. Although he had defeated the forces of 
Sayyid Madan (and killed him), he apparently knew that the family of Shaikh Nasr Al 
Mathkoor was in Diwan fort, Manama, the seat of government at the time. When 
news of the result of the battle of Souq al-Khamis reached Shaikh Nasr‘s family, they 
hid with a small force in Diwan fort. When Shaikh Ahmad and his forces reached the 
outskirts of Manama, he laid siege to the fort. It is likely that he did not want this 
siege to last long and wanted a quick showdown. He probably realized that the fort 
was lightly defended. One of the locals seems to have given him information that 
enabled him to achieve his purpose. The water supply of Diwan fort came from a little 
spring called al-Mishbir
104
 that flowed out of the fort and irrigated date gardens to the 
north. Its cover had only a few holes to allow the access of sunlight and fresh air. The 
Shaikh assigned a small group of trusted and battle-hardened warriors the task of 
sneaking into the fort through this subterranean spring so they could open its doors 
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from the inside and admit his troops. The ―special forces‖ mission was apparently 
successful, and Shaikh Ahmad soon gained control of the fort. Another force loyal to 
Shaikh Nasr had taken refuge at the fort of Bahrain (known locally as the Portuguese 
Fort and was an old fort that was built by the portugese when they occupied Bahrain 
in the 1520s). Shaikh Ahmad besieged it, but it was much better fortified than Diwan, 
and it was not surrendered for a month, when the defenders presumably realized that 
Shaikh Nasr had had his day, especially as more Utub forces arrived from Qatar daily. 
They must have decided that their resistance was in vain and surrendered. The Utub 
conquest of Bahrain under the leadership of Shaikh Ahmad bin Muhammad Al 
Khalifa was complete.
105
 See Figure 3.
106
  
Shaikh Ahmad and his forces had managed to conquer Bahrain with relative 
ease. There are no records of a public outcry against the invaders, and the battle of 
Souq al-Khamis seems to have been the only major confrontation apart from the two 
sieges. This might give us an insight into the state of Bahrain under the government of 
Shaikh Nasr Al Mathkoor, who had apparently failed to build a solid base of support 
for himself. It seems that he was more interested in using Bahrain as an economic 
generator than in nurturing support among its inhabitants. This is also clear from the 
fact that he did not make a single attempt to regain Bahrain from the control of Shaikh 
Ahmad. He might simply have feared Shaikh Ahmad‘s military strength, but probably 
he was well aware that his popular support in Bahrain could not match that enjoyed 
by Shaikh Ahmad in Qatar. The people of Qatar (and all the Utub) who apparently 
supported Shaikh Ahmad enthusiastically, and Qatari tribesman made up the bulk of 
his force. 
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Figure 3: Conquest of Shaikh Ahmed of Bahrain 1783 
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Shaikh Ahmed officially became ruler of Bahrain on 20 May 1783 (18 Jumada 
Al Akhira 1197 AH). That date was remembered by the saying Ahmad sar fi Awal 
Khalifa,
107
 ―Ahmad became a Caliph in Awal‖.108 Shaikh Ahmad displayed what can 
be described as benevolence and chivalry in his treatment of the family of Shaikh 
Nasr Al Mathkoor. He forbade any harm to be done to them and allowed them to 
return safely to Bushire, taking with them all their belongings.
109
 This humane act 
may have other interpretations. It might have been highly influenced by religious and 
Bedouin values, but he might have reasoned that, if he imprisoned the family, Shaikh 
Nasr Al Mathkoor would have felt compelled, for reasons of honour, to launch an 
attack on Bahrain regardless of cost. He might have found sympathetic allies, and 
Shaikh Ahmad obviously did not want to give him such an opportunity. At the same 
time, Shaikh Ahmad must have needed to hold the moral high ground with his 
followers and men. He probably did not want to look as vile as Shaikh Nasr had when 
he attacked Zubarah. Shaikh Ahmad would go down in history as Ahmad al-Fatih 
(The Conqueror).
110
 
Once he had become ruler of both Qatar and Bahrain, Shaikh Ahmad divided 
his time between his capital, Zubarah, and his newly acquired territory of Bahrain. He 
would spend the summers in Bahrain and the rest of the year in Zubarah. During his 
absence, a cousin, most likely Shaikh Ali bin Khalifa Al Fadhil, was his deputy in 
Bahrain, bearing the title Qa‘im Maqam.111 During the rest of his reign, many of 
Shaikh Ahmad‘s subjects migrated from Qatar to Bahrain. The main reason seems to 
have been the attractive conditions of Bahrain, which boasted ample supplies of fresh 
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water and proximity to its agricultural lands and the pearl fisheries. Many settlers built 
Firjan (plural of Fireej, a neighbourhood or district) for themselves near the city of 
Manama. Others settled in the island of Muharraq and likely built the first block of the 
city of Muharraq, which would later become the seat of government of the Al Khalifa 
family. Shaikh Ahmad ruled Bahrain and Qatar for twelve years, dying in Bahrain in 
the early summer of 1209 AH (1795 AD). He left four sons. The older two, Salman 
and Abdullah, were adults, and both would become the rulers of Qatar, Bahrain and 
other dependencies. The younger two, Muhammad and Yusuf, were minors. Salman, 
as eldest son, succeeded his father in the rulership of Bahrain and Qatar with Zubarah 
as his capital.
112
 
12. Conclusion 
As this study shows, the history of the rise of the Al Khalifa family as a political 
dynasty is complicated and eventful. Their role in the region was, and is, a prominent 
one. Their rise to power in the late eighteenth century corresponds with that of the al-
Sabah of Kuwait, the Al Saud of Saudi Arabia, the Al Nahyan of Abu Dhabi and the 
Al Said of Oman. All these families are still in power, important players in the politics 
of the Arabian Gulf region and the wider Middle East. Bahrain was always at the 
centre of any regional change, conflict, commerce and politics. The progenitors of this 
family seem to have possessed certain characteristics that distinguish them from their 
rivals. Such characteristics probably helped them to gain political power and found a 
ruling dynasty in the region, and helped them succeed where others had failed. 
First among such characteristics was the apparent pragmatism and 
industriousness of Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa al-Kabir and his family. This 
                                                          
112
 al-Khairi, Qalaid il Nahrain, 227-229. 
Abdulaziz Al Khalifa Chapter II  
 
  68 
 
chapter shows that they had learned the art of seafaring very quickly, so they must 
have been rapid adapters to new environments. Their pragmatism would prove very 
useful, as it probably gave them a lead in maritime activities over less practical 
immigrants. Such knowledge about sailing most likely enabled them to build a large 
fortune in a relatively short time. Abundant finances can bring much prestige and 
power, particularly in poverty-stricken Arabia before the discovery of oil. The Al 
Khalifa family would prove to be no exception. Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa al-
Kabir, the first and founding monarch of the dynasty, was successful in using his 
wealth, charisma and creative thinking to become a political leader. Such qualities 
most likely attracted many loyal followers who would happily fight under his name 
and who paved his path to rulership and the foundation of a dynasty. 
The second characteristic that may have helped this family to succeed was 
their apparent internal solidarity and cohesion—between themselves as a family and 
even among their men. This would later prove to be crucial when they faced the 
numerically superior army of Shaikh Nasr at the battle of Zubarah. What probably 
helped in the achievement of cohesion between them and their men was their custom 
of having open Majlises with their followers, so that they were in direct contact with 
their subjects. That proximity would have made them sensitive, more aware of the 
needs of their people and able to forge strong bonds of internal solidarity. Good 
examples of the close relationship between the Al Khalifa family and their subjects is 
shown in what can be termed the polygamous marriage policy adopted by the founder 
of the family, Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa Al Kabir. He would naturally have 
realized that, to cement his relationship with his new allies, he needed to ‗mix his 
blood‘ with theirs. This probably compelled him to marry women from the al-bin Ali 
and al-bu Kuwara tribes, both of whom gave him sons. Arguably that was a wise 
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policy, probably making his allies feel they were his family members, as the sons of 
Shaikh Muhammad were viewed as their ‗nephews‘. That would have probably made 
them fight through thick and thin for the sake of their father. 
The third characteristic that may have helped the Al Khalifa against some of 
their enemies was the homogeneity of their subjects. The vast majority of the subjects 
of the Al Khalifa in Qatar were Sunni and had a tribal descent similar to that of the Al 
Khalifa. Their adversary Shaikh Nasr Al Mathkoor had followers from different 
ethnic and sectarian backgrounds. That may have weakened cohesion, so the 
followers of Shaikh Nasr may have not had the same depth of solidarity as that of the 
subjects of the Al Khalifa in Qatar—a major disadvantage. 
The fourth characteristic that may have enabled the Al Khalifa family to reach 
prominence and defeat their adversaries was their financial strategy. Shaikh 
Muhammad bin Khalifa al-Kabir focused on strengthening his economic position in 
Zubarah. He did not dare to challenge the rulers of Qatar at that time, the Al 
Musallam family, until he was confident of his financial position. His care for the 
economy of Zubarah allowed the town to grow to be a populous and rich settlement. 
That probably helped him gain more followers and allowed him to raise an army large 
enough to defeat the Al Musallam family and declare himself ruler of Qatar. 
The fifth characteristic that may have helped the Al Khalifa family was ‗good 
fortune‘ and ‗luck‘ that presented the right opportunities at the right time and place. A 
good example of that can be seen in the weakening of the Bani Khalid, the strongest 
tribe in Eastern Arabia at the time. It ensured their inability to take revenge on Shaikh 
Muhammad bin Khalifa al-Kabir on behalf of their vassals, the Al Musallam family. 
They had even more good fortune when they were considering whether to attack 
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Bahrain. Karim Khan Zand had died, plunging Persia into state of chaos and civil war, 
denying Persian help to Shaikh Nasr Al Mathkoor after his defeat at Zubarah. That 
geopolitical opportunity must have encouraged the Al Khalifa to invade Bahrain 
secure from Persian retaliation, in their estimation. A second circumstance that may 
have helped them in their conquest of Bahrain was the internal discord between the 
people of Bahrain, whether factional or sectarian. Discord within Bahraini society 
ensured that, even if, for the sake of argument, the people disliked the Al Khalifa and 
their allies, they would have been unable to present a solid, united front against them. 
The conquest of Bahrain had lasting effects. From that date on, the islands of Bahrain 
were removed from the Persian sphere of influence. Bahrain became an ‗Arab‘ 
country, entrenched on the Arab side of the Gulf both politically and culturally. 
Persian attempts to regain control of the islands continued but none succeeded. 
Consequently, the Utub conquest of Bahrain, under the leadership of the Al Khalifa 
family, had a profound impact on the geopolitical picture we see today in the modern 
Arabian Gulf region. 
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CHAPTER III 
Joint Rule of Shaikhs Salman and Abdullah: the 
Omanis, the Saudis, Rahma bin Jabir and the British, 
1795-1825 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Shaikh Salman bin Ahmad Al Khalifa ruled Bahrain and Qatar from 1795 to 1825 
AD. He became ruler upon the death of his father, Shaikh Ahmad ―al-Fatih‖ Al 
Khalifa, in 1795. He was assisted in the task of rulership by his brother, Shaikh 
Abdullah bin Ahmad, whose political role this study examines. Shaikh Abdullah was 
not a mere assistant or aide to his brother, but a junior co-ruler. His success in facing 
external threats to the Shaikhdom was of paramount significance in the history of the 
Al Khalifa dynasty and Bahrain. 
This chapter gives us the first detailed study of Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmad, 
showing the process of definition of his political role and demonstrating its 
significance in the history of the Al Khalifa family and Bahrain. Shaikh Abdullah‘s 
efforts to neutralise the external threats against his family‘s domains give us a 
fascinating example of how an Arab Gulf ruler in the early nineteenth century went 
about such a task. The first threat was that of an Omani invasion in 1801: the family 
felt that they could not resist by force, so had to enter into an unfavourable diplomatic 
deal in which Bahrain submitted to Oman, although the Al Khalifa and their allies 
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were allowed to keep Qatar and their estates in Bahrain. Shaikhs Salman and 
Abdullah had to give up their brother, Shaikh Muhammad, as a hostage to the Omani 
ruler, Sayyid Sultan bin Ahmad Al Said of Oman and Zanzibar—Sayyid Sultan 
insisted on such a condition to guarantee that the Al Khalifa and the Utub did not try 
to attack Bahrain in his absence. Bitter though they must have been, they were able to 
oust the Omanis, with Saudi help, when circumstances changed. However, the Saudis 
apparently had their own ambitions and wrested both Bahrain and Qatar from the 
hands of the Al Khalifa. They too took hostages—shaikhs Salman and Abdullah and 
their cousin Shaikh Abdullah bin Khalifa—and held them in the Saudi capital, 
Diriyah. The family managed to get out of this predicament, kick the Saudis out of 
Bahrain and Qatar and rescue the three hostage Shaikhs, surprisingly with Omani 
help. Even then, the Saudi problem was not finally resolved until the battle of 
Akhakkira in 1811. A violent naval battle off the northwestern coast of Qatar between 
the Utub fleet under the command of Shaikh Abdullah himself and the Saudi fleet 
under the command of Rahma bin Jabir al-Jalahma and Ibrahim Ibn Ufaisan. The 
battle ended with an important victory for the Utub, who crushed the Saudi forces. 
That victory secured Shaikh Abdullah and his family from any further serious threats 
or intrigues from the Saudis for several years. 
The Omanis then threatened Bahrain again, encouraged to invade by the 
machinations of Rahma bin Jabir. Shaikh Abdullah and his family chose to resist such 
Omani intrigues, and the conflict culminated in the 1816 battle of Maqta‘a. Shaikh 
Abdullah was the chief strategist in organising the Bahraini resistance, relying on the 
assistance of two of his nephews, Shaikhs Khalifa and Ahmad, sons of his brother, the 
ruler Shaikh Salman. With their help, Shaikh Abdullah executed a defence plan that 
lured the Omanis into a trap of false security. At the moment juste, Shaikh Abdullah 
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switched to offensive mode, catching the Omanis by surprise. The battle ended with a 
signal defeat for the Omanis, their Sultan and Rahma bin Jabir al-Jalahma. 
The events in this chapter conclude with the second official treaty between the 
British and the Al Khalifa after the 1816 friendship treaty between them. The 1820 
treaty came in the aftermath of the British destruction of the centre of power of the 
Qawasim of Ras al-Khaima in 1819. The British launched that offensive because of 
what they saw as piratical acts by the chiefs of the Qawasim. The Al Khalifa 
apparently joined that treaty to exempt their ships from taxation at the hands of the 
Qawasim of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah, fellow signatories to the treaty, who 
controlled the Strait of Hormuz and levied tax on all who passed through it. 
The chapter presents an illustration of how local rulers in the early nineteenth 
century Gulf had to deal with a series of threats that compromised the integrity of 
their domains. It reveals how they had to face the grim reality of changing political 
allegiances, shifting alliances and unexpected turns of events. 
2. First Omani Invasion of 1801 
Shaikh Salman enjoyed peace of mind only for the first few years of his rulership 
before serious external threats arose. The first was the growing Saudi threat of the 
Wahhabis, under the leadership of the Al Saud family, whose head was Imam Abdul 
Aziz bin Muhammad Al Saud. By 1794 (1208 AH), the Saudis had extended their 
territories into Eastern Arabia and had captured Hasa and Qatif.
1
 That naturally 
alarmed the Al Khalifa and the Utub, as the Wahhabi forces advanced ever closer to 
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Bahrain and Qatar. Soon, Prince Saud, son of Imam Abdul Aziz bin Muhammad, 
began to lead raids into Qatar.
2
 
In 1798 (1212 AH), Shaikh Salman and the Al Khalifa seem to have decided 
that it would be safer to change their headquarters and the seat of government from 
Zubarah in Qatar to Bahrain. Shaikh Abdullah made the island of Halat Bu Maher, off 
the coast of Muharraq, his headquarters and built a fort on the remains of an older 
one. Shaikh Salman, on the other hand, first settled in the village of Jaou on the 
central eastern coast of Bahrain before moving to Riffa, in the centre of the island, 
where he too built a fort on the remains of an older one.
3
 The family‘s motives seem 
to have been tactical. They must have realized that, even though the Saudi ground 
troops outnumbered their own, the Al Khalifa had the upper hand when it came to 
fleets and naval warfare. The move increased the security of the Al Khalifa and their 
allies if a military conflict with the Saudis should arise between them and the Saudi 
forces. In the event, the first external threat came not from the Saudis but from foes 
from further afield. 
As explained in Chapter II, there were groups in Bahrain that had been 
supporters of Bahrain‘s ruler, Shaikh Nasr Al Mathkoor. Members of those groups 
would naturally have lost much of their power and prestige after the Al Khalifa 
conquest of Bahrain in 1783, a loss that would have angered some of them into a 
resolution to reverse the situation in their favour. That disgruntled group contained 
mostly wealthy Shiite families. They secretly contacted Shaikh Nasr in Bushire on the 
Persian coast, and encouraged him to recapture Bahrain. Shaikh Nasr and his covert 
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allies and sympathisers in Bahrain must have realized that the Utub and the Al Khalifa 
had a strong hold on Bahrain and that ousting them would be very difficult. That 
became especially true after Shaikh Salman and his family made Bahrain their 
permanent headquarters and the seat of government. Shaikh Nasr and his allies 
therefore needed to seek help from a powerful ruler and ally if they were to recapture 
Bahrain. The conspirators approached Sayyid Sultan bin Ahmad bin Said al-Busaidi, 
ruler of Muscat and Oman, offering him a large annual tribute if he would help Shaikh 
Nasr Al Mathkoor to recapture Bahrain. The offer seems to have been accepted, as 
Sayyid Sultan prepared his fleet and troops and then launched a campaign to seize the 
islands of Bahrain in 1801 (1215 AH).
4
 
When the news of the approaching Omani invasion reached Shaikh Salman, he 
and Shaikh Abdullah determined to stand up to the Omanis and fight them,
5
 but 
received a disappointing reaction from their allies and followers. Their men were 
reluctant to fight the army of Sayyid Sultan bin Ahmed, who had gained considerable 
fame for his successful conquests in Eastern Africa.
6
 The Shaikhs must have realized 
that coercing their men to fight might have resulted in dire consequences, so they 
were probably prompted to seek an alternative policy, one that could have saved at 
least some of their domains. They sent an envoy to Sayyid Sultan, before he could 
reach Bahrain, with a message stating their willingness to be placed under his 
‗suzerainty‘ and their desire to meet and discuss the terms and conditions of the 
proposal. It seems likely that Sayyid Sultan was wary at the beginning, possibly 
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suspecting a ploy by the Al Khalifa to trick him, lead him away from his fleet and 
then possibly assassinate him. He refused the offer, instead inviting Shaikh Salman 
and members of his family aboard his ship to discuss the conditions of suzerainty. The 
Shaikhs responded by giving Sayyid Sultan further assurances that they meant him no 
harm, stating that their sole intention was to reach an agreement beneficial to both 
parties. The assurances of the Shaikhs seem to have worked, as Sayyid Sultan agreed 
to meet them and the shaikhs of their tribal allies in Manama.
7
 
At the meeting, the Al Khalifa brokered a deal with Sayyid Sultan in which 
they and their tribal allies would be allowed to keep their estates in Bahrain. They also 
managed to secure for themselves free access to the pearl fisheries. In return, they 
would relocate to Zubarah on the Qatari coast. Those conditions were acceptable but 
the Shaikhs agreed only very reluctantly to another—that Shaikh Muhammad bin 
Ahmed, the brother of the Shaikhs, would be kept as a ‗guest‘ in Muscat. Sayyid 
Sultan most likely wanted to ensure that the Al Khalifa and their allies would not 
attempt to recapture Bahrain after he left. The Shaikhs did, however, convince Sayyid 
Sultan not to give Bahrain to Shaikh Nasr Al Mathkoor, but to install one of Sayyid 
Sultan‘s own men as local governor. Sayyid Sultan probably already held such an 
intention anyway, but the persuasion of the Al Khalifa may have made sure of the 
outcome. The Al Khalifas‘ probable object, of course, was to foil the conspirators‘ 
plot at least partially, and in this they were successful. Sayyid Sultan appointed his 
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brother Sayyid Salim (other sources name either one of his two sons Sayyid Said or 
Sayyid Majid) as local governor. The local Omani governor constructed the fort of 
Arad on Muharraq Island to serve as his headquarters in Bahrain.
8
 
Shaikhs Salman and Abdullah and the rest of their family now returned to 
their dominions in Qatar. Many of their tribal followers relocated with them, returning 
to Bahrain only for pearling and commerce. According to David Seton, around 4,000 
people crossed to Qatar.
9
 In Zubarah, the Shaikhs, naturally resentful, started thinking 
of a way to recapture Bahrain from the hold of Sayyid Sultan and to free their brother 
Shaikh Muhammad. They must have realized, of course, that any rash or reckless 
movement could bring more peril to them and make their political position even more 
precarious. Years passed before circumstances changed and presented an opportunity 
for the two Shaikhs, along with their family and tribal allies, to recapture Bahrain 
from the Omanis. As the next section relates, new circumstances arose that helped the 
Al Khalifa and their allies to achieve that goal. 
3. Ousting the Omanis and Getting Entwined with the 
Saudis 
In 1223 AH (1808 AD) Shaikh Muhammad bin Ahmed, the brother of Shaikhs 
Salman and Abdullah, died in Muscat.
10
 No available historical account indicates the 
cause of death—there are no hints that the Shaikh was killed or murdered but no 
confirmation that he died of natural causes either—but Muhammad‘s death rendered 
him useless as a hostage. Another factor favouring the Al Khalifa ambition to oust the 
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Omanis was the latter‘s religious persuasions, different from those of any sect in 
Bahrain. The Bahrainis, though nearly all Muslim, were divided into two main sects, 
Sunni and Shiite. Both sects revere the Prophet Muhammad‘s household (of whom his 
agnatic cousin and son-in-law, Imam Ali bin Abi Talib, was a paramount member), 
though the Shiites revere them in a way that is seen as exaggerated by the Sunnis. The 
Omanis, on the other hand, mostly adhere to the Ibadi sect of Islam and are highly 
critical of Imam Ali. Some Ibadi extremists do not revere the family of the Prophet 
very highly. Such sectarian differences could have prompted a degree of tension and 
incohesion between the Omanis and the people of Bahrain—a potentially useful 
situation for the Al Khalifa and their tribal allies if they were to try to recapture 
Bahrain. It probably prompted them to find and recruit supporters within the islands. 
Important though these advantages were, it was the internal situation in Oman 
that was probably the most important political factor favouring the Al Khalifa. Oman 
suffered from political instability and was enmeshed in troubles. 
In 1804, the ruler of Oman, Sayyid Sultan bin Ahmed, was killed in a skirmish 
with the Qawasim of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaima. This caused a succession issue 
between his son, Sayyid Said, who would later be Sultan of Oman and Zanzibar, and 
Said‘s paternal uncle, Sayyid Qais bin Ahmed, governor of Suhar. That conflict was 
settled after some violent clashes and an agreement was reached. Sayyid Said would 
have the domains of Muscat and its dependencies in addition to the overseas 
dependencies in Eastern Africa and Gwadar. Sayyid Qais would have the domains of 
internal Oman, though Sayyid Said managed to gain complete control of Oman later. 
No sooner had Sayyid Said settled his dispute with his uncle than he was faced 
with an invasion by the Saudis, under the leadership of the Wahhabi commander 
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Mutlaq bin Muhammad al-Mutairi. Al-Mutairi led his troops into the strategic al-
Buraimi area in 1807 (1222 AH) and amassed support from the tribes of the area, 
including the powerful al-bu-Ali tribe.
11
 
The Saudi forces now had enough support to grow in numbers and strength, 
prompting al-Mutairi to make further incursions into Omani territories. Alarmed, 
Sayyid Said amassed a large army and marched to meet the Saudi commander in a 
bloody showdown at the battle of Azka. The battle resulted in a spectacular victory 
for the Saudi forces and Sayyid Said was forced to retreat. Apparently not satisfied 
with one victory, al-Mutairi followed it up with further incursions into Oman, finally 
sacking the town of Mutrah, only two miles or so from Muscat. The Saudi advances 
eventually caused Sayyid Said to succumb to the Saudi commander. He offered to pay 
an annual tribute to the Saudi Imam in Diriyah, Najd, on condition that the Saudis 
retreated to al-Buraimi. The Saudi commander agreed and returned to al-Buraimi. The 
return was short-lived, however, and soon the Saudis started launching new raids into 
Oman. The Saudi commander, Mutlaq al-Mutairi, was killed in one raid, but his son 
Said assumed command of the Saudi forces and continued in his father‘s footsteps. 
Sayyid Said did not stop the raids and only managed to expel the Saudis from al-
Buraimi in 1810 (1225 AH) with the aid of Britain.
12
 
All these factors helped Shaikhs Salman and Abdullah to recapture Bahrain 
with the help of their allies. They appear to have decided to recruit an ally on bad 
terms with the ruler of Oman, so very logically made an alliance with the Saudis. 
Both Shaikhs, along with notables from their family and from Qatar, went to Diriyah 
to meet the Saudi Imam Saud bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud. They arranged to provide the 
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naval transport and expertise to recapture Bahrain, while the Saudi Imam provided 
them with soldiers and protection from any future Omani invasion in exchange for a 
yearly tribute from Bahrain. Imam Saud sent an army under the leadership of Ibrahim 
Ibn Ufaisan. By late 1809 the allied troops of the Utub and the Saudis crossed over to 
Bahrain, where they defeated and expelled the Omani governor and his garrison. Once 
Bahrain was secure, however, Shaikhs Salman and Abdullah received an unpleasant 
surprise: Ibn Ufaisan refused to surrender Bahrain to them, claiming that he had no 
orders from Imam Saud to do so.
13
 
The Al Khalifa now had a predicament. They had succeeded in removing one 
problem only to replace it with another by having helped the non-seafaring Saudis to 
cross into Bahrain. The Shaikhs apparently decided to retreat to Zubarah and 
correspond with Imam Saud regarding the actions of Ibn Ufaisan and the agreement 
they had brokered in Diriyah. Before they could even send a delegation, however, a 
Saudi contingent under the command of Sulaiman bin Saif bin Touq approached 
Qatar. Shaikhs Salman and Abdullah seemingly decided not to confront this army, 
possibly because they did not want to aggravate the already difficult situation with the 
Saudis. Instead, they appear to have decided to wait and see what that army would do. 
It entered Qatar and marched towards Zubarah. The Shaikhs chose to stay in the well-
fortified town and sent an envoy to Ibn Touq to enquire about his arrival. Ibn Touq 
sent a message to the Shaikhs informing them that he meant them no harm. He 
explained that he was only an envoy from Imam Saud and desired the Shaikhs to meet 
him outside Zubarah, apparently to discuss an important message that he was carrying 
from the Imam. However, as soon as the Shaikhs reached Ibn Touq, he took them 
                                                          
13
 Ibid, 92-93; al-Nabhani, Attuhfah Annabhaniya, 91-92. 
Abdulaziz Al Khalifa Chapter III  
 
  81 
 
hostage and informed them that they must travel to meet Imam Saud in Diriyah.
14
 By 
this ruse, Ibn Touq had managed to capture Zubarah and subdue the rest of Qatar. He 
sent his hostages, Shaikhs Salman and Abdullah, with many notables of Qatar and 
Bahrain, to Imam Saud in Diriyah. On arrival, the Imam separated Shaikhs Salman 
and Abdullah and their cousin Shaikh Abdullah bin Khalifa Al Khalifa from the rest 
of the hostages, whom he freed and allowed to return to Qatar.
15
 
Maybe the Shaikhs believed the false promises of Ibn Touq so readily because 
they may have feared inflaming the situation further. They may have reasoned that the 
Saudis refused to withdraw from Bahrain because they were wary of the Utub, whose 
seamanship would have given them an advantage over the Saudis had they been 
allowed to resettle in Bahrain—they might have suspended the payment of the annual 
tribute. Aware of this Saudi fear, Shaikhs Salman and Abdullah probably thought that 
their refusal to meet Ibn Touq outside Zubarah might have made the Imam‘s fears 
look more certain and inflamed his suspicions to the extent that he mounted a Saudi 
invasion of Qatar. The two Shaikhs probably decided to take the risk of meeting Ibn 
Touq outside Zubarah to alleviate some of the Saudi suspicions. They probably also 
believed that the almost puritanical Wahhabi doctrine of the Saudis would be a 
guarantee against treachery. They were wrong but, as the next section reveals, the 
three Al Khalifa Shaikhs were rescued and the plans of Imam Saud were foiled in a 
remarkable manner. 
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4. Rescuing the Shaikhs and Expelling the Saudis 
News of the Shaikhs‘ detention in Diriyah must have been distressing when it reached 
the Al Khalifa and Al Fadhil families and their allies. They would have started 
conspiring to liberate themselves from the Saudis and to rescue the imprisoned 
Shaikhs. At one of the darkest moments in the history of the Al Khalifa, into the arena 
stepped a man of the utmost courage, loyalty, bravery and cunning, ready to execute a 
dramatic rescue. Shaikh Abdul Rahman bin Rashid Al Fadhil was an agnatic cousin of 
the Al Khalifa and a nephew of Shaikhs Salman and Abdullah, who were his maternal 
uncles.
16
 Shaikh Abdul Rahman Al Fadhil devised a plan and told the Al Khalifa that 
he accepted responsibility for its execution. He had apparently realized, as we shall 
see later, that the Saudis were unaware of the close agnatic relationship between the 
Al Khalifa and Al Fadhil families. Probably deciding to use this ignorance in his 
favour, Shaikh Abdul Rahman created a plan in which he would play an overt role 
while the Al Khalifa remained covert. 
Shaikh Abdul Rahman pretended to arrange to go to India for the purposes of 
trade and commerce, an action that would not raise Saudi suspicion, as he wanted no 
attention from the Saudi governor of Zubarah, Sulaiman Ibn Touq. Once Shaikh 
Abdul Rahman had sailed from Zubarah, he headed hastily to meet an old foe—none 
other than Sayyid Said, Sultan of Oman and Zanzibar—at Muscat. When they met, 
Shaikh Abdul Rahman asked the Sultan for help to expel the Saudi forces from Qatar 
and Bahrain. In return, he made a commitment to the Sultan that, should they succeed, 
he would guarantee that Shaikhs Salman and Abdullah would pay him an annual 
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 Al-Khairi, Qalaid il Nahrain, 238-239; al-Tajir, Aqd al-La‟al, 108. According to the Al Fadhil 
family, the name of Shaikh Abdul Rahman‘s mother was Shaikha Amna bint Ahmad al-Fatih Al 
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tribute of 9,000 MT Dollars.
17
 The Sultan, of course, had not forgotten that the Al 
Khalifa and the Utub had not so long ago been allied with the Saudis against him. It 
was at that delicate point that Shaikh Abdul Rahman Al Fadhil displayed his abilities 
as a shrewd, diplomatic and cunning negotiator. 
The Shaikh apologised for his relatives‘ action and claimed that he had 
advised them against it from the very beginning.
18
 He almost certainly capitalised on 
the Sultan‘s probable feelings of resentment at what the Saudis had done in their 
invasions and raids on Oman, and probably also took advantage of the Sultan‘s anger 
against the Qawasim, the Saudis‘ allies on the coast of Oman. The Qawasim, 
allegedly, were responsible for the untimely death of the Sultan‘s father, Sayyid 
Sultan bin Ahmad.
19
 Shaikh Abdul Rahman most likely used their connection with the 
Saudis to manipulate Sayyid Said into helping to fight the Saudis—now a common 
enemy. If these indeed were his tactics, he was probably able to leverage Sultan 
Said‘s anger and desire for revenge against the Saudis, presenting himself as a ‗tool‘ 
to accomplish it. The Sultan did not supply the Shaikh with troops, but instead gave 
him a large sum of money, two large cannons, a number of war vessels loaded with 
ammunition and some experienced military tacticians.
20
 Shaikh Abdul Rahman 
thanked the Sultan for his generosity and sailed from Muscat to the coast of Persia, 
                                                          
17
 Ibid; al-Khairi, Qalaid il Nahrain, 239-240. AL-Khairi uses the word Riyal or more precisely Riyal 
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Dollar. 
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 al-Khairi, Qalaid il Nahrain, 239.  
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 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 105. 
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where he met the Chief of the Nussor tribe, Shaikh Jubara, who helped him recruit 
mercenaries from Persia.
21
 
After organising his troops, Shaikh Abdul Rahman sailed from Persia back to 
Zubarah. Before his arrival, he informed the sons of the imprisoned Shaikhs, their 
families and their allies in Zubarah of the night of his attack. He coordinated with 
them a double offensive (internal and external) to be executed against the Saudi 
garrison of Sulaiman Ibn Touq. On the agreed date, Shaikh Abdul Rahman‘s fleet 
approached the coast of Zubarah and fired its cannons at the garrison of Ibn Touq. At 
the same time, the Al Khalifa and their allies in Zubarah surprised the Saudi troops 
with a swift internal attack. The Saudis were understandably oblivious to what was 
happening to them and their garrison rapidly surrendered to the Utub. 
22
 After the 
spectacular success of the first part of his plan, Shaikh Abdul Rahman proceeded to 
pursue the second. See Figure 4.
23
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Figure 4: Shaikh Abdul Rahman Al Fadhil Ousts Saudis from Bahrain and Qatar 1810 
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Fewer than three days later, he and his family and allies sailed with their naval forces 
to Bahrain. His fleet crossed Khour al-Qulaia (the Lagoon of Qulaia‘a) and docked 
opposite Hoora, on the outskirts of old Manama.
24
 From there the Shaikh started 
firing at the Diwan Fort in Manama, headquarters of the Saudi garrison under the 
command of Ibn Ufaisan. That must have surprised and severely alarmed the Saudis. 
Their plight was probably exacerbated because Shaikh Abdul Rahman had made 
contact with his tribal allies inside Bahrain and with other groups of inhabitants. 
Nearly all the inhabitants of Bahrain were allegedly upset at the unpleasant treatment 
they received from the Saudis. Just as he had earlier in Zubarah, Shaikh Abdul 
Rahman launched a massive external attack while his internal allies were ready to 
attack when needed. The Saudis were defeated and surrendered Diwan Fort under the 
condition that they would be allowed to leave Bahrain. Shaikh Abdul Rahman insisted 
on taking some hostages to guarantee their cooperation. The Saudis agreed and the 
Shaikh took the Saudi commander, Ibn Ufaisan, in addition to sixteen other men. The 
rest were allowed to leave Bahrain.
25
 
This account demonstrates that speed and good coordination were paramount 
in catching the Saudis off guard and facilitated their defeat by the forces of Shaikh 
Abdul Rahman. The Shaikh probably realized that any delay in overcoming the 
occupying Saudi forces would have enabled the Saudi Imam in Diriyah to rescue 
them. He needed a quick victory and a substantial political gain. Shaikh Abdul 
Rahman must have transferred the rest of the family and the clan to Bahrain to ensure 
their safety, recognising that to have remained in Zubarah would have placed the three 
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hostage Shaikhs in peril. The move to Bahrain gave him an advantage over the 
Saudis: even if the enemy launched a counter-offensive, they could do so only by 
land, as they lacked the necessary means to wage naval warfare. With Sayyid Said as 
his ally, Shaikh Abdul Rahman had no fear of attack by sea. The relocation of the Al 
Khalifa, the Utub and their allies from Qatar to Bahrain placed the Utub in a very safe 
and strong position against the Saudis—an excellent position from which to negotiate. 
News of the Saudi defeats in Zubarah and Bahrain must have shocked Imam 
Saud bin Abdul-Aziz in Diriyah, apparently prompting him to summon the three Al 
Khalifa hostages for discussions. Allegedly, the Shaikhs pretended that they were not 
fond of Abdul Rahman Al Fadhil and talked about him as if he was a total stranger 
who had usurped their family‘s rulership. To complete the ruse, they apparently 
pretended that they were worried about the fate of their young, inexperienced sons in 
the hands of that ‗stranger‘. They also blamed Imam Saud for having installed weak 
governors who could not defend ‗his‘ domains in Bahrain and Qatar.26 They probably 
did this to persuade him to release them, saying they would try to oust that ‗usurper‘ 
for Imam Saud. The Imam had good reason to be suspicious of the proposals of the 
three Al Khalifa Shaikhs. He sent a delegation of some of his trusted men to meet 
Shaikh Abdul Rahman bin Rashid Al Fadhil in what can be described as a ‗fact-
finding mission‘.27 Imam Saud most likely wanted to test the honesty of what the 
imprisoned Al Khalifa Shaikhs told him. 
The Saudi delegation met Shaikh Abdul Rahman in Bahrain. The latter 
pretended to be indifferent and cold to the plight of the three imprisoned Shaikhs. To 
make the scenario even more convincing, Shaikh Abdul Rahman brought forward the 
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young sons of the captive Shaikhs, led by Shaikh Khalifa bin Salman. He told the 
Saudi delegation that they were now the rulers of Bahrain and Qatar and not their 
fathers, who were dead as far as he was concerned.
28
 Shaikh Khalifa and the other 
young Shaikhs probably orchestrated this with Shaikh Abdul Rahman to trick the 
Saudis into believing that the hostage Shaikhs were worthless assets that no longer 
need to be held. The Saudis were probably suspicious, but seemingly found it useless 
to keep on arguing with Shaikh Abdul Rahman and the other young Al Khalifa 
Shaikhs. They returned to Diriyah, and told Imam Saud what had happened. 
Imam Saud then had a meeting with Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmed, his brother 
Shaikh Salman and their cousin Shaikh Abdullah bin Khalifa. The three Shaikhs 
reiterated their sorrow that their inexperienced sons had been tricked by Abdul 
Rahman and told the Imam that they would try their best, if released, to bring the 
domains of Bahrain and Qatar back under Saudi control, with themselves as faithful 
vassals. The Imam apparently took the bait, as he saw that the three Shaikhs were 
useless to him as hostages. He released them under the condition that if they should 
succeed then they would remain loyal vassals to him.
29
 The three Shaikhs returned 
safely to Bahrain amidst rejoicing from their kinsmen and allies. The Shaikhs were 
especially thankful to Shaikh Abdul Rahman Al Fadhil, whose role in rescuing them 
and their domains had been of the utmost importance. Shaikhs Salman and Abdullah 
then released Ibn Ufaisan and the other Saudi captives, gave them presents and told 
them to inform Imam Saud, on their return, that they respected him but would never 
accept him as their overlord.
30
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This story demonstrates that Shaikh Abdullah and his family were very 
resourceful in playing political tricks on their adversaries to achieve their objectives. 
They used the friction between the Omanis and the Saudis to set one foe against the 
other, and thus rid themselves of both adversaries. The story seems fantastic to 
modern readers, but is widely believed in Bahrain today and by local historians such 
as al-Khairi, al-Tajir and al-Nabhani, who disagree on only a few details. It appears 
that the trick that the three Shaikhs played upon Imam Saud was to convince him that 
they were worthless as hostages to him. They made it seem as if their own children 
had turned against them and that their dominions in both Qatar and Bahrain were out 
of their hands and those of the Saudis. At least in releasing them he might have 
retrieved the Saudi hostages and maybe secured them as loyal vassals. However, that 
one last hope never materialised. 
5. Rahma al-Jalahma, a Relentless Foe: Battles of Huwaila 
and Akhakkira 
A new problem awaited the three Shaikhs after their departure from Diriyah. It came 
from an old enemy, Rahma bin Jabir al-Jalahma, thirsting for revenge and, as this 
section reveals, a truly relentless foe. Rahma was probably keeping a close eye on the 
exploits and vicissitudes of the Al Khalifa. When Shaikh Abdul Rahman expelled the 
Saudi forces from Bahrain and Zubarah, Rahma probably found out (or even guessed) 
the Saudis‘ probable ignorance of the close family ties between Shaikh Abdul 
Rahman and the imprisoned Shaikhs. Once he had that knowledge, he wasted no time 
in going to Diriyah to present himself as a local ally to the Wahhabi cause of the 
Saudis in Eastern Arabia. He probably also wanted to bring to the attention of Imam 
Saud the plot against him by Shaikh Abdul Rahman and the Al Khalifa. More likely 
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than not he sought to persuade the Imam to hold them, putting pressure on Shaikh 
Abdul Rahman and his allies to surrender. Rahma may have even sought to persuade 
the Imam to kill the imprisoned Shaikhs if Shaikh Abdul Rahman did not capitulate.
31
 
Rahma was to be disappointed, as he reached Diriyah only to find that the Shaikhs 
had already been released. Saud would naturally have been upset and angry when he 
discovered he had been tricked. Upon Rahma‘s advice, he sent a fast cavalry 
contingent to try to apprehend the three Shaikhs before they reached the shores of the 
Gulf. The horsemen failed.
32
 
When news of this came back to Diriyah, Imam Saud appears to have decided 
to send an army to bring the Utub back under his yoke. Rahma, who had offered his 
services to the Imam as a viable Saudi ally, was invited to join the Imam‘s army as 
chief lieutenant to the commander, Ibrahim Ibn Ufaisan. The army marched from 
Diriyah to Qatar, heading for the town of Huwaila in the northeast of the peninsula. 
When news of the approach reached Abahussain, governor of Huwaila, he sent a 
message to Shaikhs Salman and Abdullah, who sent a relief force. All of that resulted 
in the1810 battle of Huwaila, ended with a relatively easy Utub victory, to the great 
disappointment of Imam Saud.
33
 The victory was probably easy because Imam Saud 
had underestimated Utub strength and had not sent a large enough force. 
To defeat the Utub, Imam Saud needed a new strategy. It seems that he and 
Rahma, with some other confidants, decided to a raise a much larger army. To fight 
prolonged battles in the barren lands of Qatar, while the Al Khalifa were secure in 
Bahrain, was no longer feasible. Instead, the Saudis would launch a direct naval 
offensive upon the isles, menacing the Utub in the centre of their economic and naval 
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power base. If that strategy were successful, it would practically dismantle the 
political power of the Utub and their hold on their dominions. The Saudis, whose 
soldiers were accustomed only to land battles, needed Rahma‘s ships and naval 
expertise. This strategic thinking led to one of the fiercest and most decisive naval 
battles in the nineteenth century history of the Arabian Gulf: the battle of Akhakkira. 
Once Rahma al-Jalahma and the Saudis had matured their plan, Imam Saud set 
out to execute it. He raised a large army, again under the command of Ibn Ufaisan and 
Rahma al-Jalahma, which left Diriyah for Qatar. Once there, it headed towards a town 
called Rubaija, west of Zubarah, where Rahma encouraged the local tribes to join the 
Saudi army, warning them of the dire consequences for anyone who opposed the 
Saudis.
34
 Many local tribes would have joined the Saudis out of fear, conviction or 
greed for loot. Using these methods, Rahma soon assembled a large fleet to carry the 
Saudi invasion army to Bahrain. 
When news of Rahma al-Jalahma and his Saudi allies reached Bahrain, 
Shaikhs Salman and Abdullah were naturally bemused and allegedly outraged. The 
outrage spread beyond the circle of the Shaikhs to the allied tribes and the people of 
Bahrain, who had had enough of the supposed maltreatment of the Saudis and were 
utterly appalled by Rahma‘s alliance with them.35 It is likely that Shaikhs Salman and 
Abdullah sought to use this popular anger and resentment to their advantage, playing 
on their people‘s emotions. Popular resentment was almost certainly exacerbated by 
the brief Saudi occupation of Bahrain, as Sunnis and Shias alike had probably 
suffered from maltreatment. The atmosphere therefore made it easy for the Shaikhs to 
kindle rage and a fierce fighting spirit. They raised a large army and prepared their 
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fleet for one of the most decisive naval battles in the history of Bahrain. Rahma must 
have caught wind of their preparations, as he assembled and prepared his own fleet 
rapidly, probably to retain the advantage of initiating the offensive. Rahma and his 
allies assembled their fleet near Khor Hassan in northwestern Qatar, sailing for 
Bahrain as soon as they were ready.
36
 Shaikhs Salman and Abdullah, in all likelihood, 
were in a race against time to sail with their fleet so they could destroy the Saudis at 
sea, before they set foot in Bahrain. They most likely realized the grave danger that 
could have resulted if such a situation had occurred. The Shaikhs probably knew from 
their spies that the Saudi army was very large and would be difficult to defeat after a 
successful landing in Bahrain. At the same time, they must have realized that when it 
came to naval warfare, the Utub‘s greater experience, better and larger ships and 
better weaponry gave them the upper hand. Therefore, it seems that the main of 
objective of their strategy was to meet the Saudi fleet midway between Bahrain and 
Qatar and force them into a naval battle instead of a land battle. 
The Shaikhs‘ plan worked and the Bahraini fleet, under the command of 
Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmed, blocked the Saudi fleet‘s advance and forced it to battle. 
The two fleets met in a maritime area known as Akhakkira, a few miles north of Khor 
Hassan
37
. See Figure 5.
38
  
According to al-Tabatebai, the Vizier to Shaikh Salman bin Ahmad, the Utub 
fleet numbered between sixty and seventy ships.
39
 The battle took place in April 1811 
(Rabi al-Awwal 1226 AH) and ended with the defeat of Rahma and the Saudis.
40
 
According to al-Tabatebai, the battle lasted from dawn to dusk and was incredibly 
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fierce. Five Utub ships and three Saudi vessels were burnt, but the resilience of the 
Utub enabled them to defeat their foes and the battle ended with the utter defeat of the 
Saudis, whose whole fleet fell into the hands of the Utub. The Utub lost nearly 700 
men, while the losses of the Saudis were also high.
41
 According to the Najdi historian, 
Ibn Bishr, the battle resulted in over 1,600 casualties and the destruction of numerous 
ships.
42
 Shaikh Abdullah and his men had won a spectacular victory, but at a terrible 
price. 
According to oral tradition, people in Bahrain and the northern shores of Qatar 
ate no fish for several weeks or even months. They allegedly often found little bits of 
human parts, such as ears, fingers and eyes in the fish they caught. Among the notable 
Utub casualties was Shaikh Rashid bin Abdullah, his brother Shaikh Ahmad, Shaikh 
Duaij bin Jabir I Al Sabah and Abahussain, the governor of Huwaila.
43
 Rahma and 
Ibn Ufaisan barely managed to escape in a little boat (other accounts have them 
swimming on a piece of wreckage) to the coast of Qatar.
44
 Rahma also lost a hand and 
an eye in the battle. The battle over, Shaikhs Salman and Abdullah had some relief 
from the political and military turmoil that had marred their lives. The shaikhs divided 
the islands between themselves. Shaikh Abdullah made the island of Muharraq his 
base and thus founded what is known today as the city of Muharraq. Shaikh Salman 
on the other hand based himself on  the main island of Bahrain and founded the city 
of Riffa.
45
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Figure 5: Battle of Akhakkira 1811 
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The battle of Akhakkira is historically very significant. The Utub proved 
themselves, beyond doubt, as a formidable regional power to be taken seriously by 
their foes. One immediate result was that the Al Khalifa and the Utub secured 
themselves from any further Saudi attacks. That security was further consolidated 
with the Saudis becoming busy with their war with the Ottoman Viceroy of Egypt, 
Muhammad Ali Pasha. That war lasted till 1818 and ended with the defeat and 
destruction of the first Saudi state.
46
 The need did not arise to worry about another 
threat from the Saudis until 1834 (1249 AH), as shall be later seen. 
The victory also gave Shaikhs Salman and Abdullah, as well as their family 
and subjects, a breathing space. They had a chance at last to enjoy the benefits of their 
lands after the turbulent years of the Omanis and Saudis. The two Shaikhs and their 
allies were able to develop their interests in commerce and pearling and to lead 
peaceful lives. The period of calm, however, did not last very long. 
6. Rahma al-Jalahma Seeks Revenge: Second Omani 
Invasion of 1816 
After his humiliating defeats at the hands of the Al Khalifa, Rahma retreated for a 
while and lay low, nursing his desire for revenge. He sought help from the Saudis 
again, but Imam Saud, who had suffered huge losses at Akhakkira, was 
understandably unwilling to stage a counter-offensive against the Utub so soon. They 
may also have hesitated to help because they were themselves under serious threat 
from abroad. The Ottoman Sultan had instructed Muhammad Ali Pasha, Ottoman 
viceroy of Egypt, to invade and destroy the Saudi State in 1811. A settlement was 
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reached between the Saudis and Tusun Pasha, son of Muhammad Ali and commander 
of his army in 1815. However conflict was renewed in 1816 and the Saudis were so 
preoccupied by the Egyptian troops under the command of Ibrahim Pasha, son of 
Muhammad Ali, that they could spare neither resource nor power to help Rahma.
47
 
Rahma, apparently too weak to attack the Al Khalifa directly without allies, 
resorted to using spoiling tactics. He waged raids on coastal villages and towns in the 
domains of the Al Khalifa family. He intercepted and hijacked commercial ships 
plying between those domains.
48
 His aim was probably not to gain money from 
piracy, although he did so, but more of an attempt to damage the economy and 
commerce of Bahrain and its dependencies, and thus the financial interests of Shaikhs 
Salman and Abdullah. At some stage, Rahma probably realized the futility of his 
tactics, as he was not inflicting major damage on the Al Khalifa. He needed a new 
strategy, and devised a plan that many would consider diabolical. It is solid historical 
proof that Rahma al-Jalahma was a cunning tactician and political chameleon who 
had no problem in changing his ideologies to reach his political goals. Rahma had 
allied himself with the Saudis, probably presenting himself as an ardent, staunch 
supporter, a believer in the Wahhabi/Salafi interpretation of Islam, a credible Saudi 
vassal in Bahrain and Qatar. Nevertheless, he did not hesitate to ally himself with 
another force, whose religious interpretation of Islam was in direct conflict with that 
of the Wahhabi Saudis—Sayyid Said bin Sultan Al Said, Sultan of Oman and 
Zanzibar. Sayyid Said‘s family had risen to political power as Imams of the Ibadi sect 
of Islam in Oman. The alliance between Rahma and the Sultan would bring about the 
second Omani invasion of Bahrain. 
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Rahma al-Jalahma seemingly decided to seek help from the powerful Sayyid 
Said,
49
 perhaps seeing an opportunity to use that power. Shaikhs Salman and 
Abdullah had ceased paying the yearly tribute of 9,000 MT Riyals that Shaikh Abdul 
Rahman bin Rashid Al Fadhil had promised to the Sultan. And Rahma would have 
wasted not a moment in trying to capitalise on the breach of agreement. He had an 
audience with Sultan Said in Muscat, at which he displayed what al-Khairi called ―the 
arts of cunning and deception‖.50 In that meeting, Rahma used the pretext of the 
suspended annual tribute to incite the anger of the Sultan. He probably also pointed 
out that the Al Khalifa would be unable to elicit any new alliance against Oman from 
the Saudis.
51
 It seems that he presented Shaikhs Salman and Abdullah, their family 
and allies as a deceitful, untrustworthy lot, while presenting himself as a trustworthy 
ally who would be a loyal vassal if the Sultan helped him oust the Al Khalifa and their 
allies from Bahrain.
52
 Rahma‘s tactics seem to have been successful in encouraging 
Sayyid Said to invade Bahrain and recapture it from the Al Khalifa, and he may well 
have been helped in his encouragement by a close advisor and confidant of the Sultan 
known as Muhammad Ibn Khalaf, a Shiite dissident from Bahrain. Khalaf had been 
one of the conspirators who encouraged Sayyid Sultan, father of Sayyid Said, to 
invade Bahrain in 1801. He escaped from the islands when they were recaptured by 
the Utub, probably fearing retribution. Muhammad Ibn Khalaf most likely wanted his 
revenge too, so encouraged the Sultan to invade Bahrain.
53
 This, of course, became 
very beneficial for Rahma and helped him to convince the Sultan to adopt his plans. 
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Hence, we have a historical anomaly in which an Ibadi, a Shiite and a previous ally of 
the Wahhabi Saudis all agreed on a political decision. 
It worth commenting here that Shaikhs Salman and Abdullah apparently made 
an imprudent decision when they suspended the payment of the tribute, as an enemy 
like Rahma could use it against them. The Shaikhs‘ frugality or ‗love of 
independence‘ might have prevented them from seeing the political consequences of 
such a decision. The Sultan might also have made a mistake. If Rahma had secured 
Bahrain, he could have rebelled against the Sultan. Possibly, however, the Sultan was 
only using Rahma as a pawn to seize Bahrain, in the same way that his father had 
used Nasr Al Mathkoor. 
When news of the impeding invasion reached Bahrain, it must have alarmed 
the two Shaikhs and their men, but their reaction was very different from that of the 
1801 Omani invasion. They decided not to surrender Bahrain easily and not to allow 
panic to take control of them as it had in the previous invasion. It seems that their 
victories against the Saudis had boosted their confidence, though they probably 
understood that they would need a different strategy against the Omanis. In naval 
warfare, the Saudis had been inferior and the Utub had taken full advantage. Sayyid 
Said and the Omanis were certainly not inferior at sea. The Sultan had one of the 
largest fleets and native naval forces in the area, surpassed only by the British Indian 
Navy. The Shaikhs most likely appreciated the fact that defeat by the Omani fleet was 
quite possible and would have disastrous consequences. Shaikhs Salman and 
Abdullah therefore apparently decided to take a different course of action against the 
Sultan. They would allow him to land in Bahrain without harassment. They probably 
knew that Bahrain was his main interest, and that he had no interest in Zubarah or 
Qatar. They need not, therefore, expend valuable sources in securing either from 
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Sayyid Said, but would face him in a land battle in Bahrain, where they probably 
concentrated most of their forces. 
7. Battle of Maqta’a 
In the late summer of 1816 the Sultan, accompanied by Rahma al-Jalahma, landed 
with his troops on the eastern shores of Bahrain. He captured the island of Sitrah and 
its fort. The Sultan was probably surprised that there was no serious resistance—he 
and his troops remained for three days on the island of Sitrah
54
 without seeing anyone. 
Allegedly, this prompted the Sultan‘s sarcastic remark to Rahma, ―Are your Utub 
dead?‖ 55 Rahma apparently did not take that comment lightly as he too was an Utubi, 
telling the Sultan that they should meet them the next day. He was most likely aware 
from an informant that the Utub forces were camping near a village called Jid Ali.
56
 
Rahma might well have worried that a ploy was being woven against him by the 
Shaikhs. If he did, he was proved correct when the battle started. 
The following day, Utubi war banners appeared and a large army under the 
command of Shaikh Salman bin Ahmad approached.
57
 At low water Sayyid Said, 
Rahma al-Jalahma and their forces crossed from Sitrah to the main island to meet the 
forces of the Utub.
58
 The sons of Shaikh Salman, Khalifa and Ahmed, played a 
critical role in this battle and proved themselves prudent commanders. The 
prominence and prestige they gained here was later passed to their sons and, as we 
shall see in later chapters, played a vital role in the political history of Bahrain against 
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the sons of Shaikh Abdullah. Rahma‘s probable fears about a hidden ploy of the Al 
Khalifa proved to be correct. When the battle started, the Utub forces held their 
ground for a while and then began a slow retreat, probably a tactic agreed on 
beforehand between Shaikh Salman and Shaikh Abdullah. The Utub‘s retreat must 
have naturally encouraged the forces of Sayyid Said and Rahma to push further into 
the mainland—away from their ships and into an ambush. Shaikh Salman had 
apparently placed a large cavalry force under the command of his sons, Shaikhs 
Khalifa and Ahmad. It was hidden behind some thick date gardens opposite the coast 
of Sitrah. At the right moment, he apparently signalled for the hidden cavalry forces 
to strike. Naturally, the Omanis were caught by surprise and some of their formations 
broke. As local accounts narrate, Shaikh Khalifa played a vital role in exerting 
unyielding Bahraini pressure on the Omanis, and it was that battle that gave him such 
high prominence in the eyes of Bahrainis and the Utub.
59
 Shaikh Abdullah‘s next 
move made matters even worse for the Omanis. 
After the Omanis had been pulled away from their ships into the interior of the 
main island, Shaikh Abdullah‘s fleet arrived, sandwiched the docked Omani fleet 
between the island of Sitrah and his cannons, and opened fire.
60
 That was a killer 
blow. Omani forces ashore panicked and disintegrated into a frantic retreat to try and 
save their ships. As military science acknowledges, an army in disorganised retreat is 
in a far worse situation than a defeated army that retains its formation. The panicking, 
retreating troops of Sayyid Said were easy targets for the forces of Shaikh Khalifa and 
Shaikh Ahmad. The Sultan and Rahma barely escaped with their lives, as did other 
Omani contingents. The battle ended in complete rout for the forces of Sayyid Said, 
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who lost two of his relations and principal sirdars.
61
 The battle was apparently vicious 
and resulted in substantial fatalities. Among the notables of Bahrain killed were 
Shaikh Muhammad bin Ibrahim bin Muhammad Al Khalifa, Shaikh Salman bin 
Abdullah bin Ahmed Al Khalifa and Qassim bin Dirbas al-bin Ali. On the other side, 
Sayyid Hamad, brother of Sayyid Said, was killed.
62
 See Figure 6.
63
  
Shaikh Abdullah‘s military ability shines in this battle. He had most likely 
estimated the naval strength of his foe correctly, so chose, with his brother, a land and 
sea battle scenario that suited their needs, tricking the Omanis into landing in Bahrain 
and engaging them on the ground, so they were deprived of any naval advantage they 
might have had. The delay in fielding the Utub defence was possibly an intentional 
ploy conceived by Shaikh Abdullah and his family, who wanted to make the Sultan 
and his troops believe that the Utub were frightened of them. That would have made 
them overconfident and lowered their guard, committing a fatal error. Shaikh 
Abdullah revealed himself a prudent strategist. His accord with his brother and two 
nephews tempted the Omani army away from their ships in pursuit of the retreating 
ground forces, so he could encircle their docked ships and nearly wipe out the Omani 
fleet. The Shaikh‘s strategy allowed the Utub to gain a spectacular victory without 
incurring significant casualties in lives and ships in an unpredictable naval battle with 
a formidable foe. 
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Figure 6: Battle of Maqta’a 1816 
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8. Aftermath of the Battle 
Sayyid Said barely escaped the battlefield, no doubt in an angry and bitter mood. He 
naturally would have felt that he must avenge himself and his brother, Sayyid Hamad, 
who was killed in the battle. He headed to Kangoon on the Persian coast and entered 
in a correspondence with the Prince of Shiraz. He apparently tried to solicit military 
aid from him. The Persians first obliged but then apparently lost interest for unknown 
reasons and started delaying the promised supply of troops. They also demanded that 
the Sultan deliver one of his brothers, Sayyid Salim, as a hostage in Shiraz. Such 
actions and demands offended Sayyid Said and he abandoned the enterprise altogether 
and returned to Masqat.
64
 He must have felt disgruntled at his defeat and the duplicity 
of the Persians that seemingly hindered any short term possibility of getting even with 
the Utub. However, coincidence came to his aid. Some of the notables of Bahrain 
were on a commercial trip to India at the time of the Omani invasion and the battle of 
Maqta‘a. Consequently, they were naturally unaware of those events when they 
stopped in Muscat on their way home to Bahrain. They were Shaikh Muhammad bin 
Migrin bin Muhammad Al Khalifa, Shaikh Abdul-Rahman bin Rashid Al Fadhil, 
Sayyar bin Qassim al-Mua‘awdah and Muhammad bin Saqr al-Mua‘awdah.65 As soon 
as the Sultan heard of their arrival, he ordered their immediate arrest. They were 
imprisoned in a castle called Burj Mooza al-Jalali, residence of the influential Lady 
Sayyida Mooza bint Sultan, sister of Sultan Said.
66
 The Sultan, who in all likelihood 
was still bitter and angry after the Bahrain defeat, considered killing the notables as a 
form of revenge, but they were saved by the intervention of Sayyida Mooza, who had 
influence over her brother. She allegedly discouraged the Sultan from killing his 
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hostages, convincing him that such an act would bring him neither glory nor benefit, 
but would portray him in a very poor light. She advised him to launch another 
counter-offensive against Bahrain instead.
67
 
When news of the imprisonment of the four notables reached Bahrain, Shaikhs 
Salman and Abdullah were naturally angered and appalled, and they called a meeting 
with their closest aides. Most of the men, apparently full of confidence after their 
recent victory, suggested invading Muscat and freeing the Bahraini hostages by force. 
Reason, however, took hold over passion. Shaikh Ahmad bin Salman convinced the 
two Shaikhs and the rest of the audience that an invasion would be a reckless 
endeavour.
68
 It would subject them to a risky battle with the Omanis on their own soil 
and would have made Bahrain and Zubarah vulnerable to attack from Rahma al-
Jalahma.
69
 News also reached the Shaikhs that Sayyid Said might ally with the Prince 
of Shiraz against them,
70
 so they decided to take a more diplomatic approach. 
By choosing the diplomatic approach, the two Shaikhs probably sought not 
only the safe return of the hostages, but also to alienate Rahma al-Jalahma. Perhaps 
they realized that the latter had instigated the last Omani offensive, and concluded that 
by a yearly tribute to Sayyid Said plus a generous diyah
71
 for the death of his brother, 
they would be able to prevent the Sultan from attacking them in the future. Such an 
offer would also alienate the Sultan from Rahma. With that achieved, and with no 
Saudi threat, the Shaikhs probably intended to free themselves so they could pursue 
Rahma and neutralise his threat. This, as we shall see, is exactly what happened. The 
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two Shaikhs had proved themselves apt strategists, skilful in alienating one foe in 
order to deal with another. 
Shaikhs Salman and Abdullah sent an envoy to Sultan Said before he had 
finished preparing for another invasion of Bahrain. He apparently convinced the 
Sultan that the Shaikhs sought peace and cordial relations, while all earlier bloodshed 
could have been blamed on the dubious schemes of Rahma. The Sultan agreed to 
meet an Utubi delegation for further discussions of the peace deal on the island of 
Qais, off the Persian coast. The Shaikhs sent a delegation headed by Shaikh Ahmed 
bin Salman Al Khalifa, Shaikh Hamad bin Abdullah Al Khalifa and Sayyid Abdul-
Jalil al-Tabatebai, among other notables.
72
 After lengthy negotiations, the Utub agreed 
to pay the Sultan an annual tribute of 30,000 German Crowns, which the Sultan then 
reduced to 18,000 Crowns. Shaikh Ahmad bin Salman was the guarantor of the peace. 
He pledged that the tribute would never be suspended as long as he was alive and 
able.
73
 Consequently, Sultan Said released the imprisoned Bahraini notables and 
relations between the Utub, headed by Shaikhs Salman and Abdullah, and the Sultan 
returned to peaceful and cordial terms.
74
 Nevertheless, that peace did not last. 
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9. Beginning of British Involvement and the Death of 
Shaikh Salman 
Shaikh Salman‘s final few years were peaceful, and he and his brother Shaikh 
Abdullah had some peace of mind at last. Until the death of Shaikh Salman in 1825, 
the Shaikhdom faced no major external threats. That period, however, witnessed the 
beginning of British involvement in the affairs of the region and in Bahrain. Its 
beginning can be traced to 1816 when the British, through the East India Company 
Resident in Bushire, Lieutenant William Bruce, appointed a native agent in Bahrain. 
The exact date of the appointment of the agent is unknown, but it was probably not 
much later than 1816. In that same year, Lieutenant Bruce and Shaikh Abdullah 
signed a friendship treaty that would guarantee safe access for Bahraini ships to the 
ports of British India under the condition of reciprocal treatment for British ships 
visiting Bahrain.
75
 
The second major interaction with the British was the signing of the peace 
treaty of 1820. After the destruction of the Qawasim stronghold in Ras al-Khaima in 
December 1819, the British drew up an agreement known as the General Treaty of 
1820. Its stated aim was to prohibit piracy in the region and provide maritime peace.
76
 
That treaty signalled the beginning of British hegemony in the Arabian Gulf region 
and, as such, is a key historical point in the region‘s history. One of its outcomes is 
that it demarcated the Gulf region by an imaginary line, known as the Restrictive Line 
that stretched from al-Khafji south of Kuwait to Ras al-Khaima. The Gulf Arabs of 
the Arabian littoral were able to resort to naval depredations in the event of a conflict 
                                                          
75
 James Onley, The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj: Merchants, Rulers, and the British in the 
Nineteenth-Century Gulf (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 56. 
76
 Mai Al Khalifa, Muhammad bin Khalifa, 84-86. 
Abdulaziz Al Khalifa Chapter III  
 
  107 
 
west of that line but not east of it. Such a measure was meant to provide a safe 
maritime route for British shipping and trade. See Figure 7.
77
 
 
Figure 7: Map of the Restrictive Line 
More likely than not, the British did not draw up that treaty merely to stop 
piracy in the region. They probably saw it as an excuse to intervene and meddle in the 
internal affairs of the local rulers—not for the gain of regional wealth, but for the gain 
of the Gulf‘s strategic position. The Gulf provided a vital waterway for global trade. 
Controlling it would have given British India a buffer zone that would put any 
enemies seeking to attack British India at a safe distance.
78
 The British must have 
recognised that the region was arid, poor and sparsely populated, but they also saw 
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that, under the control of another rival colonial power, it would be an excellent base 
from which to attack British possessions and interests in India. British India was 
regarded as the ‗Jewel in the Crown‘ of the far-flung colonies of the British Empire. 
The British required only the Shaikhs of what was known as the ‗Trucial Coast‘ (now 
the UAE) to sign the agreement. Despite that, Shaikhs Salman and Abdullah were 
interested in joining and voluntarily offered to sign it. The probable motive was to 
secure the maritime trade of their dominions in Bahrain and Qatar. Little did they 
know that by signing such an agreement they would open the door for continued and 
unwanted involvement by the British in their internal affairs, to be witnessed by some 
of their descendants. The Shaikhs sent their Wakil (Agent), Sayyid Abdul-Jalil bin 
Yaseen al-Tabatebai, to Ras al-Khaima to sign the treaty on 5 February 1820. The 
Shaikhs subsequently signed it in Bahrain on 23 February 1820.
79
 The Shaikhs‘ 
reason for not going to Ras al-Khaima in person was perhaps that they wanted to 
differentiate themselves from the Shaikhs of the Trucial Coast. 
Shaikh Salman bin Ahmed died in 1825.
80
 According to local sources his 
death was caused by a pandemic that swept Bahrain.
81
 With the death of Shaikh 
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Salman, Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmed became the senior co-ruler of Bahrain and 
Qatar.
82
 His nephews, Shaikhs Khalifa and Ahmed, sons of Shaikh Salman, became 
junior co-rulers.
83
 The ascendancy of Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmed over the domains 
of the Al Khalifa family in Bahrain and Qatar ushered in a new era in the history of 
Bahrain and the region. It was an era of numerous military conflicts that often ended 
in violent stand-offs, but there were many diplomatic endeavours, as well. 
10. Conclusion 
The events of this chapter illustrate the various methods employed by local Arab 
rulers in the nineteenth century Gulf region to defend their domains against external 
threats. Shaikhs Salman and Abdullah used the protector-protégé dynamic against 
both Omanis and Saudis. It was a tactic used by local rulers in the Gulf before Pax 
Britannica was established at the end of the nineteenth century. A ruler would seek 
the protection of another ruler, who would provide military assistance against the 
former‘s enemies. In return, the protector expected some kind of subservience from 
the protégé. That subservience usually came in the form of tribute payment or 
relinquishment of some of the protégé‘s power and/or independence.84 James Onley 
uses the term dakhala (‗entering‘ the protection of another) for such a practice which 
comes from the Arabic word for protégé, dakheel. In his article, ―The Politics of 
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Protection: The Arabian Gulf Rulers and the Pax Britannica in the Nineteenth 
Century‖, he argues that dakhala was a very common custom in Arabia at the time 
with deep cultural roots. The major difference between such a system and between 
what is known in the west as racketeering is that the protector was bound to protect 
his protégé by a strong cultural code of honor.
85
 
Shaikhs Salman and Abdullah used such a tactic to protect themselves from 
the Omanis by allying with the Saudis. When circumstances changed, their nephew, 
Shaikh Abdul Rahman bin Rashid, allied on behalf of the Al Khalifa with the Omanis 
against the Saudis. It still took a violent military confrontation for Shaikhs Salman 
and Abdullah to secure themselves from the Saudis. Sometimes local rulers could not 
rely on their protector and had to defend themselves alone. That was what happened 
at Akhakkira, a battle that marked the beginning of a series of major military 
successes for Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmad. The Al Khalifa faced a major naval 
invasion by the Saudis and Rahma bin Jabir al-Jalahma, and only by defeating them in 
battle could they secure themselves against the Saudis for some time. It is interesting 
to note that Sayyid Said of Oman did not come to the rescue of the Utub, his protégé. 
The reason for this neglect is unknown, but it may well have prompted the two 
Shaikhs to suspend their protector-protégé relationship and stop paying tribute. That 
suspension culminated in the battle of Maqta‘a, where the Al Khalifa and their allies 
defeated Sayyid Said and routed his army. Al Khalifa success was achieved by using 
alternative forms of political tactics to safeguard their domains. Those tactics ranged 
from seeking protection to military standoffs. The local rulers of the time faced 
continued political uncertainty that forced them to switch from one tactic to another. 
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Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmed played an important role during the reign of his 
brother Shaikh Salman bin Ahmed (1795-1825). It was one of paramount importance 
and vitality. Shaikh Abdullah was one of the ‗pillars‘ on which the Al Khalifa family 
depended to maintain and intensify its hold on its dominions. With his brother Shaikh 
Salman and their family, Shaikh Abdullah succeeded in his policy of setting rival 
regional powers against each other. The goal of this policy, of course, was to let their 
foes weaken each other by fighting and military assaults. A good example of this was 
in Shaikh Abdullah‘s ability to incite his two main regional foes, the Saudis and the 
Omanis, to fight each other for the Shaikh‘s sake. In essence, Shaikh Abdullah used 
the power of one foe to further his interests against the other. He did that by 
presenting himself as an ally to one foe and using that enemy‘s power to fight the 
other foe. For instance, he used the Saudis to oust the Omanis from Bahrain, despite 
the difficulties it caused him and his family later. His nephew, Shaikh Abdul Rahman 
Al Fadhil, employed a similar tactic when he used the Omanis to get rid of the Saudis. 
Shaikh Abdullah had the ability to choose the appropriate tactic and/or 
strategy for the appropriate foe. In the battle of Akhakkira, for example, the Shaikh 
most likely recognised his advantage over the army of Rahma and Ibn Ufaisan when it 
came to naval warfare. He must have realized that if their army had indeed managed 
to land in Bahrain, the outcome would be unpredictable, so he calculated that the best 
strategy was to intercept them at sea and force them to engage his superior fleet in a 
naval battle in which the odds were in his favour. He succeeded by mobilising his 
troops very quickly, probably forewarned by an efficient network of spies that 
enabled him to prepare to face his enemies in good time. 
Another example of the Shaikh‘s ability is his face-off against Sayyid Said of 
Oman at the battle of Maqta'a. Shaikh Abdullah probably realized that his naval 
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advantage over the Saudi forces could not be counted upon when facing the strong 
naval forces of the Omanis. That realisation prompted him to change his strategy and 
engage the Omanis in a land battle—a very prudent military decision. He neutralised 
Omani naval superiority, if in fact it existed. Presumably, the Shaikh also intended to 
delay the appearance of his troops before the Omanis for three days, making the 
Sultan and his troops lower their guard through overconfidence. If that was true, it 
certainly facilitated the task of his brother Shaikh Salman as he drew the Omanis 
away from their ships. That in turn facilitated the task of Shaikhs Khalifa and Ahmad, 
sons of Shaikh Salman, in their surprise cavalry attack against the troops of the 
Sultan. Meanwhile, Shaikh Abdullah destroyed large sections of the Omani fleet at 
very little risk to himself. Naturally, that made the Omani forces panic and retreat in a 
disorganised manner. That, of course, resulted in their ultimate defeat. 
Shaikh Abdullah was not only a man of war and politics, but of peace too. He 
sought to promote the commercial interests of his subjects. This is clearly illustrated 
in the 1820 treaty he and his brother, Shaikh Salman, concluded with the British. The 
British had imposed the treaty on the rulers of the Trucial Coast, after their campaign 
against the Qawasim in 1819. The British sought by this treaty to ban piracy in the 
Gulf and thus guarantee the safety of their commercial ships and those of British 
India. The Shaikhs of Bahrain had no obligation to sign the treaty, but Shaikh 
Abdullah and Shaikh Salman probably believed that by voluntarily signing it, they 
would help secure and promote the trade of their subjects in Bahrain and Qatar. 
Possibly by protecting them from any depredations the Qawasim, who controlled the 
Strait of Hormuz, could have launched. 
Shaikh Abdullah was clearly a pivotal element in solidifying the rule and 
position of the Al Khalifa family. He was capable and prudent in both military and 
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diplomatic arenas. He knew the appropriate tactic to use for each foe, and the time to 
use it to best advantage. At the same time, he sought to advance the economic welfare 
of his subjects by willingly joining a treaty that would safeguard their trade. All this 
clearly indicates that Shaikh Abdullah is a historical figure well worthy of study by 
anyone who seeks to understand the history of the Gulf in the early modern period. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Joint Rule of Shaikhs Abdullah and Khalifa bin 
Salman: Continued Conflicts with Saudis, Omanis 
and Rahma 1825-1834 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the role played by Shaikh Abdullah in repelling external 
threats against the dominions of his family in Bahrain and Qatar between 1825 (the 
death of Shaikh Salman) and 1834 (the death of Shaikh Khalifa, Salman‘s son). 
During that period, Shaikh Abdullah was the senior co-ruler of Bahrain and its 
dependencies in Qatar and the Arabian mainland. He shared power with his nephews, 
Shaikh Khalifa and his brother Shaikh Ahmad, the junior co-rulers, who faithfully 
supported their uncle against many challenges from foreign adversaries. Some of 
those challenges were resolved through diplomacy, others through fierce military 
confrontations. The chapter analyses Shaikh Abdullah‘s important role in neutralising 
all the threats against his authority, revealing his actions as vital to the survival of the 
Al Khalifa family to the present day. 
This chapter illustrates how a local Arab ruler used both military confrontation 
and diplomatic manoeuvres to repel external threats. Although some political 
situations obliged him to fight to safeguard himself and his Shaikhdom, his skill lay in 
knowing when to strike and when to submit (temporarily) to those in a stronger 
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political position. Shaikh Abdullah provides a remarkable example of this skill in his 
dealings with the Saudis and the Omanis, as he combined confrontation and 
submission in the manner described in this chapter. Many local rulers needed to use 
these strategies and tactics to maintain their rulerships. If he appeared too submissive 
and timid, he might have encouraged his foreign protector, other external foes or even 
internal challengers to take advantage of the situation. On the other hand, if he was 
too confrontational, not knowing when to attack and when to hold back, he risked 
losing his domains to his enemies. Realising that he could not fight more than one 
enemy at a time, he sometimes needed to temporarily to submit to one foe in order to 
fight another and neutralise the threat. Before he could fight the Omanis, Shaikh 
Abdullah needed to get rid of Rahma, and before he could focus his energy and 
resources against the Saudis, he had to neutralise the Omanis. As a local ruler, he 
needed to segregate his risks, weigh the practicality and necessity of dealing with 
each, then decide which to face immediately and which to postpone. Failure to follow 
this strategy risked grave consequences for any Gulf ruler, no matter his military or 
financial strength. 
Shaikh Abdullah‘s first task was to remove the threat to the safety and 
integrity of the Al Khalifa‘s domains posed by Rahma bin Jabir al-Jalahma. He tried 
every possible way to resolve the conflict peacefully, but all his efforts were in vain, 
and violence ensued. Even Rahma's death did not end the matter, as his son Bishr 
sought to avenge his father's death by forming an alliance with an old foe of the Al 
Khalifa family. Bishr‘s actions led to an invasion of Bahrain, the third by the rulers of 
Oman and the second by Sayyid Said bin Sultan. Shaikh Abdullah won that battle, 
and the Omani Sultan never again attempted to invade Al Khalifa territory. The 
Shaikh and his family had effectively secured Bahrain against any Omani attempts at 
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achieving hegemony or control. The Shaikh‘s troubles were not over, however. He 
and the rest of the Utub now faced the threat arising from the revival of Saudi power 
in central Arabia under the command of Emir Turki bin Abdullah Al Saud, founder of 
the second Saudi state.
1
 Shaikh Abdullah found himself facing a foe so dangerous that 
he was compelled to formulate a strategy that combined diplomacy with warfare. He 
confronted the Saudis militarily when there was a good likelihood of victory, while in 
unfavourable political circumstances he stifled his deep resentment of Saudi 
hegemony, resorting to diplomacy and temporary submission. 
The following sections describe Shaikh Abdullah's great ability as a military 
leader and a diplomat skilled in political manoeuvres. He used those skills with 
considerable efficiency against many enemies eager to dispossess his family. His 
successes protected the integrity of his family's dominions and ensured Bahrain's 
independence from both Saudi and Omani hegemony. He played a paramount role in 
crystallising the position of the Al Khalifa family and the Utub as Bahrain's political 
rulers. If not for him, Bahrain might today be part of Saudi Arabia or Oman. 
2. Dealing with the Threat of Rahma al-Jalahma: Death of 
Rahma al-Jalahma, 1826 
Shaikh Abdullah used various methods to deal with the problems, annoyances and 
threats of Rahma bin Jabir. Rahma had been defeated, as had his ally the Sultan of 
Oman and Zanzibar, Sayyid Said, in the battle of Maqta‘a in 1816. The subsequent 
peace accord between the Sultan and the Al Khalifa family had the effect of isolating 
                                                          
1
 Turki bin Abdullah probably chose the title of Emir instead of Imam, used by his predecessors, so as 
not to incense the Ottomans. He probably figured that his predecessors‘ mistake was to challenge the 
Ottomans in religious leadership of the Sunni Muslim world. It led to their demise, and he certainly 
would not have wished to repeat their error. 
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Rahma, leaving him with no strong allies to aid him in his quest to invade Bahrain 
and destroy Al Khalifa authority. His isolation was deepened by the fall of the Saudis, 
defeated by the Governor of Egypt, Muhammad Ali Pasha, and his troops in 1818.
2
 
Rahma probably realized that he himself did not have the necessary force to launch an 
outright attack that would oust Shaikh Abdullah and his family. This may have 
prompted him to take a fresh approach and use different tactics. 
Rahma relocated to the town of Dammam on the east Arabian coast, just 
opposite Bahrain and close to Qatif. From there he started attacking, looting and 
extorting tribute from the people of Qatif and Hasa. Of course, Bahrain‘s maritime 
trade and that of its dependencies in Qatar were not exempt from Rahma‘s attacks and 
harassments,3
 
which he probably perpetrated for two reasons. First, the money, booty 
and tribute that he collected provided him with the financial means and ability to 
recruit mercenaries, as well as enabling him to amass provisions and arms for his next 
showdown with Shaikh Abdullah. The second reason was that harassment of trade in 
Shaikh Abdullah's domains would naturally have weakened the family and its allies 
financially. 
Shaikh Abdullah first tried peaceful means to solve the problem of Rahma al-
Jalahma. On 22 April 1822, he sent an agent to the British Resident in the Gulf.4 The 
agent asked the British Resident to mediate in the dispute between Shaikh Abdullah 
and Rahma, with the object of a return to their relative positions in status quo ante 
                                                          
2
 Francis Warden, ―Historical Sketch of the Wahabee Tribe of Arabs; From the Year 1795 to the Year 
1818‖, in Arabian Gulf Intelligence, Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, no. 
xxiv, new series. Ed. R. Hughes Thomas (Bombay: Bombay Education Society Press, 1856; reprinted 
Cambridge: The Oleander Press, 1985[1856]) 436. 
3
 Nasser Al-Khairi, Qalaid il Nahrain Fi Tarikh al-Bahrayn [The Necklaces of Pearl in the History of 
Bahrain] (Bahrain: al-Ayam Publishing Establishment, 2003 [c.1924]), 261. 
4
 Lt S. Hennell, ―Historical Sketch of the Uttoobee Tribe of Arabs(Bahrein;)‖, in Arabian Gulf 
Intelligence, Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, no. xxiv, new series, Ed. R. 
Hughes Thomas (Bombay: Bombay Education Society Press, 1856; reprinted Cambridge: The 
Oleander Press, 1985 [1856]), 373. 
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bellum.5 The British Political Agent in Basidu agreed to assume such a role and sent 
instructions to the British Resident in Bushire to mediate between the two parties. 
However, the instructions carried strict conditions, specifying that the British 
Government would take no responsibility for enforcing the conditions of any deal 
struck between Rahma al-Jalahma and Shaikh Abdullah.6  
The British Government, understandably, had a vested interest in peaceful 
maritime trade over land and sea routes in the Gulf region. Even so, it seemed 
unwilling to take any risks or responsibility for military intervention between two 
local Shaikhs unless British trade was harmed or threatened. Realising this, Rahma al-
Jalahma probably refrained from attacking British vessels to avoid the wrath of the 
British fleet and to deprive Shaikh Abdullah of the ability to convince the British that 
Rahma was a pirate to be put down by force. The British arranged a meeting between 
Shaikh Abdullah and Rahma al-Jalahma at Basidu, fifty miles east of the Strait of 
Hormuz. The meeting was unsuccessful because the acting Political Agent, Colonel 
Kennet, was unable to reconcile the differences between the demands of the two men. 
Lorimer states that each man had unreasonable expectations of the other, though he 
does not specify either their expectations or their reasons for unacceptability.7 
Shaikh Abdullah, apparently undaunted, remained resilient and optimistic 
about brokering a peace deal with Rahma. He probably knew quite well that Rahma 
lacked the military power to take Bahrain and its dependencies on his own, but he also 
seems to have been aware that Rahma‘s activities damaged his dominions' economic 
activities. It is likely that the Shaikh acknowledged the imprudence of trying to settle 
                                                          
5
 Ibid; the phrase is Latin and roughly means 'the state in which things were before the war'. 
6
 Lt S. Hennell, “Historical Sketch Uttoo ee  ri e of  ra s”, 373. 
7
 J.G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia, vol. I, historical, part II 
(Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing, 1915), 851. 
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his conflict with Rahma through military means. Had he attempted to do so, Rahma 
would have simply relocated to the Persian coast, entering under the protection of the 
Governor of the Persian province of Fars.
8
 The Shaikh would then have drained his 
resources on wild goose chases trying to bring him to battle. Safe maritime 
commerce, the Shaikh would have reasoned, depended on minimising the tensions 
between himself and Rahma. The Shaikh used no more force, eventually concluding a 
peace agreement brokered by the British Resident in the Gulf, Lt. Col. E.G. Stannus, 
on 7 February 1824. 
The agreement‘s general terms concentrated on three points. First, that Rahma 
and his dependents, and Shaikh Abdullah and his, should abstain from future mutual 
aggression and co-exist peacefully as friends. Second, that Rahma should return some 
of the boats and goods that he and his men had looted from Shaikh Abdullah‘s ports 
and subjects. Third, that Rahma would withdraw his protection from the Abu Sumait 
tribe, who had apparently carried out depredations against Shaikh Abdullah and his 
domains,9 and allow Shaikh Abdullah to punish its members, unhindered by Rahma. 
Shaikh Abdullah probably thought that, with this agreement, he had succeeded in 
pacifying Rahma and ensured the safety of trade in his dominions. He was wrong. 
Peace did not last long, though we do not know the exact date on which it faltered and 
died. Nonetheless, Rahma returned to his old ways and once again put at risk the 
maritime trade and activities of Shaikh Abdullah‘s subjects. The British Resident in 
Bushire tried, backed by the Bombay Government to settle to resolve the issue of 
                                                          
8
 Mai Al Khalifa, Muhammad bin Khalifa al-Ustoorah wal Tarikh al-Muwazi [Muhammad bin Khalifa, 
the legend and the corresponding history] (Beirut: Dar al-Jadid, 1996), 267-268. 
9
 Lt S. Hennell, ―Historical Sketch of the Uttoobee Tribe of Arabs‖, 374 ; E.G. Stannus, Peace 
Agreement between Shaikh Abdullah b. Ahmad of Bahrain and Rahma b. Jabir of Khaur Hasan, 
February 1824, in  IOR: P/385/4, reprinted in Records of Bahrain, Primary Documents 1820-1960, 
Vol I 1820-1868, Ed. Penelope Tuson (Cambridge: Archive Editions, 1993), 219-227.  
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Rahma‘s depredations and the troubles they caused for the peoples of Bahrain, Qatif, 
and Qatar. Nonetheless those efforts were not successful.
10
  
By late 1826, Shaikh Abdullah‘s patience with Rahma seems to have been 
exhausted. 11  His communications with the British Resident in the Gulf and that 
gentleman‘s missives to Rahma had no effect in persuading Rahma to change his 
ways.12 The Shaikh apparently decided that his only means of resolving the conflict 
was to use force. He would have known just how shrewd an enemy Rahma was, and 
that only a comprehensive plan would defeat him. He was also aware that the people 
of Qatif and Hasa were as seriously inconvenienced by Rahma as he was, and decided 
to turn this to his advantage. He contacted the Shaikhs of Hasa, members of the Al 
Humaid family and chiefs of the powerful Bani Khalid tribe.13 Shaikh Muhammad bin 
Urair Al Humaid and his brother Shaikh Majid, Hasa‘s ruler, were probably easily 
convinced that Rahma‘s annihilation would benefit both and could be achieved by 
their cooperation.
14
 The two Shaikhs devised a plan. Shaikh Ahmad bin Urair, Shaikh 
                                                          
10
 Letter from Political Resident in the Gulf, Lt. Col. E.G. Stannus, to Bombay Government, October 
(date not clear) 1825; Letter from Bombay Government to Political Resident in the Gulf, Lt. Col. 
E.G. Stannus, December (date not clear) 1825, in vol. 26 (211), 320-321, Maharashtra State Archive, 
Mumbai, India.  
11
 Lt S. Hennell, ―Historical Sketch of the Uttoobee Tribe of Arabs‖, 376. 
12
 For further details, see the letter from the Resident in the Gulf, Lt Col. EG Stannus, to the 
Government of Bombay Government on 12 November 1826. See also the translated copy of a letter 
from Shaikh Abdullah to the British Resident on 19 October 1825 in IOR: P/386/3, reprinted in 
Records of Bahrain, Primary Documents 1820-1960 Vol I 1820-1868, Ed. Penelope Tuson 
(Cambridge: Archive Editions, 1993), 290-296. 
13
 Al-Khairi, Qalaid il Nahrain, 261. 
14
 In letter exchanges between Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmad, Shaikhs Muhammad and Majid bin Urair, 
and Rahma bin Jabir on the one hand and the British Resident in the Gulf, Lt Col. E.G. Stannus on 
the other about the issue of Rahma al-Jalahma, one can clearly realize how much loathing Rahma 
had brought upon himself because of his depredations. For further details please see: Letter from 
Shaikh Muhammad bin Urair to Lt Col. E.G.Stannus on 19 September 1825; Letter from Shaikh 
Muhammad bin Urair to Lt Col. E.G.Stannus on 2 October 1825; Letter from Shaikh Abdullah bin 
Ahmad to Lt Col. E.G.Stannus on 19 October 1825; Letter from Lt Col. E.G.Stannus to Shaikh 
Muhammad bin Urair on 1 November 1825; Letter from Lt Col. E.G.Stannus to Rahma bin Jabir on 
1 November 1825; Letter from Rahma bin Jabir to Lt Col. E.G.Stannus on 2 November 1825; Letter 
from Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmad to Lt Col. E.G.Stannus on 3 November 1825; Letter from Lt Col. 
E.G.Stannus to Rahma bin Jabir on 4 November 1825; Letter from Shaikh Majid bin Urair to Lt Col. 
E.G.Stannus on 5 November 1825; Letter from Lt Col. E.G.Stannus to Shaikhs Muhammad and 
Majid bin Urair on 6 November 1825; Letter from Lt Col. E.G.Stannus to Rahma bin Jabir on 7 
November 1825; Letter from Rahma bin Jabir to Lt Col. E.G.Stannus on 7 November 1825, in IOR: 
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Majid's brother, marched upon Rahma‘s stronghold in the fort of Dammam. When 
Rahma saw the army approaching, he did not hesitate to confront it and a fierce battle 
ensued.15 However, what Rahma did not know was that he was facing a coordinated 
attack involving both the Al Khalifa and the Al Humaid. Just as the battle was raging 
between him and Shaikh Ahmad bin Urair, a fleet commanded by Shaikh Abdullah 
reached the shores of Dammam. 
Shaikh Abdullah landed with a contingent of his army and joined the battle. 
He left the rest of his army in the ships under the command of his nephew, Shaikh 
Ahmad bin Salman, whose task was to destroy Rahma‘s ships and prevent him from 
escaping by sea. Rahma and his troops were caught by surprise as Shaikh Abdullah 
attacked their rear flanks while they were busy fighting Shaikh Ahmad bin Urair‘s 
army to their front. What must have alarmed Rahma even more was that he saw the 
rest of the Bahraini fleet attempting to destroy his ships. Reacting quickly, he passed 
the command of the land troops to his son Bishr and hurried to rescue his ships from 
Shaikh Ahmad bin Salman's fleet.16 Rahma and Shaikh Ahmad bin Salman fought a 
hard naval battle, but once Rahma realized that most of his ships were being easily 
destroyed and that he was fighting a losing battle, he fled in his buggalow 
Ghatroosha.17 Shaikh Ahmad followed, determined to capture Rahma at any cost, and 
after a long chase grappled his ship to Ghatroosha. Probably seeing that his chances 
of victory and escape were both gone, Rahma torched his ship‘s magazine and blew 
                                                                                                                                                                      
P/386/3, reprinted in Records of Qatar, Primary Documents 1820-1960 Vol I 1820-1853, Ed. 
Penelope Tuson (Cambridge: Archive Editions, 1991), 196-211. 
15
 Al-Khairi, Qalaid il Nahrain,, 261-262. 
16
 Ibid, Qalaid il Nahrain, 262. 
17
 Khalifa Al-Nabhani, Attuhfah Annabhaniya Fi Tarikh Al Jazira Al Arabiya [The Nabhani 
Masterpiece in the History of the Arabian Peninsula] (Beirut: Dar Ehyaa al-uluum, 1986 [c.1922]), 
102. A buggalow was a large ship, native to the Gulf region and used for both commercial and 
military purposes. 
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up himself, his crew and their vessel18 in a dramatic finale to the life of the Al Khalifa 
family's ardent and resilient foe. See Figure 8.
19
  
His son Bishr was defeated by the joint forces of Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmad and 
Shaikh Ahmad bin Urair. He surrendered the fort of Dammam unconditionally to 
Shaikh Abdullah, who pardoned and freed him,20  probably because he wanted to 
avoid inflaming the animosity between the al-Jalahma and the Al Khalifa any further. 
He must have wanted to extinguish any likely future troubles and vendettas, but if he 
did, he was yet again disappointed, although he became ruler of Dammam as well as 
of Bahrain and Qatar.
21
 He returned to the people of Hasa a large quantity of the 
booty that Rahma had taken and stored in his castle. 
                                                          
18
 Lt S. Hennell, ―Historical Sketch of the Uttoobee Tribe of Arabs‖, 376; Al-Khairi, Qalaid il Nahrain, 
263; Letter from E.G Stannus, Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Government of Bombay, 
December 14, 1826, in IOR: P/386/17, reprinted in Records of Bahrain, Primary Documents 1820-
1960, Vol I 1820-1868 (Cambridge: Archive Editions, 1993), 302-304; Muhammad bin Ahmad Al 
Thani, Lamahat Min Tarikh Qatar [Glimpses from the History of Qatar], Ed. Nasser bin Ali Al 
Thani (UAE: Ministry of Economy, Office of Intellectual Classifications, 2006 [c. 1953]), 119. 
19
 This map was drawn based on both the report of E.G. Stannus, PRPG at the time as well as the 
accounts of al-Khairi, al-Tajir and al-Nabhani in addition to various traditional oral accounts. 
20
 Lt A.B Kemball, ―Chronological Table of Events with the Uttoobee Tribe of Arabs (Bahrein), From 
the Year 1716 to 1844‖, in Arabian Gulf Intelligence, Selections from the Records of the Bombay 
Government, no. xxiv, new series, Ed. R Hughes Thomas ((Bombay: Bombay Education Society 
Press, 1856; reprinted Cambridge: The Oleander Press, 1985[1856]), 144; Lt S. Hennell, ―The 
Proceedings of Rahma bin Jabir, 1809-1826, Sketch of the Proceedings of Rahmah bin Jaubir Chief 
of Khor Hassan‖, in Records of Qatar, Primary Documents 1820-1960, Vol I 1820-1853, Ed. 
Penelope Tuson (Cambridge: Archive Editions, 1991), 132. 
21
 Al Thani, Lamahat Min Tarikh Qatar, 119. 
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Figure 8: Death of Rahma Al Jalahma 1826 
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The victory relieved the Al Khalifa of a major external threat to their security 
that had lasted decades. Shaikh Abdullah played a vital role in thwarting and 
eliminating that threat. His instincts and first approaches had been peaceful, with the 
apparent intention to safeguard his dominions‘ trade and commerce with the least 
possible cost and sacrifice of human life. Only after all peaceful efforts had failed did 
the Shaikh resort to force, though when he was compelled into military engagements, 
such as the battles of Akhakkira and Maqta‘a, he succeeded in engaging and defeating 
his enemies in an efficient manner. He took full advantage of the fact that Rahma had 
many enemies with grudges against him, orchestrating an alliance with Hasa‘s rulers, 
the Al Humaid family. That strategy enabled the Shaikh to catch Rahma off guard, 
attacking him front and rear, and in the end defeating him. Nonetheless, as we are 
about to see, this was not the last of the external threats of Shaikh Abdullah‘s long 
political life. A new and dangerous threat was about to arise from an old foe. 
3. Third Omani Invasion: Battle of Gazgaz 
After the violent showdown between Shaikh Abdullah and Rahma al-Jalahma, the 
Utub and the people in their dependencies entered into a period of peace and quiet 
during which they practised their trade safely, though their peace was short-lived. As 
we saw in the previous chapter, Shaikh Ahmad bin Salman, Shaikh Abdullah‘s 
nephew, was the guarantor of the peace deal between the Utub and the Sultan of 
Oman. Shaikh Ahmad guaranteed payment of an annual tribute from the Al Khalifa, 
and Shaikh Abdullah could not suspend it for fear of embarrassing his nephew.22 
According to al-Khairi, Shaikh Ahmad suffered an (unspecified) terminal illness and 
died at the Palace of Rubaija in Qatar less than a year after his bloody showdown with 
                                                          
22
 Al-Khairi, Qalaid il Nahrain, 261. 
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Rahma al-Jalahma. His death effectively removed Shaikh Abdullah‘s scruples so that 
he suspended the Omani tribute forthwith.23 That suspension led directly to the third 
Omani invasion of Bahrain under the Al Khalifa and to one of the bloodiest battles the 
region had seen during the first half of the nineteenth century. 
Why did Shaikh Abdullah stop paying the annual tribute? The obvious 
economic advantage aside, there is a reason that historians might overlook or at least 
play down. According to al-Khairi, Shaikh Abdullah, his family and the rest of the 
Utub regarded the payment as a disgrace,24 particularly as they were the people that 
had beaten the Sultan in 1816. Nearly all agreed that payment should cease,25 though 
the decision to stop it cannot be considered politically pragmatic. Since the defeat of 
the first Saudi State by the Egyptians in 1818, the Al Khalifa had had only the Omanis 
to worry about. The other regional powers and shaikhs in the Gulf lacked the 
necessary naval power or arms to threaten them seriously. It would have been more 
sensible to pay the nominal tribute and avoid any possible Omani retribution. 
To understand the logic behind Shaikh Abdullah‘s decision, it might be useful 
to analyse it from another perspective. The Al Khalifa and the rest of the Utub were 
probably adhering, on a collective psychological and sociological level, to Bedouin 
values. The term Bedouin, in this case, is not restricted to nomadic Arabs but includes 
those who were settled but lived in close proximity to, and were of the same stock as, 
                                                          
23
 Ibid, 263-264. 
24
 Ibid; Another possible explanation for why Shaikh Abdullah and his men decided to stop paying the 
tribute can be inferred from Jerome Antony Saldanha (ed.), Précis of Correspondence Regarding the 
Affairs of the Persian Gulf, 1801-1853 (Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1906; 
reprinted Archive Editions, 1986), 105-106. In it can be seen that the British authorities were aware 
of several attempts by the Sultan of Oman to form a covert alliance with Persia against Bahrain. But, 
those attempts did not yield any alliance. Notwithstanding, it is quite possible that those designs that 
the Sultan to accomplish with Persian assistance might have leaked to Shaikh Abdullah and the Utub. 
If that indeed did happen it must have made them feel contempt to the Sultan and desirous to shake 
off his yoke. 
 
25
 Ibid. 
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nomads. The settlers shared at least some of the nomads‘ social values and personal 
attributes. According to Bedouin values, it is a disgrace for a man to come under the 
yoke of another or to pay a tribute or even a tax to anyone. A man in such a situation 
should fight or, if faced with impossible odds, emigrate.26 The disgrace would be 
intensified if a man paid tribute to someone not much more powerful than himself. 
Shaikh Abdullah‘s suspension of the tribute did not lead to an immediate 
Omani offensive. The trigger to inflict retribution upon Shaikh Abdullah and the Utub 
was pulled by Bishr, Rahma bin Jabir al-Jalahma‘s son. 27  Pardoned by Shaikh 
Abdullah after the battle in Dammam, Bishr was apparently not content to reform. In 
all likelihood, he was intent on avenging his father. It seems plausible that he saw an 
opportunity to exact his revenge as soon as he learned of Shaikh Abdullah‘s decision 
to suspend the annual Utub tribute to Sayyid Said. Sailing to Muscat in Oman, where 
he had an audience with Sayyid Said, Bishr managed to convince the Sultan to invade 
Bahrain and, like his father before him, offered his aid and services.28 The Sultan, who 
had suffered defeat at the hands of the Utub twelve years earlier in the battle of 
Maqta‘a, apparently did not want to repeat his past mistakes. It seems likely he knew 
that he was facing a formidable opponent and that victory could be gained only after a 
great deal of careful preparation. He took all the time he needed—more than a month, 
according to al-Khairi and al-Tajir—to gather and prepare his forces for the intended 
invasion of Bahrain.29 
                                                          
26
 Ali al-Wardi, Dirasa Fi Tabeat al-Mujtama‟a al-Iraqi [A Study in the Nature of Iraqi Society] 
(London: al-Warrak Publishing 2007[1965]), 85-87. 
27
 Al-Khairi, Qalaid il Nahrain, 264; Khalifa Al-Nabhani, Attuhfah Annabhaniya Fi Tarikh Al Jazira 
Al Arabya [The Nabhani Masterpiece in the History of the Arabian Peninsula] (Beirut: Dar Ehyaa al-
uluum, 1986 [c.1922]), 103; Muhammad Al-Tajir, Aqd al-La‟al Fi Tarikh Awal [The Necklace of 
Pearls in the History of Awal] (Bahrain: al-Ayam Publishing Establishment, 1996 [c.1924]), 116. 
28
 Ibid; ibid; ibid. 
29
 Al-Khairi, Qalaid il Nahrain, 264-265; al-Tajir, Aqd al-La‟al, 116. 
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Naturally, news of the Sultan‘s preparations would have forewarned Shaikh 
Abdullah and his men, and the Shaikh devised a defensive strategy for Bahrain that 
resulted in a spectacular victory for the Al Khalifa and the Utub. The Shaikh‘s 
strategy was twofold: sea and land defence, with naval defence of the islands under 
his direct command. Dividing the fleet into two sections, he assigned the first to guard 
the northeastern approaches in case the enemy invaded from that quarter. The second 
section was placed in the shallow lagoon between Manama and the island of 
Muharraq. The Shaikh also assembled a number of small vessels, which he filled with 
stones and sand and hid at Sitrah and other small islands, ordering their crews to be 
ready to carry out his instructions on receipt of the appropriate signal.30 Those small 
vessels were to play a paramount role in the forthcoming battle. 
Shaikh Abdullah entrusted land defence to the junior co-ruler, his nephew 
Shaikh Khalifa bin Salman. The plans called for the refortification of the towns of 
Manama and Muharraq, 31
 
whose forts were repaired and staffed by large 
reinforcements from all over the dominions of the Utub, including Qatar.32 Shaikh 
Khalifa divided the land forces into three sections. The soldiers in the first section 
were placed behind the walls of both towns, to guard them from unexpected attacks or 
a siege, should Sayyid Said's forces defeat the Bahraini force that opposed their 
landing. The second section, mainly cavalry, was hidden in date groves around the 
village of Mahooz (southwest of Manama), in the Diwan fort and in surrounding 
villages.33 The riders were to be a decisive factor in Shaikh Abdullah‘s victory.34 The 
third section of the army, armed mostly with rifles, was placed outside the walls of 
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Manama, in Muharraq, on Sitrah Island and in other places scattered across the 
country. Their main task was to engage the enemy from a distance once it had landed, 
and to delay its advance as long as possible before starting a slow retreat. That retreat 
was apparently calculated to draw enemy forces close to the date groves concealing 
the cavalry. Once the enemy forces were close enough, the cavalry would charge and 
surprise the Omanis. A double cannon shot was the agreed-upon signal to indicate 
where the enemy forces had landed, calling the scattered Bahraini troops to rush to 
their comrades‘ aid. The plan also included the provision of 200 small boats to aid in 
the rapid, flexible transfer of battle forces from one location to another.35 
The ingenuity and efficiency of Shaikh Abdullah‘s military strategy in facing 
the impending Omani invasion is quite evident. It contains elements of both boldness 
and caution, and reveals that the Shaikh took all necessary precautions in preparing to 
face the renewed threat of Sayyid Said. Bahrain was protected from seaborne attack 
from the east and southeast, particularly the Khor al-Qulai‘a area with Sitrah, 
Manama and Muharraq on three sides of it. On the northwestern axis, north of 
Muharraq Island, both major naval routes—those most vulnerable to an Omani 
strike—were safeguarded. An attack from the south was highly unlikely, because the 
shoal water would hinder the navigation of large ships. An attack from the west was 
also unlikely, as it would have required the Omanis to sail around the north side of 
Bahrain in a large arc, giving the Utub forces ample time to prepare for them. Such a 
manoeuvre would have also placed the Omani forces far from Bahrain‘s urban centres 
of Manama and Muharraq, whose capture was vital for an Omani victory. Shaikh 
Abdullah, with the aid of his nephew Shaikh Khalifa, organised a ground defensive 
strategy that ensured that the land forces were well distributed to defend the country. 
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Those forces were also coordinated by the cannon shot signals, and could be 
transferred easily by small boats. Shaikh Abdullah‘s defensive strategy was 
comprehensive, thorough and left nothing to chance. It enabled him to gain a decisive 
victory over his seemingly superior adversary. 
Sayyid Said‘s fleet reached Bahrain on 31 October 1828, anchoring close to 
the Khor al-Qulaia‘a, south of Juffair.36 The Sultan sent an envoy to persuade Shaikh 
Abdullah to resume payment of the annual tribute in order to save himself and his 
country from the Sultan‘s wrath and avoid bloodshed. Shaikh Abdullah refused, 
apparently having gained confidence from his last showdown with the Sultan.37 That 
might explain his defiance and willingness to engage the Omanis in battle. On 9 
November, the Sultan‘s forces moved and gathered around an area called Ras Gazgaz, 
near the village of Juffair. Shaikh Abdullah ordered two cannon shots as a signal to 
the scattered troops to move to that area. As the Omani troops started to come ashore 
near Ras Gazgaz, battle was joined. 38  Shaikh Khalifa bin Salman, leading his 
contingents of infantry, ordered them to fire their rifles and engage the Omani 
forces.
39
 The Bahraini forces successfully held their ground and held off the Omani 
advance before starting the gradual retreat called for in Shaikh Abdullah‘s plan.40 That 
strategy appears similar to the one the Al Khalifa had employed twelve years earlier at 
the battle of Maqta‘a. However, the Bahraini troops at Ras Gazgaz seemingly held 
their ground for a much longer time, possibly because Shaikh Abdullah expected the 
Omanis to see through his plan if it was repeated in a similar manner. The delay in 
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retreating would ensure that the Omanis took the bait and fell into the trap. See Figure 
9.
41
  
Just as they had at Maqta‘a, the Omanis took the bait and pursued the 
retreating Bahraini troops. When Shaikh Khalifa had drawn them close enough to the 
date groves, he signalled his hidden cavalry to attack. The Omanis were caught 
between the cavalry‘s quick strikes and the infantry, who instantly turned their retreat 
into a massive counterattack that scattered the Omani forces. 42  Nevertheless, the 
Sultan was not overwhelmed. He managed to reorganise his troops quickly and held 
his ground. The battle was still raging when distressing news reached Sayyid Said. 
Shaikh Abdullah, who had not taken an active role at the beginning of the battle, 
moved in with his fleet. He sandwiched the Omani ships between his seaborne cannon 
and the shore of Juffair. Upon seeing his fleet's predicament, the Sultan hastily rushed 
to defend it. He was carried off the battlefield by his Nubian retainers and then swam 
a considerable distance to reach the safety of his ship, but was wounded on the sole of 
his foot by a spear as he swam.43  
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Figure 9: Battle of Gazgaz 1828 
Abdulaziz Al Khalifa Chapter IV  
 
  132 
 
The Omani reverse was exacerbated by their own allies, the Abu Dhabi tribe 
of Bani Yas under Shaikh Tahnoon.44 They had fled the battle scene earlier, spreading 
panic through the rest of the Omani troops. Then, when the Omanis started their 
eventual retreat, the Bani Yas plundered their allies, preventing many Omani soldiers 
from reaching their boats. 45  Understandably, the morale of the Sultan‘s troops 
plummeted and panic spread among them.46 Again as they had at Maqta‘a twelve 
years earlier, they disintegrated into a disorganised and dangerous retreat, which 
resulted in their ultimate defeat.47 By that time, the Sultan was fully occupied with 
trying to save his fleet from the wrath of Shaikh Abdullah, but he was to receive yet 
another shock. As part of his plan, the Shaikh had assembled a number of small 
vessels, which were filled with sand and stones and well hidden. During the land 
battle between his nephew and the Sultan's forces, the Shaikh deployed boats into the 
lagoon. He dumped their ballast to ‗reclaim‘ part of the shallows so thoroughly that 
the Sultan‘s navy could leave the lagoon only through a narrow, well-guarded gap, so 
all would-be escapees had to pass under the guns of Shaikh Abdullah‘s ships.48 Those 
that ran the gauntlet suffered heavy casualties; those unable to escape became 
prisoners of war.49 Local sources estimate that the Omani death toll numbered 3,000 
men,50 but the more modest British estimate was in excess of 500, not counting the 
numerous Omani troops drowned or killed during trying to escape through the 
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narrows. 51  According to al-Khairi, it was at that moment that some of Shaikh 
Abdullah‘s men sought his permission to capture the Sultan in his moment of 
weakness, but the Shaikh forbade it ‗out of the nobility of his character‘.52 Those of 
the Sultan‘s troops who could not escape surrendered to Shaikh Abdullah and his 
forces. The Shaikh spared their lives and released them. However, he confiscated their 
weapons and valuables as war booty and sent them away with a written message for 
Sayyid Said. 53 In it, Shaikh Abdullah warned the Sultan against invading Bahrain 
again, stating that he had let him escape as a gesture of respect.54 With this decisive 
victory, Shaikh Abdullah ended Omani designs on Bahrain. His careful planning and 
masterly organisation of his forces enabled him to defeat an enemy with far larger 
forces—Sayyid Said had the forces of an empire that included Oman, possessions in 
East Africa and on the southeastern coast of Iran. 
4. Repercussions of the Battle of Gazgaz 
The Battle of Gazgaz had a profound effect on Bahraini-Omani relations. Not only did 
Shaikh Abdullah‘s decisive victory end Oman‘s continual threat to Bahrain, it also 
immensely elevated the status, prestige and prominence of the Utub among the rulers 
of Eastern Arabia. The Al Khalifa family‘s fame and prestige peaked after their 
victory against the Sultan, and the surrounding tribes came to hold them in high 
esteem. 55  That battle instantly ended the Omani threat against Bahrain and its 
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dependencies, although it took another year before a permanent peace deal with Oman 
and its Sultan was reached. 
After the battle, British authorities in the Gulf were apparently eager to ensure 
that such bloody confrontations would not recur, presumably because they threatened 
the safety of maritime trade in the region, which had strong connections with British 
possessions in India. The British Resident tried to persuade Shaikh Abdullah to make 
peace with the Sultan, but the Shaikh would agree to do so only if the British 
Government guaranteed any peace deal between him and the Omanis. The Resident, 
believing that his superiors would issue no such guarantee, abandoned further 
attempts at mediation.56 Shaikh Abdullah was apparently still worried about Sayyid 
Said, possibly because he had heard that the Sultan might have been planning another 
attack. If that was true, it could well have been the reason that Shaikh Abdullah felt 
compelled to take a more proactive strategy. To do so would have been very logical as 
he had probably gained confidence from his victory at Gazgaz. Therefore, On 21 
March 1829, a fleet of seven large vessels sailed for Muscat under Shaikh Abdullah's 
personal command. 57  Apparently, the primary objective was to cruise against the 
coasts of the Sultan‘s territories, to convey the message that the Bahraini fleet could 
strike the Sultan‘s capital. As soon as Sayyid Said was aware of the approach and 
designs of the Utub fleet, he sent two frigates to meet them and a small skirmish 
ensued, with no fatalities on either side. On its way home again, while still close to 
Muscat, the Bahraini fleet attacked and captured a commercial buggalow from the 
town of Mirbat, Dhofar, on the Arabian Sea. That must have infuriated the Sultan, 
who immediately sent two ships to intercept the assailants. They met near Cape 
Mubarak. Shaikh Abdullah ran his fleet into shallow waters and used his Mirbat prize 
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as a shield to protect his ships from the Omani cannons. The Mirbat vessel's cargo 
was looted and, under cover of night, Shaikh Abdullah altered his ships‘ course and 
returned safely to Bahrain.58 
That new development, of course, must have alarmed the British Resident in 
the Gulf. The treaty against piracy, drawn up between Britain and Bahrain in 1820 
had, as the British saw it, been openly violated. The British authorities reacted angrily 
and the Gulf Resident sent two warships to Bahrain. He made it clear that if Shaikh 
Abdullah did not remunerate the value of the captured vessel's cargo, about 8,000 
Indian Rupees, violent measures might be taken against him. The threat worked and 
the Shaikh paid the amount demanded.59 It seems that the British authorities at the 
time did not look at that incident as an act of privateering between two nations at war. 
Had they done so, the Shaikh‘s action would not have been a breach of the 1820 
agreement, as the agreement did not ban maritime warfare or privateering. The British 
chose to regard it as an act of piracy for another reason. They feared, quite possibly, 
that if such acts of privateering continued unchecked, tensions between Bahrain and 
Oman would have escalated even further. Such an escalation could have threatened 
the safety of maritime trade and possibly even given an excuse for other rulers in the 
Gulf to violate the terms of the 1820 agreement, perhaps on the pretext of joining in 
the privateering raids on the side of Oman or Bahrain. 
The taking of the Mirbat buggalow was more likely to have been motivated by 
political than by financial reasons. It was probably a demonstration of Shaikh 
Abdullah‘s ability to threaten trade passing in and out of Omani ports, a severe 
economic threat that could have pushed the Sultan to seek British intervention and 
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help. Another possible reason for the Shaikh's action could have been his desire to 
convince the British authorities in the Gulf that continuing animosity between Bahrain 
and Oman was counterproductive to Gulf security and maritime trade. Holding that 
belief, the British government might have been persuaded to guarantee a peace deal 
between him and the Sultan. If that was indeed Shaikh Abdullah‘s logic, it turned out 
be flawed.
60
 
It was not the British authorities in the Gulf, but a local chief, Shaikh 
Muhammad bin Nasser of Bushire, who finally managed to mediate a peace deal 
between Shaikh Abdullah and the Sultan.61 It was concluded on 2 December 1829 and 
stipulated that the Shaikh of Bahrain and its dependencies should pay no tribute to the 
Sultan of Oman and that neither party should interfere in the other‘s internal affairs. 
There was also a verbal agreement in which both parties promised mutual assistance 
should any enemy threaten either of them. Shaikh Tahnoon of Abu Dhabi was also 
admitted to the treaty. However, Shaikh Abdullah insisted that the al-Bu Sumait tribe, 
who resided mainly at Asilo, on the Persian coast, be excluded from the treaty.62 The 
reason appears to have been the existence of an alliance between that tribe and Bishr 
bin Rahma al-Jalahma, and the exclusion would have given the Shaikh a free hand to 
chastise them. The 1829 deal secured peace between Bahrain and Oman, and no 
threats of Omani invasion have ever again arisen. Shaikh Abdullah, of course, 
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deserves considerable credit for this. His efforts and resilience had played a major role 
in attaining such security for Bahrain. He was still not free from external threats, 
however. The next threat, as we shall see in the next section, arose from the revival of 
another old foe, the new Saudi Emir Turki bin Abdullah Al Saud. He had succeeded 
in restoring the Al Saud family's authority in Najd, thus establishing the Second Saudi 
State. 
5. Facing the Renewed Saudi Threat 
No sooner had he secured himself and his dominions from the threat of the Omani 
than Shaikh Abdullah had to turn and face the revived strength of old foes who were 
encroaching upon and threatening his domains. That renewed threat came from the 
Saudis, who were returning to power after the 1818 destruction of the First Saudi 
State at the hands of Muhammad Ali Pasha, the Ottoman Viceroy of Egypt. One 
member of the Al Saud family, Turki bin Abdullah bin Muhammad bin Saud, had 
escaped capture and deportation to Egypt. He managed to hide among the Bedouin 
tribes of Najd, lying low as he waited for an opportunity to expel the occupying 
Egyptian forces and reclaim his family's throne. After five years of hiding, Turki bin 
Abdullah started actively to gather supporters and oppose the Egyptians. By 1824, he 
had succeeded in capturing Riyadh, ousting the Egyptian garrison and proclaiming 
himself the new Saudi ruler. In early 1830 his son, Prince Faisal bin Turki, defeated 
the Bani Khalid tribe under the command of the Al Humaid family, rulers of Hasa, at 
the battle of Sabya, returning Hasa to Saudi rule.
63
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These developments would naturally have worried Shaikh Abdullah. The 
revival of Saudi authority in Najd was a sign of renewed external threats against 
Bahrain and its dependencies. The memory of the battle of Akhakkira and the ordeals 
associated with it were probably still fresh in the Shaikh‘s mind, and by the end of 
1830 his suspicions were confirmed by the arrival of an envoy from the new Saudi 
Emir. His message stipulated that the Al Khalifa family should resume the payment of 
Zakat (Islamic tithe).64 Emir Turki‘s grounds for his demand were possibly that Zakat 
had been paid to his predecessors, and the right to receive it had devolved upon him. 
Emir Turki also demanded 40,000 German Crowns as compensation for a number of 
horses belonging to the Saudi garrison that had once occupied Bahrain. His final 
demand was that the fort of Dammam, which was among the Al Khalifa possessions 
on the Arabian mainland, be surrendered to Bishr bin Rahma al-Jalahma.65 All of 
those demands, especially the last one, were naturally unwelcome to Shaikh Abdullah 
and his family. The Shaikh could have refused them and prepared for a military 
confrontation with the Saudis if it came to that. He had ample experience of fighting 
and beating the Saudis, and he had battle-hardened troops from his recent showdowns 
with Sayyid Said and Rahma al-Jalahma. Nonetheless, the arrival of such unwelcome 
news seems to have dissuaded him from violence. Allegedly, word reached him that 
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Sayyid Said might well ally himself to Emir Turki if Bahrain took arms against the 
house of Saud.66 The prospect of such an alliance between the Saudis and the Omanis 
understandably worried the Shaikh. Despite his previous military successes, he would 
have found it extremely difficult to face two strong foes at the same time. Diplomacy 
was the path to take. 
Shaikh Abdullah‘s first action was an attempt to implicate the British 
authorities in the Gulf. He endeavoured to persuade them to intervene with the Emir 
on his behalf, placing Bahrain under the umbrella of British protection. The British 
were not persuaded,67 being at that time apparently wary of intervening in the internal 
affairs of the Arab coast's local rulers. That policy underwent radical change in less 
than fifty years. Realising that his efforts with the British were going nowhere, Shaikh 
Abdullah seemingly decided to deal with the Saudi threat in his own way. He sent a 
close relative to Riyadh, the new Saudi capital, to negotiate a deal that would carry 
favourable terms for the Al Khalifa and the rest of the Utub. The envoy was 
successful, securing a deal with Emir Turki. Shaikh Abdullah would acknowledge the 
Saudi Emir‘s supremacy and pay him an annual Zakat. On the other hand, the Emir 
was bound to provide Shaikh Abdullah with assistance and protection if the latter 
faced any external threat. 
Even so, some of Emir Turki‘s actions made Shaikh Abdullah wary. The Emir 
allowed Bishr bin Rahma al-Jalahma, along with his tribal allies of the al-bu Sumait, 
all on bad terms with Shaikh Abdullah and the rest of the Utub, to settle on the island 
of Tarut, opposite Qatif and close to the Dammam fort. 68  Shaikh Abdullah‘s 
suspicions of Emir Turki‘s intentions proved to be well founded, as Bishr al-Jalahma 
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attempted to invade Bahrain in January 1832. Shaikh Abdullah easily thwarted him, 
but took no punitive action against him, probably to avoid offending the Emir of 
Najd.69 Nevertheless, other factors worked to the Shaikh‘s advantage. Later in the 
same year, Bishr al-Jalahma had a major quarrel with the people of the coastal town 
of Qatif on the Arabian mainland. The quarrel culminated in Bishr destroying his own 
fortress and departing to Muscat with his dependents and followers.70 Naturally, the 
Shaikh would have been greatly relieved. The removal of such an immediate threat 
allowed him to make plans to shake off Saudi hegemony. His first success was to 
induce Sayyid Said to remain neutral in the event of any confrontations between 
Bahrain and Emir Turki. With that achieved, the Shaikh used money and promises to 
organise a ‗consortium‘ of mainland tribes disgruntled with Saudi authority.71 
In 1833, the Shaikh seems to have convinced the Awamir section of the Bani 
Khalid tribe to launch assaults on Saudi dominions in Hasa. Supplied and financed by 
Shaikh Abdullah, they harassed the Saudi forces extensively. Emir Turki appears to 
have been unable to retaliate immediately, and early in 1834, Shaikh Abdullah took a 
proactive role and started to launch direct offensives, blockading the ports of Qatif 
and Uqair.72 The Saudi leader, no doubt alarmed and angered, dispatched an army 
under the command of his son Faisal to rescue the Saudi domains on the Gulf littoral. 
On hearing of the Saudi advance, Shaikh Abdullah assembled an army and led it to 
Qatif in person. The Saudi army marched to meet them and a violent battle ensued.73 
According to Muhammad al-Tajir, the people of Qatif became very agitated after 
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nearly forty days of hostilities, allegedly terrified that the victor would plunder their 
town. Being Shiites, they favoured the more tolerant Al Khalifa and their allies over 
the Saudis, who had meted out harsh treatment to them. That probably induced them 
to send an emissary to Shaikh Abdullah, offering to surrender their town to the 
authority of the Al Khalifa if the Shaikh would protect them and spare their lives and 
property. The Shaikh agreed and added the town to his domains and dependencies.74 
Unfortunately, al-Tajir does not explain the events surrounding the surrender, 
so we do not know what happened to the town‘s Saudi governor. It is quite possible 
that the inhabitants betrayed him and facilitated the capture of their town by Shaikh 
Abdullah. The war continued unabated. Prince Faisal appears to have been resilient 
and refused to give up easily.75 That said, an unexpected turn of events forced him to 
return to Riyadh. His father was murdered by Faisal's cousin Mashari bin Abdul-
Rahman Al Saud and Faisal understandably became preoccupied with avenging his 
father and ousting the usurper.76 According to Lorimer, Emir Turki‘s assassination by 
his nephew was engineered by Shaikh Abdullah, who allegedly celebrated Turki‘s 
death publicly by firing guns and showing other signs of joy when news of the 
assassination reached Bahrain.77 
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Once Prince Faisal had left for Najd, Shaikh Abdullah seized the opportunity 
to capture the island of Tarut from the Saudi garrison guarding it, bribing some of the 
soldiers.78 That acquisition ended the Qatif war with the Saudis. The Shaikh had not 
only thrown off Saudi control but had also added the town of Qatif and the island of 
Tarut to the dependencies ruled by Bahrain. 
With the war over and its booty still being distributed, an event occurred that 
would have profound ramifications. Shaikh Khalifa bin Salman, Shaikh Abdullah's 
nephew and junior co-ruler, had an intense dispute with some of Shaikh Abdullah's 
sons over the division of some war booty.79 That seems to have upset Shaikh Khalifa 
so much that he developed a severe fever and died.80 Kemball points out that ―vicious 
and oppressive conduct‖ by Shaikh Abdullah‘s son towards Shaikh Khalifa had 
caused his death on 31 May 1834.81 Shaikh Khalifa‘s eldest son, Shaikh Muhammad, 
succeeded him,82 but Shaikh Abdullah did not accord the new co-ruler all of his 
father's prerogatives and powers.83 It was not until a year later that an event, discussed 
in the next chapter, helped Shaikh Muhammad to increase his power and prestige and 
to emulate the position of his father. Shaikh Khalifa bin Salman's death and Shaikh 
Muhammad‘s succession ushered in a new period of turbulence for Bahrain and its 
inhabitants. It removed any check on the insolence of Shaikh Abdullah‘s sons, which 
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kept increasing until it culminated in conflict and feud within the Al Khalifa family.
84
 
Subsequent chapters discuss those events in detail. 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter examined how Shaikh Abdullah succeeded in thwarting external threats. 
Had he failed to do so, the political map of the Gulf today might be very different. 
The Al Khalifa family's retention of its political position owes a great deal to this 
man‘s efforts and successes. Without them, Bahrain might today be part of Saudi 
Arabia, under the al-Jalahma family‘s rule, or even an overseas dependency of  Oman. 
For every threat he faced, Shaikh Abdullah‘s varied choice of strategies and tactics 
enabled him to overcome his foes and achieve his objectives. Such strategies 
demonstrate his skills as a military commander, diplomat, strategist and tactician. 
The Shaikh‘s first threat came from his old enemy, Rahma bin Jabir al-
Jalahma. The Shaikh seems to have realized that Rahma alone was too weak to pose 
any real threat, either to his person or to his possessions. On the other hand, he 
probably also realized that Rahma could inflict major damage to the economy of 
Bahrain and its dependencies by naval harassment of Bahraini commercial fleets. That 
realization gives the most likely reason for the Shaikh‘s decision to pacify Rahma at 
any cost and under all circumstances. The Shaikh first tried to achieve a diplomatic 
solution by drawing up a peace agreement with Rahma. He succeeded in inducing the 
British authorities in the Gulf to help him do this; they were reluctant at first but 
finally agreed. The Shaikh achieved peace with Rahma at his second attempt, but 
Rahma failed to honour his commitments, so the Shaikh took a more confrontational 
approach. He demonstrated his shrewdness by managing to form a coalition with the 
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Bani Khalid tribe, also on poor terms with Rahma, on the mainland. This enabled him 
to organise a stealthy attack, by both land and sea, on Rahma‘s mainland fortress. 
Rahma, taken totally by surprise, could not escape, and took his own life after a 
desperate attempt to flee. This violent conclusion enabled Shaikh Abdullah 
permanently to eliminate the threat of Rahma, and though his son, Bishr, tried 
unsuccessfully to walk in his father's footsteps, the al-Jalahma family‘s ambition to 
rule Bahrain was destroyed. 
When dealing with the Omani threat, the Shaikh‘s military tactics were also 
successful. At the Battle of Gazgaz, he managed to lure the Omanis into fighting a 
land battle, thus depriving them of any naval advantage. After defeating them on his 
own turf, he pursued a strategy of securing a perpetual peace, thus stopping the Omani 
threat permanently. He became the aggressor, attacking the Omanis in their own 
territories. There are two possible reasons for this. First, that he wanted to make the 
Omani Sultan feel threatened by the knowledge that the Shaikh would no longer take 
only defensive stances, but could also attack—the Shaikh would have considered that 
an excellent way to persuade the Sultan to seek perpetual peace. Second, that the 
Shaikh purposely tried to alarm British authorities in the Gulf, to induce them to 
pressure Sayyid Said of Oman into concluding a peace treaty. That did not work, as 
the British authorities in the region refused to be drawn into local politics. Even 
without British help, the Shaikh still managed to achieve his objective. The Sultan 
eventually agreed to perpetual peace with Shaikh Abdullah and the Utub under the 
brokerage and mediation of Shaikh Muhammad bin Nasser of Bushire. That treaty 
stands as a testimony to the Shaikh‘s skill in mixing diplomatic and military tactics to 
reach his goals. 
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The last threat discussed in this chapter came from the resurgent Saudis. No 
doubt recalling his clashes with the First Saudi State, the Shaikh determined to deal 
with the re-emerging threat at all costs. However, prudence seems to have persuaded 
him not to confront the Saudis while the possibility of their alliance with Sayyid Said 
existed. He therefore paid tribute to the Saudi Emir until he was certain of the Sultan‘s 
neutrality. Once that was achieved, the Shaikh orchestrated a consortium of tribal 
allies who were disgruntled with the Saudis. When all was ready, he shook off Saudi 
hegemony by stopping his tribute payments and attacking Saudi possessions on the 
mainland. His reason for doing so might have been that he realized that Bahrain, with 
its rich pearl banks, ample supplies of fresh water, date groves and strategic position, 
was the jewel in his dependencies‘ crown. Harassing the Saudis on the Arabian 
mainland would occupy them with the defence of their possessions, and keep them 
from even thinking of invading his. If this indeed was the case, the Shaikh proved 
himself an able and very successful strategist. 
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CHAPTER V 
Sole Rule of Shaikh Abdullah, Rise of Shaikh 
Muhammad bin Khalifa: Beginnings of Internal 
Troubles, Isa bin Tarif, Persians and Egyptians 1834-
1842 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter examines Shaikh Abdullah‘s reign between 1834 and 1842. It was a 
period during which the Shaikh ruled Bahrain and its dependencies with the help of 
his grand nephew, Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa. Shaikh Muhammad had succeeded 
his late father, Shaikh Khalifa bin Salman, as co-ruler in 1834, albeit without the same 
authority. In the period covered in this chapter, Shaikh Abdullah contended with four 
threats to his rulership. Three of these were external, and the Shaikh successfully 
protected himself against all of them. The fourth was internal; it was the last threat of 
his long political career, and the one that he was unable to defend himself against. 
This chapter illustrates how an Arabian Gulf ruler dealt with major external 
threats from much larger and stronger political forces. The Saudis this time posed the 
least threat compared with the other two which were much greater. Shaikh Abdullah 
could not rely mainly on military means against adversaries with such strength. 
Therefore, he used various schemes of political and diplomatic manoeuvring to 
wriggle out of danger. Rulers of his day would play one power against another, 
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seeking protection and alliance from one power to use against another. Another tactic 
was to place oneself under the protection of another power to safeguard persons and 
property from outside danger––a practice known as dakhala, examined at length in 
the works of James Onley. As Onley clearly points out, the practice of dakhala was an 
important mechanism that the Shaikhs in the Gulf used to protect themselves and hold 
their domains intact.
1
 As can be seen in this study, Shaikh Abdullah used such a 
tactic, as well as the other two, quite extensively. 
Arabian Gulf rulers in the first half of the nineteenth century needed to 
succeed against internal challenges as well as external ones to secure their position.
2
 
Therefore this chapter also studies their methods to combat internal threats to their 
authority. Threats like these came from ambitious tribal chiefs among allies or even 
from aspiring members of a ruler‘s own family, including his sons. Shaikh Abdullah‘s 
political undoing stemmed from his inability to diffuse such internal threats. He was 
incapable of curbing the insolence of some of his sons. That led to tribal revolts in 
Qatar, trouble with the British and their native agent in Bahrain, and an internal Al 
Khalifa family revolt. It resulted in Shaikh Abdullah losing his position as ruler of 
Bahrain, Qatar and other Arabian mainland dependencies, as described in the next 
chapter. The next section details the threats to Shaikh Abdullah from 1834 to 1842. 
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2. Threats 
The first external threat of the period was a hangover from the time of Shaikh Khalifa 
bin Salman. It came from the Saudis, whose new leader, Emir Faisal bin Turki bin 
Abdullah Al Saud, continued to pose a menace to Shaikh Abdullah‘s domains. The 
Shaikh dealt with that threat by imposing naval blockades on the Saudi ports of Qatif 
and Uqair among other military manoeuvres. This strategy helped him not only to 
guard himself against the Saudis, but also to gain allies and thus the means to combat 
other threats. 
The Persians posed the second external threat. In 1836, the Persian 
government, represented by the Prince of Shiraz, claimed that Bahrain belonged to 
Persia. This was no idle claim, as the Persians had the Sultan of Oman as a 
prospective ally who could easily have supplied them with the necessary naval forces 
and military expertise for an expedition against Bahrain. The Shaikh managed to 
defuse that threat through political manoeuvring. He used his old adversaries, the 
Saudis, as new allies to neutralise Sayyid Said of Oman and deny Omani aid to the 
Persians. The prospect of fighting Bahrain‘s navy alone, with the Saudis against them 
too, cannot have been an attractive one for the Persians. 
Within two years, the third external threat rose. It came from the Egyptian 
forces of Muhammad Ali Pasha, who in 1838 launched a military campaign under the 
command of General Khorshid Pasha. The Egyptian aim was to overthrow the rule of 
the Saudi Emir Faisal bin Turki in Najd, Central Arabia. And to replace him with 
Khalid bin Saud as a vassal Emir, loyal to the Egyptians. The campaign in Najd was 
successful, and by 1839, Khorshid Pasha had advanced into Eastern Arabia and 
occupied the regions of Hasa and Qatif. His apparent intention was to continue the 
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advance, adding Bahrain and the other domains of Shaikh Abdullah to the expanding 
Egyptian realm. 
Two political factors made the Shaikh‘s position even worse. First, the 
Egyptian advance had renewed Persian interests in Bahrain, so Khorshid Pasha 
offered Egyptian protection for Shaikh Abdullah‘s domains. Second, the British 
authorities, although not ready to guarantee him security, demanded that he notify 
them before he placed himself under Egyptian protection. The Shaikh was standing on 
a knife-edge. His response was to enter secret negotiations with, and send mixed 
messages to, all three parties—Egyptians, British and Persians. This ploy enabled him 
to conclude a very beneficial deal with the Egyptians that ensured the Shaikh‘s 
retention of complete internal control over his domains. At the same time, Egyptian 
protection was secured by the Shaikh‘s payment of a small annual tribute—there was 
no requirement even to station an Egyptian Agent in Bahrain. That deal seems to have 
angered the British Government, who, as we shall see, considered replacing Shaikh 
Abdullah with another Shaikh, more favourable to their cause, who would at least 
abstain from helping Shaikh Abdullah to fight enemies and pretenders.
3
 
The fourth, internal, threat to Shaikh Abdullah proved to be his greatest 
challenge. After the death of his nephew, Shaikh Khalifa bin Salman, Shaikh 
Abdullah‘s sons felt free to meddle in Bahrain‘s rulership. Their father, apparently 
weakened by old age, was unable to restrain them. Their insolent behaviour had 
devastating consequences for Bahrain and Shaikh Abdullah. Their actions included 
extorting tribute from traders and terrorising the inhabitants of Bahrain, so that people 
feared for their own safety and that of their property. That led to an exodus from 
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Bahrain of many merchants and wealthy individuals, weakening the country 
economically and diminishing Shaikh Abdullah‘s income. The Shaikh‘s sons inflicted 
extortion even on people under British protection, such as the bania traders from 
India. That certainly brought unwanted British attention, adding even more to the 
ruler‘s difficulties. His sons also sought to oust their father and harassed other 
members of their family. Tribes traditionally loyal to the Al Khalifa family, chief 
among them the prominent al-bin Ali tribe, were stung to rebellion. Shaikh Abdullah, 
however, managed to put down the unrest and had the rebel tribes and clans exiled 
from Qatar. 
The effect of his victory was that, for more than three years, Shaikh Abdullah 
had to contend with the threat of the exiled al-bin Ali tribe under the leadership of 
Shaikh Isa bin Tarif. Shaikh Abdullah tried reconciliation, but when his efforts failed, 
he defused their threat by befriending the ruler of Abu Dhabi, who had granted a safe 
harbour to Isa bin Tarif and his followers. The Shaikh seems to have heard that the 
ruler and Isa bin Tarif had had a disagreement and apparently used that knowledge to 
his own ends. The upshot was that the ruler of Abu Dhabi gave Isa bin Tarif the 
choice of living peaceably in his domain or leaving with his followers. That 
effectively denied Isa bin Tarif and his followers a port from which they could launch 
their attacks against the Shaikh‘s domains and commercial trade. At the same time, it 
deprived them of the aid of an ally. 
Once their father had pardoned them after their defeat in Qatar, the sons 
resumed their old habits of harassing and extorting money from traders in Bahrain. 
Even their own relations were not spared. Their actions alarmed Shaikh Muhammad 
bin Khalifa bin Salman, grand nephew of Shaikh Abdullah and governor of Manama. 
He was apparently concerned about the fate awaiting his family and domains if, after 
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Shaikh Abdullah‘s death, his unruly and troublesome sons took all the reins of power. 
The family was about to be shaken to its core, as the next section reveals. 
3. Misdemeanours of the Shaikh’s Sons 
The death of Shaikh Khalifa bin Salman in 1834 seems to have been the trigger for 
the troublesome actions of some of the sons of Shaikh Abdullah. Up until that time, 
the combined authority of the two Shaikhs had probably been sufficient to inhibit any 
inherent unruliness in the younger men. Once one of the co-rulers was dead, the sons 
may have felt that their father had gained absolute power, unassailable by any 
relatives outside the immediate family—a power that they could abuse with impunity, 
especially as their father‘s authority was apparently weakened by old age and could 
be defied. Each of the Shaikh‘s sons, and some of his older grandsons, commanded 
between one and three hundred armed retainers and followers. They set about acting 
very viciously towards the inhabitants and merchants of Bahrain.
4
 Their excesses and 
insolence, combined with Shaikh Abdullah‘s apparent inability to restrain them, 
resulted in the ruin of the Shaikh‘s political career, as shall be seen later on. 
In that same year of 1834, the British Native Agent in Bahrain was grossly 
insulted by some of the Shaikh‘s sons, who were also extorting money from other 
members of the Hindu British community.
5
 The agent apparently owed money to 
Shaikh Abdullah for some business transactions, and some of the Shaikh‘s sons 
appear to have wanted to seize it, in direct opposition to the wishes of their father. 
They used ill-treatment and vicious tactics to coerce the Native Agent into paying 
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them large sums of money.
6
 Strangely, Shaikh Abdullah could not protect the agent 
from the aggressions of his sons, who took full advantage of this inability to indulge 
in aggressive behaviour. They inflicted repeated assaults upon the British Native 
Agent.
7
 Naturally, such mischief brought unwanted anger and attention from the 
British Resident in Bushire, David Blane. A naval contingent of two sloops of war 
was dispatched to Bahrain under the command of the Senior Naval Officer Persian 
Gulf (SNOPG). After spending nearly eleven days in Bahrain, the commander of the 
Gulf squadron managed to convince Shaikh Abdullah of the necessity of punishing 
those responsible for harassing the British Native Agent. The harassers were three 
slaves who belonged to Shaikh Abdullah‘s son, Muhammad. 8  The commander 
demanded that the three men be flogged aboard either the British vessel or one of the 
Shaikh‘s vessels.9 
The Shaikh‘s sons‘ irresponsible behaviour and actions clearly placed their 
father in an embarrassing and difficult situation with the British Resident in the Gulf. 
They seemed to have lacked any vision or sense of the gravity of their actions, or of 
their effects on the position and political power of their father. The Shaikh, who had 
earlier in life demonstrated his ability as a resilient and powerful military commander 
and politician, seemed unable to stop or control the behaviour and demeanour of his 
sons. Most local historians attribute the Shaikh‘s apparent powerlessness over his sons 
not to a weakness of his character, but to old age. They also cite the loss of Shaikh 
Khalifa bin Salman, who would have aided his uncle in curbing the sons‘ excesses, as 
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well as the malice of his ‗ill natured sons‘, a trait that would bring the old Shaikh 
further unwanted and unexpected troubles.10 
4. Continuing the War with the Saudis 
When it came to tackling the Saudi threat, Shaikh Abdullah used a strategy of 
containment. It involved keeping the Saudis at bay and far from Bahrain by 
continually taking the offensive on the eastern shores of Arabia. The Shaikh seized 
the opportunity provided by the absence of Faisal bin Turki, who had returned to Najd 
to avenge the murder of his father, Emir Turki bin Abdullah. The Shaikh used bribery 
to gain the fortress of Tarut, a dependency of Qatif, which gave him an extra annual 
income of 30,000 MT Dollars from taxes levied on the farmers of Tarut‘s rich date 
groves.11 Shaikh Abdullah also encouraged some tribes, such as the Amayir, to join 
him in attacking the Saudis. The Amayir tribe obliged, attacking Hasa and Qatif, parts 
of their possessions that had been taken by the Saudis. They were, however, soundly 
defeated by Omar Ibn Ufaisan, the Saudi governor of Hasa, and forced to retreat to 
Tarut.12 Even with that setback, the Shaikh had succeeded in turning Saudi attention 
away from Bahrain and Qatar and towards Tarut and Qatif. 
Saudi politics had undergone radical change since the murder of Emir Turki 
bin Abdullah bin Muhammad bin Saud in 1834. Faisal bin Turki soon avenged his 
father‘s murder by killing the usurper, Mishari bin Abdul-Rahman Al Saud, the 
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victim‘s maternal nephew.13 After establishing his position as the new and legitimate 
Emir of Najd, Faisal bin Turki redirected his attention towards reclaiming Qatif and 
Tarut. In 1835, he launched a campaign to regain Tarut from Shaikh Abdullah, but the 
campaign ended in failure. Despite his success in repelling the invaders, Shaikh 
Abdullah apparently decided to maintain his pressure on the Saudi forces by imposing 
a strict blockade on the ports of Qatif and Uqair and plundering Saudi vessels at sea.14 
Although his strategy failed to gain a definite advantage, it wore down his enemies‘ 
forces and allowed him to alleviate the Saudi threat. It is likely that the Shaikh 
planned to let the conflict drag on, exhausting the Saudi forces to the point at which 
he could execute a killer blow. Whether or not this was the case we shall never know, 
as the Shaikh‘s attention was distracted by new troubles, caused by his sons, as 
described in the next section. 
5. The Conspiracy of Shaikh Abdullah’s Sons 
The sons of Shaikh Abdullah, already heaping troubles and embarrassment on their 
elderly father by harassing the merchants and inhabitants of Bahrain, compounded 
their malice by conspiring to overthrow their father and take control of Bahrain and its 
dependencies.15 Nasser Al-Khairi gives us a detailed and vivid description of the start 
of the troubles in 1250 AH (1835 AD). Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa wanted to 
marry a young lady from the Al Fadhil, his maternal cousins, against the wishes of 
Shaikh Ali, a son of Shaikh Abdullah, who apparently wanted to marry her himself. 
Shaikh Ali was supported by his brothers, and it seemed that conflict would erupt 
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between the young Al Khalifa Shaikhs. Shaikh Abdullah stepped in to halt the family 
conflict. He issued an edict stating that, since Shaikh Muhammad was the first to ask 
for the young lady‘s hand and since she was his maternal cousin, then it was he who 
should marry her, not Shaikh Ali. Both al-Khairi and al-Nabhani tell us that Shaikh 
Ali and his brothers Ahmad, Nasser, Muhammad and Mubarak were all deeply 
angered.16 The sons protested loudly, showing great disrespect and disdain for their 
father‘s ruling. Shaikh Abdullah, who must have been surprised and alarmed by their 
reaction and impolite attitude towards him, replied just as harshly. He threatened to 
punish them by banishment from Bahrain if they did not show appropriate respect for 
him, obey his edict and cease their unruly ways. According to al-Khairi, this firm 
stance scared his sons into submission and silence.17
 
Nevertheless, as history reveals, 
their apparent submission concealed the seeds of a rebellion. 
The sons of Shaikh Abdullah devised a plan to overthrow their father and rule 
in his place over Bahrain and its dependencies. According to al-Khairi‘s account, they 
went on a hunting trip south of the village of A‘ali in Bahrain. It was a subterfuge to 
hide their main purpose of conspiring freely in a secluded place, to devise a plan for 
their intended coup.18 Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa, upon whom his grand uncle 
Shaikh Abdullah depended for the running of the government, apparently became 
very suspicious of his cousins‘ intentions because his brother Shaikh Ali, with whom 
Shaikh Muhammad was not on good terms at the time, was in the party.19 Shaikh 
Muhammad may also have had his suspicions about his brother because the latter‘s 
mother was the sister of the mother of three of Shaikh Abdullah‘s sons, Shaikhs 
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Muhammad, Ali and Ahmed. According to al-Khairi, Shaikh Muhammad spied on 
their camp and surprised the conspirators by his sudden armed entry. He scolded them 
harshly and made it clear that he was fully aware of their conspiracy. He threatened 
them, warning them to abandon any plans for mischief against their father if they 
cared for their safety. He then stormed angrily out of their camp and, as al-Khairi‘s 
account goes, was especially angry with Shaikh Ali.
20
 
The conspirators were no doubt very surprised at the ease with which Shaikh 
Muhammad had discovered their conspiracy.21 It must have impelled them into frantic 
action for fear of their father‘s reaction. They apparently decided to escape to Qatar 
where they would be in a better position to devise a plan to face their father and his 
grand nephew. On arrival, they headed towards the town of Huwaila. Their apparent 
purpose was to meet Shaikh Isa bin Tarif, chief of the powerful al-bin Ali clan.
22
 Isa 
bin Tarif was the maternal uncle of three of the sons of Shaikh Abdullah, Shaikhs 
Muhammad, Ahmad, and Ali. He warmly welcomed the renegade sons of Shaikh 
Abdullah, assuring them that they would have a safe refuge from any retribution by 
their father.
23
 
Although the renegades had arrived as asylum seekers, they did not simply 
rest in the safety of their refuge in Qatar. Isa bin Tarif appears to have taken a 
preliminary role as mediator between the father and sons, though the sons seem to 
have convinced him to espouse their cause. Perhaps Isa bin Tarif already had some 
hidden political ambitions and was taking advantage of the situation. His political 
actions between 1843 and 1847, examined in the next chapter, tend to confirm this 
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theory. Isa bin Tarif and the renegade sons took a joint decision to invade Bahrain and 
overthrow the government of Shaikh Abdullah.24 They concluded an alliance with the 
tribe of al-bu Ainain and other Bedouin tribes of Qatar.25 British records mention a 
rebellion by two of these tribes in alliance with the sons of Shaikh Abdullah,26 but 
give no reason for it. We must rely on local historians such as al-Khairi, al-Tajir and 
others to provide a valuable insight into the detailed cause or causes of the rebellion. 
The rebels solicited the aid of the Saudi Emir Faisal bin Turki, who sent several 
hundred of his followers with instructions to aid the rebels and acknowledge their 
command. One of the sons of Shaikh Abdullah, Shaikh Ahmad, started attacking and 
plundering boats belonging to Bahrain.27 The British Political Resident in the Gulf, 
naturally alarmed, warned Shaikh Ahmad bin Abdullah and demanded restitution 
from him. Shaikh Ahmad must have realized the danger he was bringing upon himself 
and his comrades and that he might jeopardise their cause, so he complied without 
hesitation.28 Matters did not stop there, though. Shaikh Ahmad bin Abdullah even 
went so far as to approach the Sultan of Oman, Sayyid Said bin Sultan, his father‘s 
old enemy, to seek his help in invading Bahrain. Surprisingly, Sayyid Said not only 
declined Shaikh Ahmad‘s offer, but also sent one of his sons, Sayyid Hilal, to try to 
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mediate between Shaikh Abdullah and his renegade sons. Sayyid Hilal did not 
succeed.29 
It is difficult to understand why Sayyid Said did not take advantage of the 
conflict between Shaikh Abdullah and his sons by inflaming matters even further. 
Such a course of action would have further weakened the internal stability of the Al 
Khalifa family and the rest of the Utub. It would have given Sayyid Said an excellent 
chance of taking revenge for his earlier defeats at the hands of Shaikh Abdullah by 
invading Bahrain. If successful, his enterprise would have added a valuable country to 
his numerous domains. It is possible that Sayyid Said subscribed to the traditional 
view in Arabia at the time that to inflame a father-son conflict is an evil and 
despicable act. He may have been deterred by the idea of his image in the area might 
have suffering if he took such a step. On the other hand, he was an expansionist, 
constantly looking, to safeguard and expand his domains. Sayyid Said‘s natural 
inclination would have been to harness the internal conflict between the Utub to his 
advantage and to make further gains for himself and his dynasty. There might, 
however, have been a third explanation, that he was preoccupied with internal issues 
of his own. If that indeed was the case then it is quite probable that the Sayyid saw 
that meddling in the internal conflicts of the Utub might have brought undesired 
outcomes. That would have been especially true if Shaikh Abdullah had won and then 
sought to chastise anyone who joined in the rebellion against him. 
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6. The Battle of Huwaila 
The old Shaikh would naturally have been upset and deeply angered at the news of 
the rebellion spearheaded by his sons and in-laws. Their treason in soliciting aid from 
the rulers of Najd and Oman must have upset him even more and filled him with 
resentment. He tried to calm matters down and appease his sons in order to end the 
chaos and avert bloodshed, but he was ignored.30 Thus he was forced to take harsher 
and more drastic measures. He summoned his grand nephew, Shaikh Muhammad bin 
Khalifa, and appointed him commander of an army to quash the rebellion in Qatar and 
to defuse the threat of his sons. Shaikh Muhammad, who had apparently managed to 
reconcile Shaikh Ali, with their grand uncle, took his brother with him on the 
campaign.31 
Shaikh Muhammad‘s fleet sailed to the southeastern coast of Qatar, where he 
landed his forces near the town of Wakrah and divided them into two sections. He 
commanded the first section, a land army, while his brother, Shaikh Ali bin Khalifa, 
was given command of the naval section. 32  From Wakrah, Shaikh Muhammad 
marched his troops to the town of Huwaila, the bastion of the rebels, in northeastern 
Qatar. Shaikh Ali sailed with his naval force around the coast to the same 
destination.33 
Wakrah seems to have been a strange choice for a landing because the march 
to Huwaila was so long. Shaikh Muhammad could as easily have disembarked at 
Sumaismah or al-Khor on the southeastern coast of Qatar, or at Zubarah or Furaiha on 
the northwestern coast, giving his troops a much shorter march. His decision gives 
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rise to a suggestion that the rebellion was not restricted to Huwaila and its vicinity. It 
may have extended to other parts of northwestern, north and northeastern Qatar. If 
that was indeed the case, it illustrates the difficulties faced by Shaikh Abdullah bin 
Ahmad and his grand nephew. Shaikh Muhammad‘s strategy seems to have been to 
surround Huwaila on its landward side and to blockade it by sea. When he arrived, he 
found the rebel troops fully assembled, ready for combat and under the command of 
Shaikh Ali bin Abdullah. Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa issued a final warning to the 
sons of Shaikh Abdullah and their rebel comrades. He called upon them to stand 
down their troops to avoid a bloodletting. He also promised them that he would 
mediate between them and their father if they heeded his warning and complied with 
his demands.34 
His warnings were ignored. Shaikh Ali bin Abdullah and his brothers became 
even more defiant.35
 
Shaikh Muhammad therefore went on the offensive and ordered 
his troops to charge the rebel army. A fierce battle ensued. Shaikh Muhammad fought 
fiercely and succeeded in dealing a devastating blow to the enemy forces, 
substantially weakening them, just as Shaikh Ali and his naval force arrived. The fleet 
started bombarding the town, the ships and boats docked in its harbour. This 
apparently caused the morale of the rebels to collapse. Their forces were defeated and 
Shaikh Muhammad made the rebellious sons of Shaikh Abdullah his captives. The 
defeated al-bin Ali tribe and their allies asked Shaikh Muhammad to grant them 
amnesty and to reconcile them with Shaikh Abdullah. However, the victor was 
unrelenting and strict. He insisted, accepting no compromise, that the al-bin Ali and 
their allies should abandon Huwaila and leave Qatar immediately. They had no option 
but to comply, and once they had left, Shaikh Muhammad ordered the town of 
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Huwaila to be razed to the ground. Shaikh Abdullah‘s sons were offered two options. 
They had to choose between banishment from both Qatar and Bahrain, or to accept 
his offer as a mediator between them and their aged father. They chose mediation, and 
Shaikh Muhammad‘s efforts resulted in reconciliation.36 Peace and calm returned to 
the Al Khalifa family, at least for a time. See Figure 10.
37
 
7. Ramifications of the Battle 
The crisis that culminated in the Battle of Huwaila, the first internal armed clash 
between family members of the Al Khalifa, entailed significant consequences for 
Shaikh Abdullah and his family. The conflict was not between brothers or cousins, as 
is historically common in ruling dynasties, but between sons and their father. It led to 
an internal rebellion by tribes that had traditionally been loyal to the Al Khalifa, such 
as the al-bin Ali and the al-bu Ainain. It also set a precedent for later animosity and 
conflict between the Al Khalifa and the al-bin Ali under the leadership of Shaikh Isa 
bin Tarif. That led to fracture in the al-Utub tribal confederation itself, to which both 
Al Khalifa and al-bin Ali belong. 
One might argue some similarity with the clashes between the Al Khalifa family and 
the al-Jalahma family under the leadership of Rahma bin Jabir. Three facts clearly 
differentiate that dispute from the conflict with al-bin Ali. First, the al-Jalahma was a 
much smaller clan than the al-bin Ali was. Second, there is scant evidence that Rahma 
was aided in his endeavours by anyone in the al-Jalahma family aside from his 
immediate relations, while most of the al-bin Ali were under the command of their 
Shaikhs, all obedient to their chief, Shaikh Isa bin Tarif. Third, with their large  
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Figure 10: Battle of Huwaila 1835 
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numbers of ships, slaves and other capital resources, the al-bin Ali were able to recruit 
allies from other tribes such as the al-bu Ainain and even mercenaries from nomadic 
tribes. Rahma, on the other hand, could recruit only Baluchis to add to his slaves and 
what aid he could procure from alliances with the Emir of Najd and the Sultan of 
Muscat.
38
 Large or small, these tribal frictions were serious for Shaikh Abdullah. He 
had to contend not only with external forces such as the Saudis, Ottomans, Egyptians, 
Persians and the British, but also with the internal forces of tribes who had 
traditionally been his loyal subjects and allies. 
Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa, grand nephew of Shaikh Abdullah, was 
young and did not have the authority and influence of his father, the late Shaikh 
Khalifa bin Salman. Nevertheless, the battle and its outcomes affected his political 
position and stature. Shaikh Abdullah, facing a rebellion by most of his sons, was 
probably wary of sending another son to fight his own brothers. He may well have felt 
unable to trust any of them. It must have seemed that there was no one to turn to but 
his grand nephew. 
The Battle of Huwaila was the first major test for Shaikh Muhammad bin 
Khalifa as a military commander and leader of a military expedition. The young 
Shaikh had to face the powerful al-bin Ali tribe under the command of Shaikh Isa bin 
Tarif, who was probably an experienced military commander. On top of that, the 
enemy was supported by the al-bu Ainain, other allies and Bedouin mercenaries, and 
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by a Saudi contingent of several hundred men. Given the forces ranged against his 
untested skills, the fact that he defeated them must have significantly boosted his 
image and stature. He would certainly have gained confidence in his competence as a 
military commander. His victory against the rebels would have elevated his personal 
prestige, not only among his family but also among the tribes and clans living in 
Bahrain, Qatar and near Dammam. The opposite would have been true of the sons of 
Shaikh Abdullah. Their failure would have diminished their prestige in the family as 
well as among the other tribes and clans. That leap in confidence, as shall be seen 
later, was the probable cause of Shaikh Muhammad‘s aspiration to the position of his 
late father. If such aspirations and ambitions were indeed real, then we may assume 
that they might have led Shaikh Muhammad to view himself as the logical and 
legitimate successor to his great–uncle, especially as the misconduct of Shaikh 
Abdullah‘s sons would have ruled them out of succession in the eyes of their family 
and tribe. 
8. Continued Troubles with Shaikh Isa bin Tarif 
After their defeat at the battle of Huwaila, Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa forced the 
al-bin Ali tribe and their allies, the tribe of al-bu Ainain among them, to leave Qatar. 
The banished rebels resettled near the town of Abu Dhabi on the coast of Oman, now 
part of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). They took refuge under its ruler, Shaikh 
Khalifa bin Shakhboot Al Nahyan.39 It was at that time that Shaikh Isa bin Tarif, 
leader of the al-bin Ali, started planning revenge against Shaikh Abdullah. Shaikh Isa 
bin Tarif apparently feared that his movements against Shaikh Abdullah might have 
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been regarded by the British as piracy. Such a prospect must have worried him as it 
may have brought British retribution upon him. This probably prompted him to 
correspond with the British Resident in the Gulf, asking permission to wage war and 
initiate hostilities against the maritime trade and territories of Shaikh Abdullah and his 
family. The Resident refused, on the grounds that Isa bin Tarif and his followers were 
established in a port that was at least neutral if not friendly to Shaikh Abdullah.40 The 
conditions for commencing hostilities against the Shaikh of Bahrain, the Resident 
said, were that Shaikh Isa should either persuade the ruler of Abu Dhabi to declare his 
willingness to take responsibility for the Shaikh‘s actions, or make an open alliance 
with him against Shaikh Abdullah.41 Disquiet evolved between the banished rebels in 
Abu Dhabi and Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmad. The British were probably worried 
about maritime safety in the region and wanted to end the conflict as soon as possible. 
Between 1835 and 1838, the British Resident in the Gulf tried to mediate and 
conclude a peace between the two conflicting parties. The matter certainly got more 
intense when Shaikh Khalifa bin Shakhboot took to the cause of the rebels. 
Nevertheless, that did not deter the efforts of the Political Resident in Bushire.
42
 
Stubbornness on both sides made this impossible, according to British records. The 
British Resident, probably realising the futility of his efforts, told both leaders that he 
would step back from their conflict and offer neither interference nor mediation. This 
effectively freed the two factions to commence hostilities against one another. The 
Resident gave the belligerents a deadline to withhold hostilities that would have 
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passed at the end of the pearling season and that also coincided with the end of the 
month of Ramadan, roughly 18 December 1838.
43
 Once that date had passed, the two 
belligerents would be free to fight each other. 
Shortly before the official date of resumption of hostilities between the two 
parties, Shaikh Abdullah sent an envoy, his vizier, Haji Bu Shihab, to the British 
Resident, Captain S. Hennell, with a peace initiative. The Shaikh was willing to allow 
the al-bin Ali, the al-bu Ainain and their allies to return to Bahrain, and to give them 
compensation for their boats and properties—as long as the British Resident would 
act as a guarantor. Haji Bu Shihab made it clear that Shaikh Abdullah was powerful 
enough to defeat the fugitive rebels but that he desired to avoid bloodshed.
44
 The 
Resident, who would have naturally been wary of being dragged into guaranteeing 
any peace deal, refused, but tried once again to broker an accommodation between 
Shaikh Abdullah and Shaikh Isa, in order to avoid hostilities that might involve other 
rulers in the Gulf region. Haji Bu Shihab even conceded that if Isa bin Tarif refused to 
return to Bahrain, Shaikh Abdullah would not object to his people resettling on the 
coast of Qatar.
45
 
Isa bin Tarif refused all Shaikh Abdullah‘s offers of peace and reconciliation. 
Hostilities began, but before matters escalated, Shaikh Abdullah managed to defuse 
the situation. He deprived his foe of the use of the port of Abu Dhabi as a base from 
which to launch his attacks. Shaikh Abdullah apparently became aware that relations 
between Shaikh Isa bin Tarif and Shaikh Khalifa bin Shakhboot, ruler of Abu Dhabi, 
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were becoming strained.
46
 That most likely prompted Shaikh Abdullah to befriend the 
latter. Gifts and presents were exchanged between the two rulers and soon a peace 
treaty was signed as well. Shaikh Isa bin Tarif was now denied the port of Abu Dhabi 
and was forced to leave, along with his followers, at the end of the pearling season.
47
 
According to local historians, the exiles relocated to the island of Qais near the 
Persian coast.
48
 
Shaikh Abdullah had succeeded in resolving the conflict with the al-bin Ali 
tribe and their allies through political and diplomatic methods rather than by force of 
arms. That state of peace prevailed for a few years. He would probably have beaten 
his enemies if he had gone to war with them, but almost certainly had his reasons for 
choosing other methods instead. More likely than not, he believed that continued 
tensions with the al-bin Ali tribe would further weaken the Bani Utbah, mother tribe 
of the Al Khalifa, al-bin Ali and other families and clans. He must have hoped that, 
over time, he could heal the ‗psychological wounds‘ and reunite all factions of the 
Bani Utbah. His desire to avoid hostilities may also have been rooted in his 
disinclination to make more enemies. Historically, there had been no friction between 
the Bani Utbah, led by the Al Khalifa, and the Bani Yas, led by the Al Nahayan. 
Shaikh Abdullah probably did not want war with Shaikh Isa bin Tarif to upset that 
state of affairs. His original, failed efforts to reconcile with the al-bin Ali had involved 
the successful neutralising of the Bani Yas, but a new war with Isa bin Tarif and his 
followers could have brought them back into conflict with him.
49
 
                                                          
46
 Letter from, Native Agent in Bahrain,Mirza Muhammad Ali, to PRPG, 7 February 1839, 70, in 
Bombay Political & Secret Department Diary, vol. 64 (1060), Maharashtra State Archive, Mumbai, 
India.  
47
 Lt. A.B. Kemball, ―Historical Sketch of the Uttoobee Tribe of Arabs‖, 388. 
48
 Al-Tajir, Aqd al-La‟al, 121; al-Khairi, Qalaid il Nahrain, 287. 
49
 For further details on the issue of conflict between Isa bin Tarif and Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmad see 
following letter exchanges: Letter from Captain S. Hennell, Resident in the Persian Gulf to Shaikh 
Abdulaziz Al Khalifa Chapter V  
 
  168 
 
9. Persian Encroachments and Threats against Bahrain 
As if dealing with Arab problems on the western side of the Gulf was not enough for 
the Shaikh, he faced a renewed threat from the Persians. In 1836, he received a 
communication from the Governor of Shiraz calling upon him as a ―Persian subject‖ 
to submit to the Qajari Shah. His probable alarm at this encroachment would have 
naturally been exacerbated by his belief that the Persians would solicit aid and support 
from Sayyid Said of Oman if he did not comply with their demands.
50
 The Shaikh 
could easily have believed that, as he must have known that Sayyid Said was married 
to at least two Persian princesses, at least one related to the Prince of Shiraz.
51
 Such 
liaisons would have understandably made the Shaikh very wary of the possibility of 
the Sultan of Oman coming to help his in-laws and join them in an invasion of 
Bahrain.
52
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The Shaikh decided to stand up to the Persian demands by turning his ongoing 
quarrel with the Saudi Emir of Najd, Faisal bin Turki, to his advantage. That quarrel 
was a continuation of the Shaikh‘s differences with the Emir‘s late father Turki bin 
Abdullah. Shaikh Abdullah most likely realized that Faisal and his subjects in Hasa 
were exhausted by his continued blockade of the ports of Uqair and Qatif, and took 
reconciliatory steps. He offered to lift his blockade and to pay a nominal tribute of 
2,000 MT dollars a year to the Saudi Emir. In return, the Emir would supply Shaikh 
Abdullah with the troops and other resources necessary to defend Bahrain and its 
dependencies from any external attack. Emir Faisal welcomed the offer, as the lifting 
of the blockade would have allowed him to concentrate on thwarting Egyptian 
incursions on the western frontiers of his domains. The settlement with Shaikh 
Abdullah was quickly reached. 
At the Shaikh‘s insistence, the treaty included a clause denying the Emir‘s 
right to any Bahraini help if he should decide to send any naval expeditions against 
Oman.
53
 This appears to have been a political precaution. Understandably, the Shaikh 
would not have wanted to be dragged into unnecessary military adventures that the 
new young Saudi Emir might attempt against Sayyid Said. The Shaikh, as we saw 
earlier, had agreed to peaceful and cordial relations with Sayyid Said after a period of 
fierce military engagements. Hence, that extra clause in the treaty between the Al 
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Khalifa and the Al Saud would have sent an indirect message of goodwill to Sayyid 
Said. Its likely intent was to dissuade him from joining the Persians against him. 
Shaikh Abdullah apparently knew that the Persians were not well endowed with naval 
power at that time, so would need an ally like Sayyid Said to attack the Shaikh. 
Sayyid Said, the Shaikh probably reasoned, would have realized that the Shaikh was 
capable of joining forces with the Saudi Emir against him. He must have also realized 
that such an attack was quite possible if the Sayyid allied himself with the Persians 
against Bahrain and Qatar. Sayyid Said must therefore have reasoned that the 
Shaikh‘s alliance with the Emir placed him in a much stronger position and 
appreciated the indirect message conveyed by Shaikh Abdullah‘s insistence on not 
being obliged to join any Saudi cause against Omani interests. As far as Sayyid Said 
was concerned, the Shaikh‘s treaty with the Emir made it very unwise to join the 
Persians in their encroachments upon the Shaikh‘s domains. 
By allying with the Saudis and simultaneously maintaining good relations with 
the Omanis, the Shaikh not only strengthened his position against the Persians but also 
deprived them of a valuable ally whose assistance would probably have been necessary 
for any adventures against Bahrain. The political manoeuvring must have worked well, 
as available historical accounts mention no Persian attacks or expeditions against 
Bahrain and its dependencies at that time.
54
 The manner in which the Shaikh extracted 
himself from such a predicament reveals him to have been a skilled political strategist, 
not just an able military commander. 
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10.  The Egyptian Encroachment of 1839 
By 1839, another wave of trouble was approaching Shaikh Abdullah and his domains. 
Khorshid Pasha, an Egyptian general of Muhammad Ali Pasha, Viceroy of Egypt, was 
sent by his overlord to overthrow the rule of Emir Faisal. The Pasha‘s intention, given 
success, was to install a pretender, Khalid bin Saud, as the new Emir of Najd, thus 
bringing the region under Egyptian hegemony.
 55
 Khalid bin Saud had been captured 
at the fall of Diriyah in 1818 and taken to Egypt, where he lived until 1836.
56
 
Muhammad Ali Pasha would have wanted an Emir in Najd of whose loyalty he could 
be assured. By doing so, he would have ensured firm Egyptian hegemony over that 
region. Such hegemony would have given Egypt firm control and authority over 
central and eastern Arabia. Khalid bin Saud, whose long captivity in Egypt had 
probably put him under its cultural and political influence, seemed the perfect vassal 
for Muhammad Ali to use.
57
 Khorshid Pasha was successful in his mission. He 
defeated Faisal bin Turki, captured him and his immediate family and sent them into 
exile in Egypt. He then installed Khalid bin Saud as the new Saudi Emir of Najd 
before continuing his campaign and bringing Hasa and Qatif under the control of the 
new Emir.
58
 
Shaikh Abdullah doubtless feared for the safety of his domains when he heard 
the news, but worse was to come. First of all Emir Khalid and Khorshid Pasha sent 
letters to Shaikhs Abdullah bin Ahmad and Muhammad bin Khalifa in which they 
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demanded that the payment of tribute by Bahrain and its dependencies to the 
government of Najd would be resumed.
59
 However, when Omar Ibn Ufaisan, one of 
the generals of the former Emir, Faisal bin Turki, sought and received asylum in 
Bahrain the new Emir made other demands.
60
 He ordered Shaikh Abdullah surrender 
Ibn Ufaisan, the fort of Dammam and the island of Tarut. The Shaikh might well have 
felt that conceding them would simply lead to further demands and the severe 
weakening of his own power and authority.
61
 His fears would have been deepened 
when he heard that Khorshid Pasha had sent a letter to the British authorities in the 
Gulf. The Pasha notified the British of his intention to invade Bahrain and incorporate 
it into the realm of the new Saudi Emir.
62
 The British opposed this, telling the Pasha 
that the grounds on which he based his intention to invade Bahrain were invalid.
63
 
The Shaikh was in an uncomfortable position, especially as the threat from Isa 
bin Tarif had yet to be defused. Shaikh Abdullah made a new overture to the Persian 
government. Receiving it favourably, the Prince of Shiraz sent an envoy called Haji 
Qasim, escorted by ten sirbaz (soldiars), with a rukum (dress of honour) for Shaikh 
Abdullah. The Persian intention was that Haji Qasim should remain in Bahrain as the 
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Persian agent on the islands. He would have been responsible for the collection of the 
annual tribute that Shaikh Abdullah was supposed to pay to the Persians.
64
 At exactly 
that time, Shaikh Abdullah succeeded in defusing the threat posed by Isa bin Tarif in 
the manner described earlier. He was now free of the internal threat and of the threat 
that came from across the Gulf, and was able to concentrate his power and energy on 
thwarting the impending threat of the Egyptians. 
The Shaikh first sought advice from the British Resident in Bushire, Captain 
S. Hennell on how to deal with this new Egyptian threat. The Resident replied that he 
was unable to advice Shaikh Abdullah on any course to take in dealing with the 
Egyptians and that the Shaikh should pursue the policy that suits his own interests.
65
 
Later on the Shaikh sought British protection against Egypt, but the Resident could 
offer him neither a guarantee of safety nor a definite pledge of support and 
assistance.
66
 Instead, he solicited a promise from the Shaikh that the latter would 
notify the former before placing himself under the protection of any foreign power.
67
 
Such an outcome appears illogical to a modern observer and would have 
understandably made the Shaikh very uncomfortable. He probably agreed, against his 
                                                          
64
 Letter from PRPG to Bombay Government of Bombay, 15 March 1839, 199-202, in Bombay 
Political & Secret Department Diary, vol. 64 (1060), Maharashtra State Archive, Mumbai, India. See 
also Lt. A.B. Kemball, “Historical Sketch of the Uttoo ee  ri e of  ra s”, 388.  
65
 See letter from Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmad to PRPG, 26 January 1839; Letter from PRPG to Shaikh 
Abdullah bin Ahmad, 11 February 1839, 74-75, in Bombay Political & Secret Department Diary, vol. 
64 (1060), Maharashtra State Archive, Mumbai, India.  
66
 In a letter from the PRPG to the Bombay Government the Resident states that he did not receive any 
request from Shaikh Abdullah to receive British protection but that the Resident supposed that the 
Shaikh was seeking protection because he asked for the Resident‘s advice in dealing with Khorshid 
Pasha. The Resident then comments on the pros and cons of having Bahrain being placed under 
British protection and later supplants with his letter a general report about Bahrain and its resources 
and conditions. For further details see letter from PRPG to Bombay Goevrnment, 22 February 1839, 
131-137, and subsequent report, 2 March 1839, 139-145; Later on the Resident received a letter from 
the Bombay government in which he was instructed to offer the Shaikh of Bahrain British protection 
but not to make any final deal without having the final consent of his superiors in Bombay, for further 
details see letter from Bombay Government to PRPG, 1 April 1839, 147-148, in Bombay Political & 
Secret Department Diary, vol. 64 (1060), Maharashtra State Archive, Mumbai, India.  
67
 Lt. A.B. Kemball, “Historical Sketch of the Uttoo ee  ri e of  ra s”, 388-389. 
Abdulaziz Al Khalifa Chapter V  
 
  174 
 
will, in the hope of being able to secure British protection in the future.
68
 Shaikh 
Abdullah, denied protection from the British, declared himself a tributary of the 
Egyptians and placed himself under their protection. The Shaikh‘s deal with the Pasha 
was reasonably advantageous to Bahraini interests. The nominal annual tribute, a 
trivial 2,000 MT dollars, safeguarded the integrity of his domains and his authority 
over them. At the Shaikh‘s insistence, no agent of the Pasha would reside in Bahrain. 
This move must have been a most unpleasant surprise for the Persians. The 
British Resident, who first heard of it from the Pasha, must have been equally 
surprised and perhaps a little dismayed. Shaikh Abdullah defended his action to the 
Resident by stating that he had made that choice only after he had given up all hope of 
receiving protection from the British. He went on to say that his situation was 
exacerbated because his Bedouin subjects on the Arabian mainland had proclaimed 
their submission to Khorshid Pasha. He claimed that he feared that the Pasha would 
use them against him if he did not cooperate. The Shaikh also informed the Resident 
that he disliked Khorshid Pasha and was willing to repudiate his agreement with him. 
However, that was provisional on his receipt of the fullest written assurance by the 
British government that it would protect him from any external aggressor. According 
to the Resident, the Shaikh also told him that he would be happy for his domains to 
become dependencies of Great Britain if he received such assurances—though he 
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declined to commit such a statement to paper.
69
 Shaikh Abdullah had obtained 
freedom from Egyptian threat for a trifling price, and had no need to become a 
dependant of the British Empire unless such an action would provide him with cast 
iron protection. 
Shrewdness and cunning had brought Shaikh Abdullah protection from the 
Egyptian threat. This was not some local difficulty. It was a very real threat from the 
imperial forces of Muhammad Ali Pasha, the man who had nearly toppled the 
Ottoman Empire. The Shaikh probably reasoned that, given his limited resources and 
forces, no matter how brave they were, military action would have been an act of utter 
recklessness. He therefore needed help and protection from another empire. His 
previous experience of the British probably told him from the very beginning that the 
British would not, or could not, offer any guaranteed protection to a local ruler like 
him. They had been reluctant to guarantee any peace deals between him and Rahma 
bin Jabir and Sayyid Said of Oman, so why would they guarantee any solid protection 
for him and his domains against the forces of Khorshid Pasha? Nonetheless, he 
probably also realized that the British themselves would have been alarmed at the new 
Egyptian encroachment. Rahma and Sayyid Said did not pose such threats against 
British interests as Egyptian dominance in the Arab Gulf and Eastern Arabia would 
have done, so it was logical for Shaikh Abdullah to try to solicit some kind of 
protection from them. He had, of course, also sought, and this time received, 
protection from the Persians, but they lacked the naval power to protect him (or to 
attack him, for that matter). The British had that power, but they would not protect 
him. Why, therefore, did he seek protection from both powers at the same time? One 
probable reason was that, if each power was convinced of his dire need for protection, 
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neither would suspect him of parleying with the Egyptians. Another likely reason, it 
can be assumed, was that he wanted to use the Persian protection he had received, as 
well as the possible interference and protection of the British, as tools to bargain with 
the Egyptians. If that was indeed the case, his negotiations worked very well. He 
neutralised the threat from the Egyptians and gained their protection for a tribute of a 
mere 2,000 MT dollars a year. As he did not have to endure the presence of an 
Egyptian agent in Bahrain, he had also prevented any foreign interference in the 
internal affairs of his territories. However, the Shaikh‘s insistence on the absence of a 
resident Egyptian agent may also have been a ploy to appease the British. He 
probably wanted to keep the door open for future cooperation with them. His political 
acumen had brought him rewards that could not have been won militarily. 
The result was not perfect in every respect. The British, who had refused to 
give Shaikh Abdullah a guaranteed assurance of protection before the fact, were 
incensed by his alliance with the Egyptians. He was considered by them to have 
―forfeited the friendship of the British Government‖.70 In all likelihood the British 
were trying to have a firmer grip on the Gulf region to safeguard their domains in 
India and the maritime trade route. Hence, it is highly probable that they desired the 
local rulers of the gulf to behave like protégés and succumb to any instructions given 
to them by the British. Nevertheless, in the case of Shaikh Abdullah they were unable 
or unwilling to give him what every protégé desires the most, protection, which the 
Egyptians were more than willing to offer. Therefore, they must have seen that the 
choice made by Shaikh Abdullah in making himself a protégé of the Egyptians 
instead of them as detrimental to their interests of obtaining hegemony over the 
Arabian Gulf region. The British seriously entertained the possibility of replacing 
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Shaikh Abdullah with another Shaikh who was more favourably disposed towards 
them. They also considered not restraining Sayyid Said of Oman should he attempt 
another invasion of Bahrain.
71
 Shaikh Abdullah may have angered Great Britain by 
his alliance with the Egyptians, but without guaranteed British protection, it was his 
only option if he was to protect himself, his family and his country.
72
 
The Egyptian expedition of 1839 was the last serious external threat Shaikh 
Abdullah faced. By 1840, the Egyptian forces of Muhammad Ali Pasha had left 
Eastern Arabia, Hasa and Qatif, relieving the Shaikh of further concern about them. It 
was not until early 1842 that Shaikh Abdullah had to face the next serious threat to his 
political position and authority, as we shall see in the next chapter. 
11. Conclusion 
Ruling shaikhs in the Gulf faced frequent political challenges and threats during the 
first half of the nineteenth century. They needed to be one step ahead of their foes at 
all times, remaining constantly alive to any threat to their authority. They could not 
afford to tolerate dissent from family members or tribal allies, as any laxity would 
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have brought ruin upon the shaikhdom and its ruler. From time to time, they would 
become entangled with other powers, regional and international, usually by force of 
circumstance and unwillingly. Realising that resolution by military means would be 
futile and reckless, a ruling Shaikh would either try to seek the aid of an ally, or to 
‗enter‘ (dakhala or zabana) into a protector-protégé relationship of a more powerful 
ruler, or to play one power against another, as James Onley has shown.
73
  Such was 
the grim political reality of the Arabian Gulf at the time, and Shaikh Abdullah 
presents a good example of the rulers of his day.  During the period 1834–1842, he 
occasionally took military action against the Saudis, though he more usually resorted 
to diplomatic tactics. He used both protector-protégé and play-off tactics very 
efficiently in his dealings with the British, the Egyptians and the Persians. 
Shaikh Abdullah successfully repelled all the external threats mounted against 
him and his domains. He demonstrated his agility as a political leader by using a 
range of tactics and strategies, both military and diplomatic, at the appropriate times 
and places. Against the internal threat to his reign—the irresponsible and unruly 
conduct of his sons—he proved ineffectual. Against the Saudi threat, Shaikh Abdullah 
employed a mixture of strategies to achieve success and prevail. Commencing direct 
military conflict, by garrisoning Qatif and Hasa, for instance, would have taken a long 
time and exhausted his resources. Instead he chose a military strategy of indirect 
engagement. In those circumstances, the strategy appears to have been necessary to 
retain his domains of Dammam and Tarut and to contain the Saudis. He initiated a 
naval blockade on the Saudi ports of Qatif and Uqair, combining it with sporadic land 
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skirmishes. That offensive strategy consumed few resources and enabled him to take 
advantage of his superior naval power to maintain extended blockades and debilitate 
Saudi resources. The outcome was complete success for the Shaikh. He did not 
simply alleviate the threat of the Saudis but also turned them from enemies to allies 
against other possible foes, simply by paying them a nominal annual tribute. 
The Shaikh was also successful in denying renewed Persian claims to his 
domains in 1836. He seems to have carefully analysed the strengths and weaknesses 
of the claimants, realising their lack of naval resources meant they would need the 
help of Sayyid Said of Oman, the only naval power in the Gulf that could match his 
own. Because even the prospect of such an alliance would have been detrimental to 
Bahrain and its dependencies, the Shaikh changed his confrontational stance with the 
Saudi Emir into one of friendship and alliance, as explained in the previous 
paragraph. By lifting the blockade of the Saudi ports, he not only made the whole of 
his forces available for defence against the Persians, but also had the use of a 
contingent of soldiers supplied by the Emir. The same treaty averted the risk of being 
entangled in an armed Saudi-Omani conflict. As we have seen, the Shaikh insisted on 
a clause releasing him from any obligation to help the Saudis should they engage in 
conflict with the Omanis. This clause sent an indirect message to Sayyid Said: the 
Shaikh was quite capable of joining forces with the Saudis against him, but as he 
chose not to so, he would appreciate it if Sayyid Said would reciprocate by refusing to 
support any Persian action against Bahrain and Qatar. The overall effect was that the 
Shaikh had deprived the Persians of a vital ally, as without Oman they had no serious 
chance of success against Bahrain. The Persian threat was neutralised. Had he failed, 
the geopolitical scene in the Gulf region today might look very different. Bahrain, 
even Qatar and the Arabian coast opposite Bahrain as well, could have been part of 
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Iran. Today‘s Western and Arab interests in the Gulf might well have been in a very 
precarious position. 
Shaikh Abdullah‘s last external threat came from the growing empire of 
Muhammad Ali Pasha, the Ottoman Viceroy and de facto ruler of Egypt. His forces, 
under the command of his general Khorshid Pasha, toppled the Saudi Emir Faisal bin 
Turki in 1838. In his place, the Egyptians installed another member of the Al Saud, 
Khalid bin Saud, thus ensuring a faithful ally in Central Arabia. Khorshid Pasha‘s 
next intention was to expand his master‘s territory and influence to Bahrain and its 
dependencies in Qatar, Dammam and Tarut. Shaikh Abdullah‘s alarm at this new 
threat from the west must have been intensified when he learned (as he probably did) 
that the Pasha was corresponding with the British about his ambition. The Shaikh 
applied to the British for protection against the Pasha, but was not only denied it but 
was forced to agree to notify the British before placing himself and his domains under 
the protection of any foreign power. 
The Shaikh was equal to the complexities of the situation. His actions were 
immediate, decisive and shrewd, aimed at spreading confusion among the three major 
powers in the Gulf at the time: Britain, Persia and Egypt. He probably decided that the 
protection of his domains should take precedence over British interests or favour. He 
solicited, and received, the aid and protection of the Persians. The Shaikh no doubt 
realized that this sort of action would excite the attention of the British but would not 
provoke them substantially or raise their suspicions. By distracting them with the new 
liaison with the Persians, he was able to conceal the fact that he was engaged in secret 
talks with Khorshid Pasha. That same liaison gave him bargaining power with the 
Pasha, enabling him to conclude his agreement with the Egyptians on terms 
favourable to Bahrain and its dependencies. His endeavour succeeded so well that 
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Shaikh Abdullah not only spared his domains from direct Egyptian domination but 
also procured Egyptian protection without direct Egyptian interference, as there was 
to be no Egyptian Wakil (Agent) in Bahrain. The price for all this was a more or less 
trivial annual tribute. The Shaikh‘s success in safeguarding himself and his domains 
from the Egyptians would have unwanted consequences, however. He had angered 
the British, who denied him the help he needed when new internal problems arose, as 
we shall see in the next chapter. The Shaikh could be criticised for entering into good 
relations with the Egyptians, thus incurring British resentment, but he was probably 
exercising the best possible option open to him. Military confrontation with the 
Egyptians, without solid and guaranteed British protection, may well have had 
unwelcome consequences. 
The final part of this chapter‘s conclusion deals with Shaikh Abdullah‘s 
internal problems with his unruly sons and his in-law, Shaikh Isa bin Tarif, the chief 
of the al-bin Ali tribe. It is notable that the Shaikh was not as successful on that 
internal front as he was with all the external challenges of his long political career. 
Local historians al-Khairi and al-Tajir offer the only logical explanation: Shaikh 
Abdullah was weakened by old age and was unable to restrain his family‘s insolence 
and excesses. Another reason may have been that the Shaikh, an able leader against 
external threats, was so overcome with emotion and sentiment that he could not act 
decisively and rationally to nip their excesses in the bud. Whatever the reason, the 
Shaikh‘s weakness had dire consequences for the Al Khalifa family and the Bani 
Utbah tribal confederation, causing a major tribal schism. It encouraged Shaikh Isa 
bin Tarif, the maternal uncle of some of Shaikh Abdullah‘s sons, to engage in a revolt 
against the authority of Shaikh Abdullah. The apparent object of the revolt was to 
dethrone Shaikh Abdullah and install his sons as rulers, although it is possible that Isa 
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bin Tarif himself was the prime mover, seeking to increase his own political power or 
even to install himself as ruler. Events examined in the next chapter substantially 
support this hypothesis. 
Despite his failure to curb the excesses of his sons, Shaikh Abdullah did curb 
the ambitions of Isa bin Tarif. With the help of his grand nephew, Shaikh Muhammad 
bin Khalifa, he defeated Isa‘s forces and banished him and his supporters from Qatar. 
During subsequent attempts at reconciliation with Isa bin Tarif, Shaikh Abdullah 
managed to deprive him of an ally and of the use of a port from which he could attack 
Bahraini interests. The Shaikh achieved this by befriending the ruler of Abu Dhabi, 
home port of the banished rebels, so that they were forced to leave Abu Dhabi and go 
to the island of Qais, relieving the Shaikh of their annoyances for some time at least. 
The events examined in this chapter reveal Shaikh Abdullah as an able 
political and military leader. He protected himself and his domains from all external 
threats. For each enemy and situation, he apparently knew when to use direct 
confrontation, when to lay prolonged sieges backed up with skirmishes, and when to 
employ political cunning and shrewdness. Contemporary historians, looking through 
modern eyes at his life and career, might accuse him of slyness, inconsistency, 
violence and deceit. However, in doing so they would not be looking at the man as a 
whole, and would not be able to appreciate the geopolitical and social circumstances 
of his day. The Shaikh was driven by a set of values that was quite acceptable, if not 
praiseworthy, in Arab societies of the first half of the nineteenth century. It is safe to 
say that by the standards of his day, Shaikh Abdullah had excelled in his role. His 
success should be as worthy of praise and appreciation by modern scholars as it most 
likely was by his contemporaries. 
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CHAPTER VI 
Shaikh Abdullah’s Downfall and Death 1842-1849 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter examines how a ruling shaikh could lose his rulership in the nineteenth 
century Gulf. It looks at the end of the political career and life of Shaikh Abdullah bin 
Ahmad Al Khalifa. A ruler could lose his authority by neglecting one or more 
external and internal factors. Among the internal factors was his relationship with his 
family, tribal allies, governors and merchants. The external factors included his 
relationship with the British authorities in the Gulf and other regional powers. A ruler 
had to maintain a balanced, healthy relationship with all political players or he risked 
losing his rulership.
1
 Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmad‘s weaknesses in the internal 
factors, namely his relationship with his family, tribal allies and merchants, paved the 
way to his downfall. His situation was perhaps exacerbated by the British refusal to 
support him; they even gave indirect moral support to those who rebelled against him. 
We can derive from this chapter the difficulties and risks to authority that faced Gulf 
rulers of this period. 
The previous chapter described the mischievous acts of Shaikh Abdullah‘s 
sons and his inability or unwillingness to restrain them, to the detriment of his 
political authority. These acts placed him in an uncomfortable position with the 
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merchants in Bahrain, both foreign and local. His family and allies must have worried 
about the state of affairs that would come about if his unruly sons were to succeed 
him. This chapter tells more of this story, examining the dynastic difficulties that led 
to further deterioration of the hierarchy of leadership and eventually to civil/dynastic 
war. The leader of the rebellion against Shaikh Abdullah was his grand nephew 
Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa, the junior co-ruler. He was able to defeat Shaikh 
Abdullah with relative ease apparently because of the actions of the former‘s sons, 
actions that alienated many of Shaikh Abdullah‘s supporters, even among his own 
family. The chapter goes on to describe Shaikh Abdullah‘s attempts to regain his 
position of power. Both Shaikh Abdullah and his rival grand nephew had many 
intrigues with the regional political powers in the Gulf, among them the British, the 
Persians, the Sultan of Oman and the Emir of Najd, ruler of Kuwait. Among other 
political players were the Shaikhs of the Trucial Coast and internal power brokers 
within the dominions of the Al Khalifa in Qatar, Bahrain and the Arabian mainland. 
This part of the chapter gives the reader a clear picture of the dynamics of political 
power in the Gulf region at the time. 
All Shaikh Abdullah‘s attempts failed. After his last serious threat to his grand 
nephew, an alliance with Isa bin Tarif, chief of the al-bin Ali tribe, who led a failed 
yet dangerous uprising against Shaikh Muhammad, Shaikh Abdullah left for Zanzibar, 
seeking the assistance of Sayyid Said, Sultan of Oman and Zanzibar. It was on that 
journey in 1849 that Shaikh Abdullah passed away in the port city of Masqat after a 
long and eventful life of political intrigue and violent military showdowns. 
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2. Background to the Civil War of 1842-1843 
Local historians like al-Khairi give us a detailed account of the internal course of 
events in Bahrain at the time and explain how the mischievous actions of the Shaikh's 
sons and grandsons led inevitably to the old man‘s political downfall. After the battle 
of Huwaila in 1835 and the apparent submission of his sons, the dominions of the 
Shaikh seemed calm. By 1252 AH (1836), Shaikh Abdullah spent most of his time in 
Qatar, visiting Bahrain only when necessary. According to local accounts such as that 
of al-Khairi, this was for health reasons, as the ―clear air‖ of Qatar was regarded as 
better for the old Shaikh's health than that of the islands.
2
 Shaikh Abdullah made his 
son, Shaikh Muhammad bin Abdullah, his deputy. According to al-Khairi, it was then 
that the trouble started, particularly because of the aggression of the followers and 
servants of the young Shaikhs, which became so bad that many people left Bahrain 
for places of greater safety.
3
 Contemporary British accounts confirm this story, 
describing some of the misdeeds of the sons of the old Shaikh and their effect on the 
value of Bahrain‘s trade, which very nearly halved in only a few years. The sons, or 
their followers, committed outrages such as the looting of commercial ships bound for 
Bahrain.
4
 Such actions must have naturally caught the attention of Shaikh Muhammad 
bin Khalifa bin Salman, the Shaikh‘s grand nephew. The relations between Shaikh 
Muhammad and his cousins were most probably strained after his battle against them 
in Huwaila. 
Relations between Shaikh Muhammad and his grand uncle had apparently 
become strained too. In 1840, after the departure of the Egyptian general, Khorshid 
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Pasha, the people of Hasa in Eastern Arabia sent an envoy to Shaikh Abdullah, 
inviting him to appoint his grand nephew, Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa, governor 
of Hasa, for protection against the Saudi Emir Khalid bin Saud. Shaikh Muhammad 
wanted to accept, but Shaikh Abdullah objected. The old Shaikh‘s objections were 
probably based on a fear that such a move might provoke the anger of the Saudi Emir, 
hence bringing unwanted trouble upon himself and his domains. Despite the marked 
difference of opinion, the two Shaikhs managed to reconcile with one another.
5
 The 
Hasa argument was probably not serious enough to bring about a severe schism 
between them, as some historians seem to suggest. Even so, the continued mischief of 
the sons of Shaikh Abdullah must have had a negative effect on Shaikh Muhammad 
bin Khalifa and probably inflamed his irritation and anger concerning the internal 
economic and political situation in Bahrain. 
Matters between Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa and the sons of Shaikh 
Abdullah came to a head in early 1842 (late 1257 AH), when the continuous 
harassment had started to affect the trade of Manama, a port under the control of 
Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa. It apparently prompted him to complain to his grand 
uncle, but Shaikh Abdullah did not respond. The reason for such neglect was, as al-
Khairi puts it, that the Shaikh ―...was unable to control the unruliness of his sons‖.6 
Shaikh Muhammad continued to complain, but still his grand uncle did nothing. Most 
probably, it was then that Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa gave serious thought to 
overthrowing Shaikh Abdullah‘s government. According to al-Khairi, he saw himself 
as the rightful heir as he was the grandson of Shaikh Salman, the elder brother of 
Shaikh Abdullah. It is also highly likely that the young Shaikh never forgot that his 
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father, Shaikh Khalifa, had died because of the actions of Shaikh Abdullah‘s sons, 
whose unruly conduct and attitude had never ceased. He must have baulked at the 
thought of living, with his family, under the authority of such individuals once the old 
Shaikh had passed on.
7
 According to al-Khairi, all those reasons led the young Shaikh 
to pre-empt such an unpleasant future by overthrowing his grand uncle. 
3. The Revolt of Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa and the 
Battle of al-Nasfah 
When Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa decided to overthrow Shaikh Abdullah, he 
consulted his immediate family members. His brothers Ali, Duaij, Salman and Rashid 
agreed to his plans, as did the rest of the descendants of Shaikh Salman bin Ahmad 
and other members of the Al Khalifa family. However, two uncles of Shaikh 
Muhammad bin Khalifa, Shaikh Muhammad bin Salman and Shaikh Humood bin 
Salman, chose to side with their uncle, Shaikh Abdullah.
8
 Once Shaikh Muhammad 
was sure of his allies, he declared his revolt. It apparently came as a surprise to his old 
grand uncle in Qatar and his sons, Shaikh Muhammad‘s cousins, in Muharraq. 9 
Shaikh Abdullah wasted no time, however, and stealthily moved to crush the mutiny. 
The old Shaikh, along with his sons, grandsons and followers, assembled their troops 
in Muharraq. From there they crossed to the island of Manama, where Shaikh 
Muhammad‘s forces were based. The forces met at al-Nasfah near the village of 
Sanad, and fought a fierce battle that ended with the defeat of Shaikh Abdullah. 
According to al-Khairi, most of Shaikh Abdullah‘s men fought half-heartedly, and 
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many deserted to Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa.
10
 They have possibly been 
alienated by the appalling reputation that the sons of Shaikh Abdullah had made for 
themselves, so that they changed their allegiance to Shaikh Muhammad. It is probable 
that they shared the hard feelings that the young pretender must have harboured 
towards his cousins. 
After his defeat, Shaikh Abdullah, his family and the remainder of his 
followers retreated to the settlement of Hoora near old Manama, whence they crossed 
back to Muharraq. Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa sent an emissary to Shaikh 
Abdullah, demanding the old man‘s abdication in his favour. He also demanded that 
the troublemakers among his sons and grandsons should leave Bahrain and relieve the 
islands from their mischief.
11
 The old Shaikh, surrounded and in a weak position, 
probably decided that trying to fight his grand nephew would have been futile. This 
must have prompted him to leave Bahrain altogether, with his sons, to Dammam, the 
only place that still recognised his authority. Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa allowed 
him to go with his portable possessions and his family.
12
 Shaikh Muhammad now 
declared himself ruler of Bahrain and Qatar. As we shall see in the next section, 
matters did not rest there. 
4. The Conspiracy of Shaikh Ali, the Battle of Souq el-
Khamis and the Return of Shaikh Abdullah 
Shaikh Muhammad started by changing the political structure of the Al Khalifa rule. 
The new ruler perhaps realized the precarious nature of the joint rule tradition, and 
sought to end it by centralising his authority. He made his brother, Shaikh Ali, the 
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governor of Manama and commander of the fleet, while making it clear to his family 
members that each had a natural limit to their authority—sole rulership was his 
alone.
13
 All of his family seem to have adhered to that new arrangement with the sole 
exception of Shaikh Ali, who tried to convince his other brothers and uncles to oppose 
the new policy, though apparently in vain. His subsequent acceptance of his brother‘s 
new policy must have been pretence, as he was working against him behind the 
scenes. Plots to overthrow a current ruler, like Muhammad bin Khalifa‘s against his 
grand uncle (and Shaikh Ali‘s against his brother, as we are about to see) were 
common in the Arabian Gulf before the Pax Britannica.
14
 All rulers had to take 
precautions to safeguard their power, as none was ever absolutely secure in his 
position; this insecurity was a major source of political instability. Shaikh Abdullah‘s 
failure in that regard cost him his rulership and Shaikh Muhammad almost met a 
similar fate at the beginning of his rulership; he was saved only by good fortune. 
Shaikh Ali wrote to Shaikh Abdullah, suggesting that the old leader should 
invade Bahrain from Dammam and overthrow Shaikh Muhammad with his, Ali‘s, 
help. The two Shaikhs would then be co-rulers with the same level of authority and an 
equal share in the revenue of Bahrain and its dependencies. Shaikh Abdullah was 
naturally delighted and promptly seized his unexpected opportunity. He agreed to 
Shaikh Ali's proposal, and began to gather Bedouin troops from the Bani Murrah and 
other tribes on the Arabian mainland for the impeding invasion of Bahrain.
15
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Once all the preparations were made, Shaikh Abdullah commenced his 
campaign against Bahrain, landing close to Manama. When news of this reached 
Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa, who at the time resided at Muharraq, he was 
understandably alarmed. He mustered all the troops at his disposal and sent a message 
for his brother, Shaikh Ali, to call upon and assemble fighting men from Riffa.
16
 
Shaikh Muhammad, of course, was unaware of Shaikh Ali‘s designs and set off with 
the rest of his brothers, cousins and troops to meet the forces of Shaikh Abdullah. He 
camped near Souq el-Khamis in western Manama and waited for reinforcements he 
had ordered Shaikh Ali to bring from Riffa so that he could meet the forces of his 
grand uncle. The reinforcements never arrived. They were withheld by Shaikh Ali. By 
the time that Shaikh Muhammad must realized they were not coming (and presumably 
the reason they were not coming), it was too late. Shaikh Abdullah‘s troops had 
already reached the battlefield, and Shaikh Muhammad was forced to fight an unequal 
battle.
17
 The battle was fierce and well fought, but ended in a disastrous defeat for 
Shaikh Muhammad. His troops were routed and one of his brothers, Shaikh Duaij, 
was killed, as well as one of the grandsons of Shaikh Abdullah, Shaikh Muhammad 
bin Mubarak.
18
 Shaikh Muhammad tried to retreat to Manama, but was prevented 
from doing so by a contingent under the command of his brother, Shaikh Ali, who 
tried to capture him.
19
 Nonetheless, Shaikh Muhammad managed to escape with a 
band of followers to the Arabian mainland. From there he proceeded to Riyadh to 
seek help from the new Saudi Emir, Abdullah bin Thunayaan.
20
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Meanwhile, the situation in Bahrain became very turbulent. Shaikh Abdullah 
allowed his Bedouin army to plunder every town in their path.
21
 Why the Shaikh 
allowed such things to happen is unclear. One possible reason is that the army, mostly 
undisciplined mercenary Bedouins, was hard to control, though they took such 
extreme measures that Shaikh Abdullah cannot even have tried to stop them looting. 
Possibly he was angry with the people of Bahrain because they had supported his 
grand nephew, but he seems to have allowed his anger to cloud his judgment. Perhaps 
the old Shaikh did not understand the real reason why many people in Bahrain 
supported his grand nephew—probably the malicious conduct of his sons, their 
retinues and followers—and so wanted to punish the people of Manama and others for 
doing so. It is quite plausible that he wanted to instil fear in their hearts so they would 
never take the side of any future pretender. Whatever the reason for it, his policy only 
served to increase the alienation of the people of Bahrain, and even of those in Qatar. 
Shaikh Abdullah had unwittingly given his adversary, Shaikh Muhammad bin 
Khalifa, a great opportunity (which was taken, as we shall see) to recruit large 
numbers of followers and sympathisers in any future campaign against him. As for 
Shaikh Ali bin Khalifa, his grand uncle not only failed to fulfil his promise of sharing 
the rulership, but also severely maltreated him. Shaikh Ali, who must have regretted 
his conspiracy against his brother, attempted reconciliation so that they could attempt 
to regain their political power which was compromised by the battle of Souq el-
Khamis.
22
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5. Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa's Exile and Return 
Defeated at al-Nasfah, Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa fled to the Arabian mainland 
and took refuge at Riyadh with the new Saudi Emir, Abdullah bin Thunayyan.
23
 The 
Emir gave Shaikh Muhammad a warm welcome, granted him asylum but declined to 
help him by supplying him with troops, saying that he had only just secured his 
political position and needed time to consolidate his power internally before engaging 
in any external conflict.
24
 Letters from his brother, Shaikh Ali, soon started reaching 
him. Shaikh Ali expressed his deep regret at what had happened and told his brother 
that he was secretly rallying people to their cause. He would seek aid from their old 
foe, Isa bin Tarif al-bin Ali, who also happened to be Shaikh Ali's maternal uncle, as 
well as from Bishr bin Rahma al-Jalahma, the son of the arch-nemesis of their family, 
and from other tribal allies in Qatar. According to local historians, such as al-Khairi 
and al-Tajir, Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa was very surprised,
25
 but seems to have 
quickly overcome any hard feelings, as he apparently resolved to seize the 
opportunity offered to him. He responded positively, telling Shaikh Ali that he would 
leave Najd for Qatar at once in order to gather allies and supporters, and that Shaikh 
Ali should covertly do the same.
26
 
That conciliatory, yet pragmatic, action taken by Shaikh Muhammad bin 
Khalifa reveals that Shaikh Abdullah was facing a difficult foe. In a message, Shaikh 
Abdullah warned the Saudi Emir against intervening in his conflict with his grand 
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nephew. He advised him to observe strict neutrality, and even used threatening 
language to make his point clear.
27
 In his account, al-Khairi goes so far as to claim 
that Shaikh Abdullah openly threatened to resort to open warfare. He made it clear 
that he would wage a military campaign to annex Saudi Qatif and Saihat if the Emir 
did not banish Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa from his lands.
28
 That clearly shows 
that Shaikh Abdullah saw Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa as a very serious threat to 
his rulership, and may have overreacted to it. He did not give the same kind of 
attention to Shaikh Ali, who, rather strangely, continued to reside in Bahrain.
29
 Shaikh 
Abdullah‘s aggressive approach risked reopening a dangerous front with the Saudis as 
he spent considerable attention and energy to prevent an alliance between Shaikh 
Muhammad and Emir Abdullah bin Thunayyan. His close attention distracted him so 
that he failed to notice, or respond to, the covert coalition being built by his grand 
nephews, Shaikhs Muhammad and Ali. 
The plan of the two brothers was twofold. First, Shaikh Ali entered into 
correspondence with his maternal uncle, Shaikh Isa bin Tarif al-bin Ali, chief of the 
powerful and numerous al-bin Ali tribe and their allies. He also communicated with 
Bishr bin Rahma al-Jalahma, who mustered a force of no fewer than three or four 
hundred men.
30
 Second, their cousin Shaikh Abdul-Rahman bin Abdul-Latif Al 
Khalifa rallied support on their behalf from their tribal allies in Qatar.
31
 The two 
brothers built a formidable coalition, taking advantage of the fragile and unstable 
tribal/political structure of the Arabian Gulf at the time. They easily managed to 
recruit people who had been enemies to their families just a few years previously. 
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This capriciousness made any Gulf ruler wary of shifting political allegiances as they 
could easily jeopardise his rulership. The ruler always needed to be alert to such 
developments so that he could extinguish any potential danger. However, as we shall 
see, Shaikh Abdullah failed in that task and lost his rulership. 
In late 1842, the British Resident at Bushire, Captain Hennell, received a visit 
from Isa bin Tarif and Bishr bin Rahma al-Jalahma. The two men sought his 
permission to join the cause of Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa, and to ally with him 
against Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmad. The Resident did not hesitate to give his 
blessing for hostilities against Shaikh Abdullah to commence, as long as the 
Restrictive Line remained inviolate. The promptness of the sanction made by Captain 
Hennell seems to have been a response to what the British perceived as unsatisfactory 
behaviour by Shaikh Abdullah in his handling of the Egyptian Crisis of 1839. These 
tense relations must have been exacerbated by the incident at the house of the British 
native agent when Shaikh Abdullah sacked Manama following his victory at the battle 
of Souq el-Khamis in 1842.
32
 
In November 1842, the British Resident despatched his assistant, Lieutenant 
Kemball, to Bahrain in order to warn Shaikh Abdullah that British permission had 
been granted to his foes to attack him. The news appears to have taken the Shaikh 
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completely by surprise. He protested to Lieutenant Kemball that news of that coalition 
and of the British sanction had come too late, since the majority of his men and 
vessels were away on trading voyages. The Shaikh requested that the British delay 
giving their permission until the safe return of his men and vessels, as otherwise he 
would be in an unbalanced and unfair situation vis-à-vis his foes.
33
 The Shaikh also 
warned that if the British failed to delay the commencement of hostilities, he would 
be forced to ally himself with the Saudi Emir, subjecting his territories to Wahhabi 
influence. The Shaikh must have perceived that such a move would be 
counterproductive to British interests in the Gulf. He also offered to allow Bishr bin 
Rahma al-Jalahma access to Dammam in order to remove the produce of his estates 
and property. That offer came with the condition that he did not bring any large 
vessels, which could have been used for hostile actions, near Dammam's harbour so as 
not to threaten the Shaikh‘s domains. Shaikh Abdullah made this proposal because 
Bishr claimed that his reason for wanting to join the coalition against the Shaikh was 
that he was forbidden access to his estates near Dammam. Captain Kemball took 
careful note of the Shaikh's remarks and duly reported them to the Resident in 
Bushire, but the British took no action to delay the commencement of hostilities.
34
 
It is uncertain whether Shaikh Abdullah actually needed his vessels and 
dependants to return from their trading voyages to face this new coalition. He could 
have used that plea as a ploy to buy the time to cool his confrontation with the Saudis 
and assemble his troops to face the new threat. He might have been telling the truth, 
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however, since the autumn and winter months were conducive to trade with East 
Africa, Aden and Malabar. It is also possible, though uncertain, that the British 
authorities chose to notify the Shaikh at that time to put him at a disadvantage against 
his adversaries. This may have been in retaliation for his handling of the Egyptian 
crisis of 1839, which the British viewed in a poor light.
35
 Shaikh Abdullah attempted 
to break the coalition forming against him by trying to appease Bishr bin Rahma al-
Jalahma, but to no avail. That ploy seems to have been commonly used by Arabian 
Gulf rulers at the time. Such rulers must have realized that with their limited material 
resources they needed to fragment their enemies in order to defeat them. Shaikh 
Abdullah was unable to do that. 
6. Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa Retakes Bahrain: 
Takeover of Qatar and the Battles of al-Hunaynia and al-
Saya 
Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa bade farewell to Emir Abdullah bin Thunayyan, 
travelling to Hasa and thence to Qatar in order to rally his supporters, arriving in early 
1843.
36
 He was greeted by Shaikh Abdul-Rahman bin Abdul-Latif Al Khalifa, a 
staunch supporter of Shaikh Muhammad‘s cause. Both shaikhs gathered supporters in 
Qatar. Simultaneously, Isa bin Tarif, Bishr bin Rahma al-Jalahma and their allies 
reached Qatar, as organised by Shaikh Ali bin Khalifa.
37
 As well as these chiefs and 
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their followers, the al-bu Kawara tribe under their chief, Muhammad bin Sa'ad, the al-
Nuaim under their chief, Jabr bin Nasser, and several other tribal allies joined forces 
with Shaikh Muhammad.
38
 This large, diverse coalition of the Qatari population set 
about the takeover of Qatar. They seized the fort of Murair near Zubarah. Shaikh 
Abdullah sent a contingent to prevent the seizure, but it arrived too late and retreated 
without attempting to recover it.
39
 With that episode, Shaikh Muhammad successfully 
took over Qatar and placed it firmly under his control.
40
 He then started to assemble a 
fleet to carry his troops to Bahrain. Shaikh Muhammad sent an army under the 
command of his cousin, Shaikh Abdul-Rahman and Shaikh Jabr bin Nasir, chief of 
the al-Nuaim tribe. According to local accounts, Shaikh Muhammad had so many 
troops at his disposal that he and his allies did not have enough ships to transport all 
of them to attack Bahrain at the same time. Shaikh Muhammad ordered the fleet to 
transport nearly half the men under the command of his cousin, Shaikh Abdul-
Rahman, to Bahrain. The fleet would then come back to the Qatari coast to transport 
him and the rest of his troops to Bahrain.
41
 These accounts indicate not only that 
Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa had gathered a large support base, but also that 
Shaikh Abdullah and his sons had alienated many tribal allies in Qatar. This must 
have created a power vacuum that Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa and his supporters 
successfully used to their advantage. 
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Shaikh Abdul-Rahman landed with his forces at al-Jisaira, on the southeastern 
coast of Bahrain, with the intention of capturing the town of Riffa. Before his arrival, 
he sent a messenger to Shaikh Ali, who resided at Riffa, to gather his supporters to 
meet and join the invading force. Once the two allies and their respective forces had 
combined, they proceeded to take Riffa by surprise.
42
 Shaikh Abdullah, however, 
appears to have detected that move. He sent an army led by his son, Shaikh Nasser, to 
meet the invaders and stop them before they could takeover Riffa.
43
 The two armies 
met near the wells of al-Hunaynia, south of Riffa. A short but fierce battle ended in a 
few hours, with Shaikh Ali Abdul-Rahman and his allies victorious. Shaikh Nasser 
bin Abdullah retreated to Manama. Among the notable casualties who were slain in 
that battle was Shaikh Muhammad bin Ahmad bin Salman Al Khalifa.
44
 
The allies then proceeded to take Manama. The people there, as we saw 
earlier, had suffered from the plunder by the Bedouin soldiers of Shaikh Abdullah's 
troops in his retake of Bahrain. That would have naturally made them feel bitter to 
Shaikh Abdullah and his allies, so they took the side of his adversaries, the army led 
by Shaikhs Ali and Abdul-Rahman, enabling Shaikh Ali to capture Manama with 
relative ease.
45
 Meanwhile, Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa landed with the rest of his 
forces near Manama. There he was joined by the forces under the command of his 
brother, Shaikh Ali. From there, the joint forces of the two Shaikhs crossed over from 
Manama and attacked Muaharraq, the last remaining town in Bahrain under the 
control of Shaikh Abdullah. Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa and his allies were 
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victorious. They forced Shaikh Abdullah to take refuge at the fort of Abu Maher 
while his sons took refuge at the fort of Arad. Local historians, such as al-Nabhani 
and al-Tajir, call this battle of April 1843
46
 the battle of al-Saya. Among the Bahrain 
notables who died in this battle was Shaikh Yousif bin Muhammad bin Ibrahim Al 
Khalifa.
47
 He fought on the side of Shaikh Muhammad, dying from his injuries a few 
days after the battle.
48
 Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmad fought bravely, but the tide of the 
battle turned against him, and he was soon forced to surrender. The old Shaikh was 
allowed to take his belongings and leave for Dammam, which was governed by his 
eldest son, Mubarak. It was the only place that still acknowledged his authority. 
Shaikh Abdullah‘s sons, who had also surrendered, were permitted to remain in 
Bahrain.
49
 After the battle, Shaikhs Muhammad and Ali were reconciled and Shaikh 
Muhammad re-declared himself ruler of Bahrain and its dependencies, and duly made 
Shaikh Ali his deputy.
50
 A new era had begun in the modern history of Bahrain and 
the Al Khalifa family. See Figure 11.
51
 
It is puzzling that Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmad, a capable military commander 
who had defeated formidable foes such as Sultan Said of Oman, Rahma bin Jabir al-
Jalahma, Ibrahim bin Ufaisan and the Saudi rulers of Najd, was defeated so quickly. 
One possible factor could have been the military prowess of Shaikh Muhammad bin 
Khalifa, but this could not have been the sole, or even prime, reason. Most probably, 
there were several different factors at work. First, it cannot be overlooked that by  
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Figure 11: Shaikh Muhammad Bin Khalifa Captures Bahrain 1843 
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1842-1843 Shaikh Abdullah had become a very old man. That would naturally have 
affected his ability and performance. Second, the sons of Shaikh Abdullah bin 
Ahmad, far from being supportive, were sources of annoyance and trouble for him. 
They and their followers persisted in acts of aggression against traders, especially 
foreigners. Understandably, that placed their father in an uncomfortable and 
embarrassing situation with foreign powers, especially with the British. They also 
shattered the image of their father's authority by instigating and participating in an 
open rebellion against him in Qatar. Their actions brought about unnecessary conflicts 
between their father and Isa bin Tarif, chief of the al-bin Ali tribe. Later, after their 
reconciliation with their father and return to Bahrain, they once again started to defy 
their father's authority. Their conduct must have spread discomfort and insecurity 
throughout the islands. That, coupled with the old age of their father, which forced 
him to reside for extended periods at Khor Hassan in Qatar, would have alienated the 
people of Bahrain and the prospect of one of Shaikh Abdullah‘s sons ruling Bahrain 
after the Shaikh‘s death may even have frightened them. The sons of Shaikh Abdullah 
probably even alienated the rest of the Al Khalifa family. As we have seen, other Al 
Khalifa Shaikhs, and members of different branches of the Al Khalifa family, fought 
on the side of Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa. The sons of Shaikh Abdullah bin 
Ahmad had unwittingly provided the perfect environment for Shaikh Muhammad bin 
Khalifa to gain supporters, followers and sympathisers for his cause. 
A third factor in Shaikh Abdullah‘s defeat may have been the British 
authorities in the Gulf. They must have viewed Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmad 
disapprovingly after his handling of the Egyptian crisis in 1839. This may have been 
why they promptly granted permission for Isa bin Tarif and Bishr al-Jalahma to join 
Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa. It may also explain why they did not notify Shaikh 
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Abdullah about his adversaries‘ intentions until too late, and why they chose to notify 
him at a time when many of his vessels and followers were probably absent on trading 
voyages. 
A fourth factor was probably Shaikh Abdullah‘s overreaction when he retook 
Bahrain from Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa and subjected Manama to the 
uncontrolled plunder of his Bedouin mercenaries. That moment of blind anger would 
have alienated even more people. 
All these factors undoubtedly greatly facilitated the task of Shaikh Muhammad 
bin Khalifa in usurping the rulership from his grand uncle. 
7. Reign of Shaikh Muhammad, Exile of Shaikh Abdullah 
and attempts to recapture Bahrain 1843-1847 
By April 1843, Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa had effectively secured control of 
Bahrain and Qatar. Only Dammam remained in the hands of his grand uncle. Shaikh 
Abdullah remained quiet for a short while, and neither party bothered the other, both 
probably catching their breath after their intensive showdown. They were probably 
busy assessing their respective political positions as well as consolidating their power 
bases and forces. However, change started in June 1843, as Shaikh Abdullah started a 
campaign of naval raids, harassing the naval trade and maritime traffic of Bahrain.
52
 
The old Shaikh probably chose early summer to start these hostile operations because 
it was the beginning of the pearling season in Bahrain and in the Gulf region in 
general. This would have given maximum annoyance to the new ruler, whose 
domains‘ economy depended heavily on pearling. At the same time, Shaikh 
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Muhammad would not have had a large number of fighting men at his disposal to 
resist Shaikh Abdullah, and would look incapable of protecting the livelihoods of his 
subjects. That would naturally have shaken the political image of Shaikh Muhammad 
and weakened his position as a new ruler. 
Shaikh Muhammad must have realized the dangers of his grand uncle‘s 
schemes and promptly responded to them. He dispatched several vessels to blockade 
the port of Dammam, bottling up the old Shaikh‘s vessels and preventing imports and 
exports.
53
 These hostilities caught the attention of Faisal bin Turki Al Saud, the new 
Emir of Najd, who had just overthrown Emir Abdullah bin Faisal and re-established 
himself as the new Saudi ruler and Emir of Najd.
54
 The new Emir probably wanted to 
play one Al Khalifa Shaikh off the other. He could hardly fail to gain, as both Shaikhs 
solicited his aid and alliance.
55
 Shaikh Abdullah most probably wanted him as a 
strong ally to help him regain his authority over Bahrain and its dependencies. Shaikh 
Muhammad must have realized his great uncle‘s intentions and sought alliance with 
Faisal simply to deprive Shaikh Abdullah of it. Lucrative though this play-off would 
have been for him, the new Emir was not in a position to take full advantage as he had 
not yet consolidated his power at home. His role in the conflict between the two 
Shaikhs was therefore not very active.
56
 After much deliberation and several rounds 
of negotiations with both parties, Emir Faisal decided to side with Shaikh Muhammad 
bin Khalifa. It was the brother of Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa, Shaikh Rashid, who 
headed the negotiations with Emir Faisal and secured the Emir's favourable position 
towards his brother. The Emir's decision could have been influenced by the 
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experience his father had had in his disputes and confrontations with Shaikh 
Abdullah. Therefore it is quite plausible that the Emir bore a personal grudge against 
Shaikh Abdullah.
57
 Or they may have also been other reasons behind Emir Faisal's 
decision. First, he probably viewed Shaikh Muhammad as the stronger of the two 
parties, and the better choice for an alliance. Second, Shaikh Abdullah and his sons 
occupied Dammam, on the Arabian mainland very near Saihat and Qatif. Faisal quite 
possibly viewed these lands as his rightful ancestral domains and reasoned that the 
expulsion of Shaikh Abdullah and his allies from Dammam was a vital step towards 
reasserting his authority in that region. This, as we shall see, is exactly what 
happened. 
As the conflict between the two parties deepened, a local Gulf ruler, Shaikh 
Jabir bin Abdullah Al Sabah of Kuwait, an old ally and kinsman of the Al Khalifa 
family, tried to mediate a peace settlement between the two belligerents, having, in 
August 1843, sought and received the permission of the British authorities in the Gulf 
to intervene. The British advised Shaikh Jabir to confine his efforts to peaceful 
mediation between the two parties, and to avoid from engaging in any hostile action 
against Shaikh Muhammad. Shaikh Jabir agreed to this, and proceeded to Bahrain 
accompanied by eight large vessels.
58
 Once there, he entered into lengthy 
deliberations with Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa and managed to convince him to 
                                                          
57
 Ibid. See also letter from Lt. J.J. Draper, Commander of sloop of war Coote to Lt A.B. Kemball, 
Asst. PRPG, 1 October 1843, enclosing report compiled from intelligence received by native agent in 
Bahrain, Haji Jassim, 23 September 1843 to 1 October 1843, 490-492, in Bombay Political & Secret 
Department Diary, vol. 67 (1488), Maharashtra State Archive, Mumbai, India. 
58
 Lt. A.B. Kemball, ―Historical Sketch of the Uttoobee Tribe of Arabs‖, 401; See also J.G. Lorimer, 
Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia, 872. See also letter from Lt. J.J. Draper to 
J.P. Portes, SNOPG, 4 September 1843, 463-466; Letter from Asst. PRPG, Lt. Col A.B. Kemball, to 
Lt. J.J. Draper, 14 September 1843, 469-471; Letter from Native Agent in Bahrain to Lt. J.J. Draper, 
23 September 1843, 490-492; Letter from Asst. PRPG to Bombay Government, 3 October 1843, 436; 
Letter from Asst. PRPG to Bombay Government, 18 October 1843, 485-487, in Bombay Political & 
Secret Department Diary, vol. 67 (1488), Maharashtra State Archive, Mumbai, India.  
 
Abdulaziz Al Khalifa Chapter VI  
 
  205 
 
invite his grand uncle to Bahrain. Shaikh Abdullah refused to play any part in that 
initiative when he realized it would not restore him to his previous power. He also 
refused an offer made by Shaikh Jabir to come and live with him in Kuwait until the 
tensions between him and his grand nephew had subsided. Without having achieved 
any of his objectives, Shaikh Jabir returned to Kuwait.
59
 Shaikh Abdullah left for 
Bushire.
60
 
After this well-intentioned but unsuccessful Kuwaiti initiative, Shaikh 
Abdullah, whose attempt to regain his authority had cost him the alliances of both the 
Emir of Najd and the Shaikh of Kuwait, searched for other allies. He tried 
approaching the Shaikhs of the Trucial states for support, namely Sultan bin Saqr al-
Qasimi of Sharjah and Maktoom bin Buti of Dubai.
61
 Learning of Shaikh Abdullah‘s 
schemes, Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa and his allies wasted no time in looking for 
their own allies. Isa bin Tarif, now the ally of Shaikh Muhammad, entered into 
communication with Shaikh Khalifa bin Shakhboot Al Nahyan of Abu Dhabi and 
Shaikh Abdullah bin Rashid Al Mualla of Umm al-Quwain. He invited them to meet 
him on the island of Qais
62
 and managed to secure their alliance through valuable 
presents.
63
 
These developments naturally alarmed the British authorities, who must have 
feared for maritime safety in the Gulf as these hostile coalitions formed. They decided 
to intervene, discouraging the shaikhs of the Trucial Coast from joining any of the 
warring parties in Bahrain. They also informed Shaikh Abdullah that they disliked the 
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prospect of the shaikhs and tribes of the Trucial Coast being dragged into the conflict 
with his grand nephew, since it would endanger maritime safety in the Gulf. They did, 
however, offer to mediate between grand uncle and grand nephew, although they 
made it clear that they would not be able to guarantee the restoration of his quondam 
position and power.
64
 The British motives are not fully clear. Possibly fear for the 
safety of maritime traffic and trade in the Gulf region was their only reason for 
stopping the shaikhs of Trucial Oman from joining the cause of Shaikh Abdullah, but 
it is also possible that the British despised Shaikh Abdullah because of his handling of 
the Egyptian Crisis of 1839 and might have wanted to punish him for his actions. 
Once Shaikh Abdullah understood that allies were not to be found on the 
Arabian littoral of the Gulf, he sought the aid of a much larger power, namely Persia. 
He communicated with Shaikh Salman, nephew of the Shaikh of Bushire, by visiting 
that port in 1843 and sending a message to Tehran. He returned to Dammam to await 
a reply.
65
 According to Lorimer, the purpose of his intrigues was to alarm the British 
authorities, possibly pressuring them to take a more favourable disposition towards 
him.
66
 Shaikh Abdullah visited Bushire again in December 1843, to meet the British 
Resident. The Resident offered to have a meeting on one of his warships, but the 
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Shaikh declined, and suggested instead that they meet on shore. According to 
Kemball, Shaikh Abdullah insisted on a shore meeting because his real intention was 
to hold a secret meeting with Shaikh Salman, not an overt one with the British.
67
 The 
old Shaikh may have feared that the British would try to sabotage any alliance with 
the Persians, thus foiling his plans to regain authority in Bahrain and Qatar. 
8. The Siege and Loss of Dammam in 1844 
A new development on the Arabian littoral pushed Shaikh Abdullah even further 
towards throwing himself into the arms of Persia.
68
 In early 1844, a Najdi army under 
the command of Emir Faisal bin Turki arrived and laid siege to Dammam, the only 
place still under the authority of Shaikh Abdullah.
69
 The Saudi siege was aggravated 
by a naval blockade administered by Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa and his forces. 
When news of this reached Shaikh Abdullah, he was in Bushire trying to solicit aid 
and support from the Persians or the British. The Shaikh of Kuwait tried to smuggle in 
provisions for the sons of Shaikh Abdullah and their besieged men, but both of his 
boats were intercepted by the vessels of Shaikh Muhammad before they reached Khor 
Balbul, where the provisions were to have been landed for onward carriage by camel. 
Shaikh Muhammad agreed, on the advice and recommendation of the British 
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authorities in the Gulf, to return the boats and cargo belonging to the Shaikh of 
Kuwait. But only under the condition that Shaikh Jabir abstain from intervening in the 
conflict with his grand uncle.
70
 Upon learning of the very precarious situation of his 
sons and followers in Dammam, Shaikh Abdullah left Bushire in an attempt to relieve 
them. Once the Shaikh was in the neighbourhood of Bahraini waters, he tried to send 
another boat to supply provisions to the besieged people in Dammam.
71
 
That relief attempts were being made in this way sheds light on the Shaikh 
Abdullah‘s situation and strategy at the time. His forces in Dammam were likely 
surrounded by overwhelmingly large land and naval forces, and severely 
outnumbered. The apparent plan of the besieged was to stand their ground and remain 
in the secure fortifications of Dammam until the enemy forces, especially those of 
Faisal bin Turki who were a long way from their homeland, became so restive that 
Shaikh Abdullah would have been able to push them to a compromise. The defenders 
must have realized that direct engagement with a numerically superior enemy would 
have led to disastrous consequences. This episode also reveals that Shaikh Abdullah‘s 
followers, and his naval force, were shrinking. He could not even attempt to break the 
naval blockade. Shaikh Abdullah‘s smuggling attempt failed, as his boat was 
intercepted. Four buteels
72
 were dispatched to catch the Shaikh himself, but he 
managed to outmanoeuvre them and escaped to Kuwait. In the meantime, his sons and 
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their men were forced to surrender, stipulating as conditions the sanctity of their lives 
and the liberty to carry away their personal property and belongings.
73
 
9. Shaikh Abdullah Relocates to Naband 
Some of the sons of Shaikh Abdullah, including Nasser, returned to Bahrain 
after the loss of Dammam, while others preferred to stay with their father, who 
relocated to Naband on the Persian littoral.
74
 Shaikh Mubarak bin Abdullah, on the 
other hand, left for Qatar with his ally Shafi, chief of the Bani Hajir tribe. From there 
he went to Bahrain to meet his cousin, Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa, in order to 
reach a compromise that would finally put an end to the family feud. Shaikh 
Muhammad agreed to end the conflict with his grand uncle and cousins, welcoming 
them to Bahrain as long they accepted that sole political authority in Bahrain and its 
dependencies would be his unchallenged prerogative.
75
 Historical sources do not give 
us an account of Shaikh Abdullah‘s reply, but judging from his later actions, he must 
have refused the offer. 
From Naband, Shaikh Abdullah embarked on a campaign of harassing the 
shipping of Bahrain.
76
 This was a shrewd strategy, as the Shaikh apparently realized 
that Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa and his allies could easily attack him at 
Dammam, to the west of the 1820 restrictive line in an area where the British 
authorities would allow the Gulf Arabs to engage in warfare. Shaikh Abdullah had 
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few potential recruits on that side of the Gulf, anyway, as many leaders there, such as 
Faisal bin Turki, Isa bin Tarif and Bishr bin Rahma, harboured grudges against him. 
At the same time, the British authorities in the Gulf discouraged the Trucial Coast 
Shaikhs of Sharjah and Dubai from joining him, apparently to punish Shaikh 
Abdullah for his dealings with the Egyptians. Nonetheless, although the Shaikh could 
not solicit aid from the Persian Government, he realized that Persia might help him in 
another way. The old Shaikh must have reasoned that if he ran his campaign from a 
port on the Persian littoral, he would be within the restrictive line, although he 
intended to make naval raids west of, and therefore outside, the restrictive line, thus 
achieving several objectives.
77
 First, he could harass the trade of Bahrain and its 
dependencies, denting his grand nephew‘s economy and weakening his power. 
Second, the booty from his raids would enable him to recruit, by financial seduction, a 
large number of mercenaries from among the tribal chiefs and allies of Qatar and the 
littoral opposite Bahrain. Third, by making his base on the Persian littoral, he secured 
himself from any possible retribution by Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa, who would 
have been unable to cross the restrictive line and wage war against his grand uncle in 
the restrictive zone. Fourth, Shaikh Abdullah would exert pressure on the relations 
between the British and the Persian authorities. A British attack against the Shaikh on 
the Persian coast would have led to a crisis between the British and Persia. The old 
Shaikh would have made the ―legitimate‖ excuse that he only raided Bahraini 
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shipping in areas outside the restrictive zone, a permissible action according to the 
1820 treaty between Great Britain and the Arab shaikhs and rulers around the Gulf. 
Once settled at Naband, Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmad started a campaign of 
naval raids in Bahraini waters, no doubt to the great annoyance of Shaikh Muhammad 
bin Khalifa. During one of Shaikh Abdullah‘s raids near Bahrain, while he was still 
close to the islands, Shaikh Muhammad sent him a delegation of leading notables 
from Bahrain. The delegation‘s message invited Shaikh Abdullah to return and settle 
in Bahrain, but the old man said that he would accept only if the fort of Abu Mahir in 
Muharraq were restored to his authority. He made other conditions too, but it seems 
they were too demanding,
78
 so the reconciliation attempt ended in failure. 
On his way back from that raid, Shaikh Abdullah seized two vessels near the 
shoal of Fasht el-Debil, southeast of Bahrain, sparking a complaint from Shaikh 
Muhammad bin Khalifa to the British Resident in Bushire. He demanded that the 
British either restrain Shaikh Abdullah or allow Shaikh Muhammad to chase him 
inside the restrictive zone.
79
 The second option most certainly did not appeal to the 
British authorities, as it would have jeopardised their long-term strategy to create a 
safe maritime zone for trade and shipping in the Gulf region. They therefore had to try 
to restrain Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmad in the same way that they had restrained his 
old enemy Isa bin Tarif, though in this case the circumstances were quite different. Isa 
bin Tarif‘s base was on the island of Qais, detached from the Persian mainland and 
easy for British cruisers to reach and restrain him at any time they needed to do so.
80
 
The same did not apply to Shaikh Abdullah, located at a port that was difficult to 
access, being wide open to the prevailing winds in an area where sailing was both 
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difficult and dangerous. Naband was also on the Persian mainland, where a British 
attack on Shaikh Abdullah's vessels would have constituted a direct act of aggression 
on Persian soil.
81
 That could have sparked a diplomatic row between Britain and 
Persia, something that the British were anxious to avoid. They tried a different tactic 
to contain Shaikh Abdullah. 
The British Resident entered into correspondence with the Governor of 
Naband, Ahmad bin Saif, trying to pressurise him into restraining the hostile activities 
of Shaikh Abdullah against Bahrain and its dependencies. Ahmad bin Saif responded 
positively, even sending a confidential envoy to Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa to 
convey his apologies for the behaviour of Shaikh Abdullah. He also promised to 
restrain Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmad to the utmost of his power.
82
 He failed to do so, 
as Shaikh Abdullah interfered in the internal politics of Naband by allying himself 
with the tribe of Bani Malij, who had a feud with Governor Ahmad bin Saif.
83
 That 
enabled Shaikh Abdullah to contain the Governor of Naband—the opposite effect to 
the one intended by the British. 
Shaikh Abdullah attacked Bahrain and its dependencies once again, seizing 
another two vessels. Incensed, Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa sent his brother, 
Shaikh Ali, to the British Resident in Bushire to complain. Shaikh Ali reiterated his 
brother's demand that the British should either restrain his grand uncle or allow 
Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa to retaliate against him, even within the restrictive 
zone.
84
 The British authorities considered the proposal seriously. It was quite possible 
that they would have allowed Shaikh Muhammad to retaliate militarily, but before 
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they had reached a decision, strict orders arrived from the British Government. The 
Resident was to use force if necessary to prohibit Shaikh Abdullah from stirring up 
any more trouble for Bahrain and its trade as long as he remained on Persian soil. The 
British and Persian governments had been in communication, and the British were 
now at liberty to exercise that option. The Resident immediately dispatched a warship 
to Naband to inform Shaikh Abdullah that he was under restraint by the British 
Government as long as he continued to live in Persia.
85
 Shaikh Abdullah's movements 
and intrigues were now effectively restrained by the British Resident in Bushire, 
despite the ―legal loophole‖ in the 1820 agreement and the diplomatic row that his 
actions and machinations had caused. Naband had lost its geographical advantage for 
the old Shaikh, so he needed to devise another strategy to continue his feud with his 
grand nephew. 
10. Shaikh Abdullah Leaves Naband 
By October 1845, Shaikh Abdullah informed the British Resident at Bushire that he 
intended to leave Naband and travel to Qatif on the Arabian littoral of the Gulf. He 
had seen an opportunity to help him in his struggle with his grand nephew. He had 
received a letter from Abdullah bin Said, the Saudi Governor of Qatif, in which the 
Governor invited the Shaikh to join him as an ally against Shaikh Muhammad bin 
Khalifa. On the surface, the Saudi Governor maintained apparent amity towards 
Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa, but was secretly preparing to attack him and 
specifically invited Shaikh Abdullah to join him for this purpose.
86
 Shaikh Abdullah 
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sailed with his men to meet Abdullah bin Said, but the schemes of the Saudi Governor 
had been discovered before they arrived, and the Bahraini navy, under Shaikh Ali bin 
Khalifa, was already blockading Qatif. As a result, Shaikh Abdullah landed in the area 
of Ras Tanura, about 12 miles north of Qatif. He sent a messenger to his son, Shaikh 
Mubarak, and to Abdullah bin Said, informing them of his position and giving 
directions for his plan. The old Shaikh intended to make a surprise attack on the 
blockading Bahraini fleet, enticing it to pursue him. Once the blockade was lifted by 
his father‘s manoeuvre, Shaikh Mubarak bin Abdullah and Abdullah bin Said were to 
launch a surprise attack on Bahrain, wresting it from the hands of Shaikh Muhammad 
bin Khalifa.
87
 
Shaikh Abdullah‘s messenger was unable to deliver his messages, as he was 
intercepted by the Awamir tribe, allies of Shaikh Muhammad and his brother. The 
Awamir immediately carried the letters to Shaikh Ali bin Khalifa, and the designs of 
Shaikh Abdullah were revealed. Preparations were immediately made in Bahrain to 
defend the islands from surprise attacks, and many more vessels were sent to support 
Shaikh Ali off Qatif. As Shaikh Abdullah approached Qatif, apparently unaware that 
his messages had gone astray, he was overwhelmed by the large, well-prepared naval 
force that attacked him as soon as he arrived.
88
 The old Shaikh retreated rapidly. He 
was now in some difficulty, since his schemes with the Saudi Governor had failed, but 
it was useless to return to Naband even if that were possible—neither the British 
Resident at Bushire nor Abdullah bin Saif would have welcomed him. Shaikh 
Abdullah apparently decided to go and settle, at least for a while, somewhere safe 
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from his grand nephew‘s retribution and away from the British Resident and his 
authority.
89
 
The old Shaikh set sail for Kuwait, where he was warmly welcomed by the 
ruler, Shaikh Jabir bin Abdullah Al Sabah. When the British Resident heard Shaikh 
Abdullah had settled in Kuwait, he seems to have taken alarm at the mischief that he 
might have been plotting. He wrote to the ruler of Kuwait, expressing the hope that he 
would help preserve maritime peace by restraining Shaikh Abdullah, during his stay 
in Kuwait, from engaging in hostilities against the trade of Bahrain and its 
dependencies.
90
 The British Resident was not disappointed, as Shaikh Abdullah did 
not engage in any hostilities against his grand nephew, but maintained a calm and 
peaceful style of life in Kuwait. He probably only monitored, quietly and from a 
distance, the raging conflict between his grand nephew and the Saudi Governor of 
Qatif. 
In June 1846, during Shaikh Abdullah‘s stay in Kuwait, the Persian 
Government approached him with a new political offer in the form of an invitation 
from the Governor of the Province of Fars to return to Bushire. The Shaikh would be 
entertained and maintained by the Shah of Persia until an opportunity arose for action 
to reinstall him as the Ruler of Bahrain and its dependencies.
91
 The sudden Persian 
enthusiasm for the cause of Shaikh Abdullah seemed suspicious, given that they had 
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previously declined to help him. The reason is debatable. Possibly it was a ploy to use 
Shaikh Abdullah as a pawn, to influence Bahrain and the Arabian littoral in general, 
or maybe Persia wanted to prick the growing British naval influence in the Gulf 
region. Shaikh Abdullah also seemed to have suspected their motives. As Disbrowe 
states, the Shaikh probably realized their duplicity as well as their unwillingness and 
inability to assist him in his endeavours.
92
 However suspicious he was, he probably 
did not want to close the channels of communication between him and Persia, as they 
would be vital if the Shaikh desired to retain his influence on the local politics of the 
Gulf politics at the time. He declined politely, saying that his current circumstances 
did not allow him to accept the Shah‘s offer at that time.93 
Three months later, Shaikh Abdullah decided to leave Kuwait, probably 
because of the restraints and restrictions placed on his political and naval moves 
during his residence there. He moved to the island of Tarut, near Dammam.
94
 Shaikh 
Abdullah's sudden re-emergence in the area alarmed all the political players in the 
region and prompted Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa to reinstate his blockade of 
Qatif.
95
 It also led to clashes on the Arabian mainland between Shaikh Muhammad 
and the Saudi Governor, Abdullah bin Said. Strangely enough, Shaikh Abdullah took 
no part in these hostilities and practised strict neutrality.
96
 Why he did so seems 
inexplicable. If he really left Kuwait due to political restrictions, it seems strange that 
he engaged in no hostilities once he had left. Did he leave Kuwait because he felt 
unwelcome there, or perhaps because he wanted to be somewhere where he was not 
subject to political restrictions, and where he would remain quiet, though able to act 
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quickly once an opportunity presented itself? There is no verifiable evidence that he 
had been unwelcome, so the second explanation seems more likely. 
It was not until 1847 that Shaikh Abdullah was involved in another political 
struggle with his grand nephew. That year, his brother-in-law and erstwhile enemy, 
Isa bin Tarif, led an open and dangerous rebellion in Qatar against Shaikh Muhammad 
bin Khalifa. It was to be the last battle to which Shaikh Abdullah contributed forces 
against his grand nephew, though he did not participate personally. The next section 
explains the relationship between Isa bin Tarif and Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa 
during the period between the defeat of Shaikh Abdullah in 1843 and the tumultuous 
events of 1847 that culminated in the battle of Umm Suwayya. The section also 
examines the role of Shaikh Abdullah and his sons in that land battle, as well as the 
battle‘s consequences for both Shaikh Muhammad and Shaikh Abdullah. 
11. Relations between Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa and 
Isa bin Tarif, 1843-1847 
The alliance between the two men started when Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa was 
struggling to overthrow his grand uncle and seize his political power. According to al-
Khairi, Shaikh Muhammad started consolidating his position as the new ruler once he 
had defeated Shaikh Abdullah and ousted him from Bahrain. He rewarded Isa bin 
Tarif, chief of the al-bin Ali tribe, with the island of Sitrah in Bahrain as a fief and 
reward for his services and help.
97
 Shortly thereafter, however, Isa bin Tarif 
apparently requested his nephew, Shaikh Ali bin Khalifa, to ask Shaikh Muhammad 
to appoint him as Governor of Qatar, which at that time was still under Al Khalifa 
rule. Shaikh Muhammad took alarm at that ambition and told his brother he did not 
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trust Isa bin Tarif. Shaikh Ali kept on giving assurances and guarantees to his brother 
about the future conduct of his maternal uncle, but Shaikh Muhammad refused to 
grant the request, probably hoping that Shaikh Ali would give up and forget about the 
matter. Shaikh Ali persisted, however, until Shaikh Muhammad reluctantly agreed 
and appointed Isa bin Tarif as Governor of Qatar. According to al-Khairi, Shaikh 
Muhammad only agreed to prevent a new family conflict arising between him and his 
brother.
98
 
In October 1843, Isa bin Tarif and his dependents left the island of Qais and 
established themselves in Bida‘a (Doha), Qatar.99 According to al-Khairi, Isa bin Tarif 
remained quietly in his post for several years before he began to make trouble. Al-
Tajir, on the other hand, claims that Isa bin Tarif had always harboured malicious, 
though well-concealed, intentions against Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa and the Al 
Khalifa family in general.
100
 Al-Tajir seems quite credible, as Lorimer agrees with 
him, stating that no sooner had Isa bin Tarif settled in Qatar than he started conspiring 
against Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa. He communicated with Sayyid Thuwaini bin 
Said, the regent of Masqat and the son of Sayyid Said, Sultan of Oman and Zanzibar. 
Isa bin Tarif suggested to Sayyid Thuwaini that he should make use of the dissensions 
and conflicts within the Al Khalifa family to make a bid for the conquest of Bahrain, 
offering his services to help the Omanis do so.
101
 He probably wanted the Omanis to 
make him their vassal governor over Bahrain and its dependencies; after a few years, 
once his position was established and secure, he would have probably revolted against 
them. 
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When Sayyid Thuwaini received Isa bin Tarif‘s proposal, he forwarded it to 
his father in Zanzibar. The Sultan contacted the British authorities for their advice, 
and they urged him to reject the offer for two main reasons. First, the Sultan had 
based himself in Zanzibar, so far from the political scene in the Gulf that he would 
have difficulty waging a military campaign in person—the British viewed his son, 
Sayyid Thuwaini, as incapable of handling such an enterprise alone. Second, such an 
invasion could have led to a regional crisis in the Gulf as, if Isa bin Tarif could solicit 
the aid of the Omanis, then Shaikh Muhammad could solicit that of the Saudis, who 
could easily have launched a counterattack by land invasion. That would have 
weakened the Omanis, slackening the pressure on Shaikh Muhammad and allowing 
him to confront Isa bin Tarif and his allies with relative ease. At the same time, the 
Iranians might have used the situation as an opportunity to espouse the cause of 
Shaikh Abdullah, and the Shaikhs of Sharjah and Dubai might have protested at the 
British ban, imposed earlier, on their joining the conflict.
102
 The prospect of a regional 
war in the Gulf must have looked very grim for the British in the Gulf, who wanted 
nothing more than peace to ensure the safety of maritime trade; a regional war would 
certainly be counterproductive. 
Local historians such as al-Khairi and al-Tajir do not mention Isa bin Tarif‘s 
early conspiracy, merely documenting Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa‘s suspicions of 
him from a very early stage. Lorimer‘s account of the conspiracy, however, sheds 
light on an important aspect of the conflict between Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmad and 
his grand nephew. Isa bin Tarif, whose malicious, secret ambitions had existed from a 
very early stage, probably espoused Shaikh Abdullah‘s cause in 1847 as part of a 
longer-term plan to further those ambitions. He apparently desired to dethrone the Al 
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Khalifa family from Bahrain and their other dependencies, and to crown himself as a 
new ruler, founder of a new dynasty. This reveals the fragility of the political position 
of any Arab Gulf ruler at the time. The Al Khalifa had enjoyed political hegemony in 
Bahrain and Qatar for nearly eighty years, yet one of their closest allies, related by 
marriage, sought to overthrow the dynasty. 
12. Last Days: Battle of Umm Suwayya 1847 and Death of 
Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmad 1849 
According to local historians such as al-Nabhani and al-Tajir, by 1847 (1264 AH) Isa 
bin Tarif had secretly organised a network of tribal supporters in Qatar with the 
intention of revolting against Shaikh Muhammad. He also sent for the sons of Shaikh 
Abdullah, based near al-Hasa, to participate in the revolt. Shaikh Mubarak bin 
Abdullah led a contingent of the Bani Hajir tribe to join Isa bin Tarif.
103
 Shaikh 
Abdullah, who must have seen this as a lucrative opportunity, was willing to put aside 
his past conflicts with Ibn Tarif. Not only did he send his son Shaikh Mubarak, but he 
also crossed to the Persian mainland to recruit soldiers and obtain reinforcements.
104
 
This sudden and unexpected alliance between his governor and his grand uncle put 
Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa in a precarious position. 
It is surprising that Shaikh Abdullah should have been willing to ally himself 
with such a treacherous man as Isa bin Tarif, but he had suffered long years of exile 
and may now have been desperate to make progress. Their alliance was probably a 
―marriage of convenience‖ that would have dissolved once their common enemy was 
vanquished. Lorimer‘s account gives us a good indication of the gravity of Shaikh 
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Muhammad‘s situation, stating that the British Indian Government had sent 
confidential orders to the British authorities in the Gulf that any invasion of Bahrain 
by Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmad, Isa bin Tarif and their allies should be prevented by 
the British naval force in the region. Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa was deliberately 
kept in the dark about these orders because the British did not want him to rely on 
their aid—they would act directly only as a last resort, if Shaikh Muhammad could 
not beat his enemies alone.
105
 
Shaikh Abdullah and Isa bin Tarif had clearly placed Shaikh Muhammad in a 
very perilous situation. In fact, according to al-Khairi and al-Tajir, Isa bin Tarif‘s 
forces numbered about 7,000. As al-Khairi puts it, ―... Isa did not have a shadow of 
doubt that Bahrain was at his mercy‖,106 although Shaikh Muhammad, who had had 
his suspicions about Ibn Tarif all along, was not unnerved.
107
 
The rebels in Qatar exchanged communications with Shaikh Muhammad. Isa 
bin Tarif and his allies demanded that Shaikh Muhammad restore the estates and 
property belonging to Shaikh Abdullah and his family.
108
 As al-Khairi points out, this 
manoeuvre was probably only a ploy to further their selfish interests; they had no real 
interest in the welfare of Shaikh Abdullah.
109
 Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa, 
however, decided to crush this rebellion in Qatar before Shaikh Abdullah could return 
from the Persian mainland, and before the rebels could pose a significant naval threat 
to Bahrain. Accordingly, Shaikh Muhammad led an army into Qatar, and apparently 
decided to have a showdown on land. The allied rebels probably did not expect this 
move by Shaikh Muhammad, believing that their large numbers would deter him from 
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waging war on land. Shaikh Muhammad‘s timing also ensured that the battle would 
take place before his enemies‘ strength was augmented by the arrival of Shaikh 
Abdullah from Persia. The armies engaged near the town of Fuwairat in northern 
Qatar. Shaikh Muhammad inflicted a crushing defeat on the forces of the allied rebels 
and Isa bin Tarif was among those slain in the battle.
110
 See Figure 12.
111
 
Local historians call the battle ―Umm Suwayya‖ after a spring of water located 
near the battlefield. According to Hennell, Isa bin Tarif lost no fewer than eighty men 
there, ten of them prominent men from Ibn Tarif‘s own tribe.112 Lorimer says: ―This 
disaster was the death blow of Shaikh Abdullah's hopes.‖113 After his victory, Shaikh 
Muhammad bin Khalifa proceeded to al-Bida‘a (Doha) and appointed his nephew, 
Shaikh Ahmad bin Muhammad, governor of eastern Qatar.
114
 Before his return to 
Bahrain, Shaikh Muhammad also banished from Qatar some of the tribes that had 
been the main instigators and encouragers of the rebellion led by Isa bin Tarif, such as 
the al-Suwaidi tribe.
115
 The battle had two major outcomes. First, it was the last 
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serious threat that Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmad presented to Shaikh Muhammad bin  
 
 
Figure 12: Battle of Umm Suwayya 1847 
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Khalifa before the former's death in 1849. Second, Shaikh Muhammad managed to 
defuse a major threat to the Al Khalifa dynasty by defeating Isa bin Tarif, chief of the 
powerful al-bin Ali tribe. With that victory, Shaikh Muhammad consolidated his 
power and position as ruler of Bahrain, Qatar and dependencies. The alliance between 
Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmad and Isa bin Tarif, as stated earlier, was probably only a 
‗marriage of convenience‘. In all likelihood, each ally tried to use the other as a ladder 
to achieve his ambition in the highly risky game of politics and war. 
After the devastating blow to his efforts and hopes in Qatar, there were only 
two minor events before Shaikh Abdullah‘s death in 1849. First, he was approached 
by the Persian Consul General in Baghdad, Abdul Jabbar Khan, who expressed the 
Persian government‘s interest in espousing his cause. Ironically, the Consul also 
wrote letters to Bahrain expressing Persia‘s support for Shaikh Muhammad bin 
Khalifa.
116
 The Persian object of this double-dealing might have been to deceive 
Shaikh Muhammad, but they might have intended to use both Shaikhs as pawns in a 
larger political scheme. However, the British Resident apparently caught wind of 
what was going on. He must have seen the growing Persian influence in Bahrain as 
counterproductive to British interests in the Gulf. He therefore exerted pressure on the 
Persian Consul to cease communications with both Al Khalifa Shaikhs. The Consul 
eventually acceded to the British demands.
117
 Shaikh Abdullah then searched for a 
new ally, and found no one but his old foe, Sayyid Said of Oman and Zanzibar. The 
Shaikh set off to visit the Sultan in Zanzibar at the time, in the hopes of forging an 
alliance with him. On his way, Shaikh Abdullah stopped at Masqat in Oman, where 
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he breathed his last and died, apparently from old age.
118
 His death concluded a major 
period in the modern history of Bahrain, the Al Khalifa family, and the Gulf region. 
13. Conclusion 
Much can be deduced from the analysis of this period of Shaikh Abdullah‘s life. We 
have seen a detailed and thorough account of the internal and external political factors 
that affected the sustainability of the rulership in the nineteenth century Arabian Gulf. 
Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmad‘s inability to succeed in balancing those factors 
ultimately resulted in his political downfall and the loss of his shaikhdom. 
What led to the political downfall of such a strong and powerful leader as 
Shaikh Abdullah? The primary reason seems to have been his inability or 
unwillingness to control his sons. Their insolence and their conduct and attitude 
towards the people living in their dominions, such as the merchants and the tribal 
leaders/men, and even towards their own family, certainly helped to bring about the 
demise of their father‘s political position. The unruly conduct of Shaikh Abdullah‘s 
sons seems to have isolated them and their father from many of their tribal supporters, 
not to mention other members of the Al Khalifa family—Shaikh Muhammad bin 
Khalifa had no difficulty in rallying support from other family members. Many of 
them must have shared his fears and concerns for what might have happened after 
Shaikh Abdullah‘s death and the accession of one of his sons. Shaikh Muhammad was 
able to recruit members of the family who were not from the Ahmad al-Fatih branch, 
including Shaikhs Abdul-Rahman bin Abdul-Latif and Yousif bin Muhammad. 
Shaikh Abdullah, on the other hand, had only the support of his sons and grandsons. It 
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is noteworthy that, even when trying to regain his political position in Bahrain, Shaikh 
Abdullah could rally no supporters from within the Al Khalifa family. 
As well as family members, Shaikh Muhammad succeeded in recruiting not 
only tribal allies with previous grievances against Shaikh Abdullah, such as al-
Jalahma and the al-bin Ali tribe, but also other tribes such as the al-bu Kawara and al-
Nuaim. Shaikh Abdullah had become increasingly isolated because of his apparent 
inability to restrain the abusive conduct of his sons, so could only recruit mercenary 
Bedouin troops, whose unruliness and tendency to loot must have isolated him even 
further from the populace in Bahrain and Qatar. All of that facilitated Shaikh 
Muhammad bin Khalifa‘s overthrow of his grand uncle and his enthronement as ruler 
of Bahrain and its dependencies.  
When Shaikh Abdullah was ousted from Bahrain, he attempted more than 
once to reclaim his lost political authority but always failed. His loss of power 
coincided with the ascendancy of a new Saudi Emir, Faisal bin Turki Al Saud, who 
probably held a grudge against Shaikh Abdullah because of the latter‘s past conflict 
with Faisal's father, Emir Turki bin Abdullah, and because Shaikh Abdullah had 
occupied Dammam, part of Emir Faisal‘s ancestral heritage, after his exile. All this 
might well have inclined Emir Faisal towards Shaikh Muhammad and against Shaikh 
Abdullah, as a step towards regaining his lands. Shaikh Abdullah had been deprived 
of the assistance of a very powerful potential ally, who chose instead to join his 
adversary. 
Another major reason for Shaikh Abdullah‘s failure, this time external, was 
the attitude of the British, who probably viewed Shaikh Abdullah in such a poor light 
after his dealings with the Egyptians in 1839 that they were willing to support any 
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move against him by a cooperating pretender. It is true that they did not give any 
known direct military or financial support to Shaikh Muhammad, but they did provide 
substantial indirect political support. They prohibited the Arab tribal chiefs on the 
Trucial Coast from espousing the cause of Shaikh Abdullah, or from meddling in the 
internal politics of the Al Khalifa family. They also discouraged the Shaikh of Kuwait 
from giving military support to Shaikh Abdullah, restricting his activities to peaceful 
mediation between the warring factions of the Al Khalifa family. By doing so, they 
deprived Shaikh Abdullah of the services and assistance of other tribal allies on the 
Arabian littoral of the Gulf. They also scotched his attempts to ally himself with the 
Persians, using political pressure and influence. They also pressured the Persians into 
allowing them to restrain Shaikh Abdullah from raiding Bahrain‘s maritime traffic 
from his base at Naband on the Persian littoral. 
Shaikh Abdullah, already hobbled by age, failed alliance attempts and the 
threatened intervention of the British, faced a formidable foe with apparent military 
prowess. Coincidence and luck were also on Shaikh Muhammad‘s side, as they 
helped him foil Shaikh Abdullah‘s attempt to take advantage, with his sons, of his 
alliance with the Saudi Governor of Qatif, Abdullah bin Said, to take back Bahrain. 
The allies‘ communications were intercepted by allies of Shaikh Muhammad, so the 
crucial element of surprise was lost and Shaikh Abdullah was defeated. Shaikh 
Abdullah and his sons did manage, however, to strike a dangerous and crafty alliance 
with Isa bin Tarif, but Shaikh Muhammad proved to be a prudent military 
commander. He crushed the dangerous uprising of 1847 before it got beyond control, 
and this had grave consequences for his rulership and political position of Shaikh 
Abdullah. Shaikh Muhammad confirmed, yet again, that he was the undisputed chief 
in both Bahrain and Qatar. His victory probably made any possible attempts by some 
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of his allies to flaunt their previous support for him in claiming rulership as a favour. 
That would have been especially true with the defeat and death of the most prominent 
among them, Isa bin Tarif. Shaikh Muhammad‘s victory also severely weakened 
Shaikh Abdullah‘s political position and ability to recruit supporters in Bahrain, Qatar 
and other parts of Eastern Arabia. Knowledge of that weakness is probably what 
prompted Shaikh Abdullah to solicit the aid and alliance of his old foe, Sayyid Said 
bin Sultan of Oman and Zanzibar. 
All the reasons cited above contributed to the political downfall of Shaikh 
Abdullah and to the failure of his numerous attempts to regain control of his position 
as ruler of Bahrain and its dependencies. For an observer trying to understand the 
history of Bahrain and the surrounding region in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, Shaikh Abdullah stands out as an important figure. Analysis of his political 
career informs understanding of the history of the region. His role was pivotal in 
many of the major political events and intrigues, as well as in the military standoffs 
between the local rulers of his day. He helped to shape the geopolitical structure that 
we see in the Gulf region today. Yet Shaikh Abdullah also presents himself as a 
historical paradox. As a leader, he defeated all his external enemies, but he was 
brought to ruin from within his own household. Whatever his mistakes, faults and 
miscalculations, it would be essential for historians to understand the important 
political role that he played starting his father's death in 1795 and which lasted until 
his own death in 1849. His mark on the political history of his country, and of the 
region in his day, deserves our proper attention and consideration. 
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CHAPTER VII 
Conclusion 
 
What new light does this study shed on the history of Arab Gulf politics and rulers in 
the first half of the nineteenth century in general, and the political role played by the 
Al Khalifa family and Shaikh Abdullah in particular?  It reveals that the Gulf rulers 
employed a set of strategies to defend themselves and their dominions. Skilful use of 
these strategies was vital for the survival of a ruler, his family and his shaikhdom in 
the era that preceded British protection and hegemony. Rulers generally had a choice 
of three basic mechanisms/tactics to be used against external threats. 
The first was for a ruler to enter into direct military confrontation with his foe 
and defeat him in battle. If successful, it put an immediate end to the threat. The 
possibility and consequences of defeat had to be considered, however. Two other 
tactics could be employed if a ruler was not confident of winning a war. The most 
common of these was entering into a protector-protégé relationship (a process known 
as dakhala), where the ruler placed himself and his shaikhdom under the protection of 
a more powerful ruler––including his attacker––by paying him a sum of money, a 
form of annual ―protection tax‖.1 Although largely effective in securing a domain, this 
strategy had its disadvantages––chief among them was that a protector frequently 
meddled in the internal affairs of his protégé.  To lessen the hold or influence of a 
protector, a ruler could seek the support of a new protector. 
                                                          
1
 James Onley, ―The Politics of Protection in the Gulf: The Arab Rulers and the British Resident in the 
Nineteenth Century,‖ New Arabian Studies 6 (2004), 42-60; James Onley and Sulayman Khalaf, 
―Shaikhly Authority in the Pre-Oil Gulf: An Historical-Anthropological Study‖, History and 
Anthropology 17 (2006), 200-201. 
Abdulaziz Al Khalifa Chapter VII  
 
  230 
 
The final choice for a ruler who wished to avoid both war and a protector-
protégé relationship was to play his foes off against each other. When a ruler was 
forced to contend with a powerful regional power, he would usually ally himself with 
another ruler, who acted as an auxiliary force. Such an alliance would usually stop an 
approaching foe in his tracks. A good example of this was Shaikh Abdullah‘s action 
against the Persian encroachment of 1836. When Shaikh Abdullah became aware of 
Persia‘s designs against him and of the possibility of a Persian-Omani alliance, he 
sought the alliance and protection of the Saudis. One apparent aim was to discourage 
the Omanis from allying with the Persians, and he succeeded, as the Persians were 
deterred from proceeding with their aggressive designs against Bahrain and its 
dependencies. 
Playing foes off against each other, though usually effective, rarely led to 
long-term security; the agreements resulting from such tactics were short-term 
marriages of convenience, dissolved as soon as they were no longer needed. The 
quick termination of these alliances is explained by the limited economic resources 
available to the Gulf rulers at the time.
2
 Lack of resources probably generated envy 
between neighbours, who would try to take whatever they could. The same lack made 
rulers unwilling to share wealth, in the form of a tribute; with anyone else, so that 
once the need for protection was over they would usually try to shake off the yoke of 
the protector. 
Another major aspect of this study is the political life and legacy of Shaikh 
Abdullah bin Ahmad Al Khalifa. During his long political life, 54 years, from 1795 to 
1849, Shaikh Abdullah exhibited many of the characteristics of an ideal Arab ruler of 
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his day, at least in his ability to face external threats. The Shaikh‘s qualities as an able 
ruler were evident during his time as junior co-ruler with his brother Shaikh Salman, 
his senior co-rulership with his nephew Shaikh Khalifa bin Salman and then with his 
grand nephew Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa. The Shaikh used all three of the 
tactics/mechanisms described above with exemplary efficiency. He protected Bahrain 
and its dependencies from falling prey to foreign occupation and preserved the 
rulership of the Al Khalifa family. Shaikh Abdullah succeeded in protecting the 
domains of his family from the Omanis, the Saudis, Rahma bin Jabir al-Jalahma, Isa 
bin Tarif al-bin Ali, the Egyptians and the Persians. 
Nonetheless, prior to Shaikh Abdullah's reign with his brother Shaikh Salman, 
their father and grandfather used such tactics successfully. Shaikh Muhammad bin 
Khalifa al-Kabir first placed himself under the protection of the al-Musallam family 
who were the vassal rulers of Qatar for the Bani Khalid tribe. Notwithstanding, when 
Shaikh Muhammad felt that his financial and military power grew vis-à-vis the al-
Musallam, and that their protectors, the Bani Khalid, were weakened from internal 
feuding, he rebelled against their authority, and used direct military confrontation to 
overthrow them. His son Shaikh Ahmad al-Fatih found no alternative to using direct 
military confrontation to thwart the attack of Shaikh Nasr al-Mathkoor‘s army on 
Zubarahh in 1782. Shaikh Ahmad later used such a method to launch a conquest 
against Bahrain and add it to his family‘s domains.  
Shaikh Abdullah and his family used direct military confrontation effectively 
against many foes, including the Saudis, whom they defeated in several battles. 
Among his successes in using such a tactic were the ousting of the Saudis from Qatar 
and Bahrain in 1810, the decisive naval victory over the Saudis and their ally Rahma 
bin Jabir in 1811 and his campaign of war and raids in Eastern Arabia in the 1830s. 
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Direct military confrontation was successful against the Omanis too. Shaikh Abdullah 
and his family defeated the Omanis and their ally, Rahma bin Jabir, at the battle of 
Maqta‘a in 1816. His victory over the Sultan of Oman in the battle of Gazgaz in 1828, 
combined with a naval raid on Masqat, convinced the Sultan that he should seek an 
agreement of perpetual peace with Shaikh Abdullah.  The agreement was successful 
and there has been no armed conflict between Bahrain and Oman since 1829. 
Local rulers sometimes needed to use direct military confrontation against the 
threats of political rivals. Shaikh Abdullah and his family were threatened by 
contenders among the Bani Utbah tribal confederation like the famous warlord Rahma 
bin Jabir al-Jalahma, finally defeated and slain in 1826. Rahma, who apparently 
wanted to settle an old family feud with the Al Khalifa family, tried to achieve his 
objective by allying with different foes of the Al Khalifa, like the Saudis of Najd and 
the Al Said of Oman. When the geopolitical circumstances changed and Rahma could 
find no allies among the major regional powers that would allow him to attack the Al 
Khalifa domains in Bahrain and Qatar directly, he resorted to maritime raids. Such 
raids were intended not just to provide financial gain but also to weaken the 
economic, and thus the political, position of Shaikh Abdullah and his family. To 
counter this threat, Shaikh Abdullah formed an alliance with the Bani Khalid, who 
were angered by Rahma‘s land raids. Rahma had not expected this coalition, which 
besieged him by land and sea—a campaign that ended with the defeat and death of 
Rahma. Isa bin Tarif, chief of the al-bin Ali tribe, was another political rival. He tried, 
with the help of some of Shaikh Abdullah‘s sons, to stage a revolt in Qatar in 1835. 
He, too, was defeated and was forced to leave Qatar with his followers. 
Other threats were countered either by entering into protector-protégé relations 
or by playing one power off against another. Shaikh Abdullah, along with Shaikh 
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Salman and their family, willingly submitted to Sayyid Ahmad bin Said of Oman in 
1801, placing themselves under his protection. They relinquished their authority over 
Bahrain in order to maintain control over Zubarah and their other dependencies in 
Qatar and to retain their agricultural estates in Bahrain. Nevertheless, eight years later, 
Shaikh Abdullah and his family placed themselves under the protection of the Saudis 
and allied with them to throw the Omanis out of Bahrain. This was not an unqualified 
success, as the Al Khalifa, although free from the Omanis, fell victim to the Saudis, 
who took over Bahrain and Qatar, taking Shaikhs Abdullah and Salman, and their 
cousin Shaikh Abdullah bin Khalifa, as hostages to the Saudi capital of Diriyah. To 
deal with this reversal, the Al Khalifa family, under the leadership of Shaikh 
Abdullah‘s nephew, Shaikh Abdul Rahman bin Rashid Al Fadhil, put themselves 
back under Omani protection. With Omani help, Shaikh Abdul Rahman managed to 
oust the Saudis from both Bahrain and Qatar. His victory probably prompted Shaikh 
Abdullah, with his brother and cousin, to negotiate terms for their release by the Saudi 
ruler. Succeeding, they returned safely to their domains. 
Shaikh Abdullah was also successful in playing off one power against another 
during his reign as senior co-ruler. He saw that the Persians were intent on trying to 
bring him under their yoke in 1836, and that the Persian Prince of Shiraz was likely to 
call upon his in-law, Sayyid Said of Oman, to aid him with his naval power against 
Bahrain. That must have prompted the Shaikh to end his ongoing conflict with the 
Saudi Emir at the time, Faisal bin Turki Al Saud, and seal an alliance with him 
instead. The Shaikh placed himself under Saudi protection for a mere 2,000 MT 
Dollars a year and obligated himself to provide military assistance if needed by the 
Saudi Emir. In return, the Saudis would supply Shaikh Abdullah with military 
assistance if Persia attacked him. The Shaikh did, however, insist that he would aid 
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the Saudis militarily against any enemy except Sayyid Said of Oman. That would 
have sent an indirect message to Sayyid Said that, as Shaikh Abdullah had denied 
himself a Saudi-Bahrain alliance against Oman alone, but not one against a Persia-
Oman alliance, it would not be in Sayyid Said‘s best interests to form such an 
alliance. If that was indeed the case, the Shaikh‘s strategy worked brilliantly. 
The Shaikh Abdullah also played off one power against the other during the 
Egyptian crisis of 1839, when there was a strong possibility of an Egyptian invasion 
of his domains in Bahrain and Qatar. At the time, the Shaikh was under pressure from 
the British Resident in the Gulf not to enter into any agreements with the Egyptians, 
though the Resident refused the Shaikh guaranteed British protection against an 
Egyptian invasion. The Shaikh‘s only hope of success was to play off the two powers 
against one another. He sought Persian protection while at the same time demanding 
that the British should protect him if they did not want him to become a protégé of the 
Egyptians; he was also secretly making deals with the Egyptian commander, Khorshid 
Pasha. Almost certainly, the Shaikh‘s pleas for British and Persian protection were no 
more than tools to manipulate the Pasha and make him believe that one or the other 
would protect him if the Egyptian offer to their potential protégé was unconvincing. If 
that was indeed his intention, he succeeded. Khorshid Pasha agreed that Shaikh 
Abdullah and his domains in Bahrain, Qatar and Dammam should enjoy Egyptian 
protection for a small annual tribute of 2,000 MT Dollars. The Shaikh also succeeded 
in inducing the Pasha to agree that there was no need for an Egyptian Wakil to reside 
in Bahrain. 
The Shaikh‘s political manoeuvres saved Bahrain and its dependencies from a 
possible devastating Egyptian invasion for a trivial price. It was Shaikh Abdullah‘s 
ability to play off the major regional powers (Egypt, Britain and Persia) against each 
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other that led to the settlement with Khorshid Pasha, though his success caused some 
undesired consequences later. The Egyptian departure from Eastern Arabia in 1841 
left Shaikh Abdullah without any solid protection from a major power. The British 
resented him too, so he could not call on British help when he could have benefited 
from it a few years later. 
Any Arabian Gulf ruler at the time had to be alert to several factors if he was 
to maintain his authority and rulership.
3
 These factors were both external and internal, 
but it is the internal ones affecting Shaikh Abdullah that were the cause of his 
downfall. By neglecting them, he lost his authority and power when his grand 
nephew, Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa, led a rebellion against him. It is quite 
possible that the Shaikh would have been able to solicit some foreign aid in that 
struggle if any of the powers had felt that he had substantial support from the 
populace of Bahrain or from his family. The old Shaikh had neither. 
How did Shaikh Abdullah lose all support within Bahrain? It seems quite a 
paradox that a leader who was able to thwart various external threats to his power and 
authority was defeated so easily by an internal mutiny, against which he seemed 
unable to recruit any support from his subjects or his own family. To try to explain 
that, we need to look at the internal factors affecting a ruler‘s authority in the early 
nineteenth century Gulf. The political power of any Shaikh depended on the support 
of three main groups in society. First was his extended family, whose support and 
approval of his rule was vital. Second was the support of his tribal allies, as they 
provided the bulk of his military force. Third was the support of the merchant 
community, who had a much larger political influence in the pre oil economy of the 
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Gulf than they have today. The local economy at the time depended on them, and if a 
group of wealthy merchants decided to immigrate to a better port, they could affect 
the local economy badly, as the ruler and shaikhdom would not only lose financially, 
they would also lose status in the eyes of other merchants in the Gulf region.
4
 
By the end of his reign, Shaikh Abdullah seems to have lost the support of all 
these groups and the loss led directly to his political ruin. As we have seen, the 
behaviour and attitude of his sons sowed the seeds of his downfall, starting after the 
death of Shaikh Khalifa bin Salman in 1834, when they became aggressive and 
rebellious against their father‘s authority. Their actions culminated in the 1835 Qatar 
rebellion, in which they allied with Isa bin Tarif, chief of the al-bin Ali tribe and 
maternal uncle to three of them. The rebels‘ aim was to dethrone Shaikh Abdullah, 
but the old Shaikh managed to crush them with the help of his grand nephew, Shaikh 
Muhammad bin Khalifa. Reconciliation followed, but the episode should have been 
an early warning sign to Shaikh Abdullah, alerting him to his sons‘ actions and their 
possible (and in fact actual) undesired consequences. Shaikh Abdullah‘s sons soon 
returned to their insolent behaviour. They started harassing merchants in Bahrain and 
compounded their depredations by offending and abusing the British Native Agent in 
Bahrain, bringing unwanted trouble with the British. The Shaikh‘s old age seems to 
have decreased his ability and vigour as a ruler, making him delegate more of his 
authority to his sons and grand nephew, Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa. 
That delegation of authority was the start of more trouble. The sons of Shaikh 
Abdullah started to abuse their authority, spreading chaos and resentment among the 
populace of Bahrain. The atmosphere, as the sons continued their misdemeanours, led 
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to frequent clashes between them and Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa. Such a tense 
socio-political environment also resulted in a slowdown in the local economy, as 
many merchants started to see Bahrain as an unsuitable place to conduct business and 
trade. The insolence of Shaikh Abdullah‘s sons seems to have affected not only the 
general populace of Bahrain but also its merchants, tribal leaders, and most 
importantly many of the Al Khalifa Shaikhs. 
Shaikh Abdullah was now losing all three props of his authority: family, tribal 
allies and mercantile community. The deprivation had started because of the actions 
of his sons and his inability or unwillingness to restrain or control them. Shaikh 
Muhammad must have seen this as an opportunity to unite the Al Khalifa family 
under his command and to project himself as a potential, probably the most eligible, 
candidate to succeed his grand uncle. As has been seen, a civil war ensued, Shaikh 
Muhammad overthrew his grand uncle and assumed the rulership of Bahrain and its 
Qatar dependencies in 1843. All Shaikh Abdullah‘s efforts to restore his position 
failed, and he died at Masqat in 1849. There were three reasons for his continued 
failures. First, he had no internal support within the Al Khalifa family or from other 
tribal leaders in Bahrain. Second, there was no external support from any local power, 
as the British, apparently resentful of his 1839 dealings with the Egyptians, actively 
sought to deny any such support. There was one power, the Saudis, whom the British 
might not have been able to influence against the Shaikh, but the Emir of Najd, Faisal 
bin Turki Al Saud, chose to side with Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa instead. Third, 
Shaikh Muhammad managed to crush the only serious threat to his rulership of 
Bahrain in 1847 when Isa bin Tarif, chief of the al-bin Ali tribe and governor of 
Bida‘a (Doha) in Qatar, had defected to Shaikh Abdullah. Isa bin Tarif assembled a 
large army and the British at the time believed that he had a very good chance of 
Abdulaziz Al Khalifa Chapter VII  
 
  238 
 
defeating Shaikh Muhammad. Nevertheless, Shaikh Muhammad still managed to 
defeat his troops and slay him at the battle of Umm Suwayya in Qatar. That was 
Shaikh Abdullah‘s last attempt to regain his domains; he died in 1849 in Masqat, still 
searching for an ally, as he awaited a reply to his request of alliance with his old foe, 
Sayyid Said bin Sultan. 
Shaikh Abdullah‘s life, a prime example of an Arabian Gulf ruler‘s career in 
the first half of the nineteenth century, presents itself as a political paradox. This 
thesis shows that from an international point of view, he was a very competent and 
capable ruler, able to counter all external threats to his shaikhdom by using the three 
strategies with meticulous efficiency, always choosing the best strategy for the 
circumstances. He knew when to go to war, when and with whom to ally, when and 
from whom to seek protection, and (except possibly in one case) when to play one foe 
against another. The exception was during the Egyptian crisis of 1839, when he 
managed to protect himself from the wrath of the Egyptians but at the expense of 
bringing British resentment upon himself. Even that might not have been a mistake, as 
he did not have sufficient guarantees of protection from the British. That flaw aside 
(and perhaps an accusation of negligence could be made in his dealing with the Saudis 
in 1809-1810), the Shaikh was very successful in managing Bahrain‘s external affairs. 
Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmad‘s major flaw as a political leader was his 
weakness in domestic affairs, particularly family affairs. He may have been unlucky 
in that most of his numerous sons were aggressive rogues, but he could have 
exercised more effort to try to restrict their excesses, it might be argued. Those 
excessive and abusive actions and conduct built anger and resentment among the 
populace of Bahrain and its dependencies, not just among the masses but also among 
the merchants, tribal leaders and allies of the Al Khalifa, and even members of the Al 
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Khalifa family itself. Fear of the political and economic future of Bahrain if the sons 
had succeeded the father would have generated a suitable political climate for the 
overthrow of Shaikh Abdullah. Nobody had any confidence in the Shaikh‘s sons or 
could trust them with their future and interests. In such an environment, the most 
suitable candidate to replace Shaikh Abdullah was his grand nephew, Shaikh 
Muhammad bin Khalifa. As we have seen, Shaikh Muhammad did indeed rebel 
against his grand uncle and found ample support among his family, the tribes and the 
populace of Bahrain and Qatar in general, while Shaikh Abdullah, no doubt surprised 
that his erstwhile tribal allies favoured Shaikh Muhammad, was forced to depend 
mostly on Bedouin mercenaries from the Arabian mainland. 
Could Shaikh Abdullah have saved himself from political downfall had he 
nominated another member of his family as his successor? That successor would have 
been a member of the family with the confidence of the family, the people and the Al 
Khalifa‘s allies. If he had found and nominated such a successor, he might well have 
remained in power until the end of his life, though his sons would certainly have 
objected. If they had, the Shaikh would have had to fight and possibly kill his own 
sons, and that thought must have made him unwilling to appoint a successor, 
preferring to risk the loss of his shaikhdom for the sake of maintaining his house 
intact rather than to retain power and lose his sons. His heart, not his head, cost 
Shaikh Abdullah his position as Ruler. 
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Date Remark 
c. Mid 1600s Ancestors of the Al Khalifa and al-Sabah and other Utubi 
families from the Jumaila tribe leave their ancestral home in 
al-Haddar, Najd. Bani Utbah or the Utub tribal confederation 
is formed in eastern Arabia between them and the al-bin Ali 
from the Bani Sulaim tribe.  
1701 The Utub wage an unsuccessful Naval conquest on Bahrain 
but are repelled by the Huwala Arabs. 
c.1716 The Utub establish themselves on Kuwait under the suzerainty 
of the Bani Khalid tribe. They gradually become independent 
from Bani Khalid under the rulership of the al-Sabah dynasty. 
c.1766 Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa al-Kabir relocates from 
Kuwait to Zubarahh. Builds Sabha (Murair) Fort and gradually 
defeats al-Musallam, Bani Khalid vassals in Qatar, and 
assumes the Shaikhdom of that Peninsula. 
c.1778 Shaikh Muhammad dies, his son Shaikh Khalifa bin 
Muhammad rules. 
1782 Shaikh Khalifa leaves for pilgrimage. His brother Shaikh 
Ahmad is his deputy and faced invasion from the Al Mathkoor 
family of Bahrain and Bushire. Shaikh Ahmad defeats them at 
battle of Zubarahh. Shaikh Khalifa dies in pilgrimage and 
Shaikh Ahmad becomes Ruler in his place. 
1783 Shaikh Ahmad bin Muhammad wages a successful conquest 
against Bahrain and includes it in his domains 
1795 Shaikh Ahmad dies and is succeeded by his son, Shaikh 
Salman. 
1798 Shaikh Salman relocates his seat of government from 
Zubarahh to Bahrain so as to be in a better position against the 
emerging Saudi threat. 
1801 Bahrain faces Omani Invasion by Sayyid Sultan bin Ahmad. 
Shaikh Salman submits on certain terms and conditions and 
relocates to Zubarahh 
1809-1810 Shaikhs Salman and Abdullah manage to oust Omanis from 
Bahrain by Saudi help but then captured and held as captives 
in Riyadh along with their cousin Shaikh Abdullah bin 
Khalifa. Their nephew, Shaikh Abdul Rahman bin Rashid Al 
Fadhil, manages to obtain help from Sayyid Said of Oman. 
Through scheming with his cousin, Shaikh Khalifa bin 
Salman, he succeeds in capturing Zubarahh and Bahrain from 
the Saudis and imprisoning their garrisons. His success 
secured the release of the imprisoned Al Khalifa Shaikhs in 
Diriyah. 
1811 Battle of Akhakhira 
1816 Battle of Maqta'a 
1820 Shaikhs Salman and Abdullah sign General Treaty of 1820 
with the British Government. The stated aim of the treaty was 
to restrict piracy and assure maritime peace. 
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1822 Shiraz agreement is signed between Captain William Bruce, 
PRPG, and the Prince of Shiraz. The agreement acknowledges 
British recognition of Persian sovereignty over Bahrain. The 
agreement sparks British anger and is not recognised by 
Bruce's superiors as the latter signed it without their prior 
consultation and approval and he is removed from his post. 
1825 Shaikh Salman dies. 
1826 Rahma al-Jalahma is slain in a naval battle of the coast of 
Dammam. 
1828 Battle of Gazgaz 
1833-1834 Saudi-Bahrain war 
1834 Shaikh Khalifa bin Salman dies. 
1835 Sons of Shaikh Abdullah along with the maternal uncle of 
three of them, Isa bin Tarif al-bin Ali, start a rebellion in 
Qatar. The rebellion fails as it is crushed by the forces of 
Shaikh Abdullah led by Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa. 
1836 Prince of Shiraz tries to intimidate Shaikh Abdullah into 
acknowledging Persian hegemony over Bahrain. Shaikh 
Abdullah responds by stopping his conflicts with the Saudis 
and acknowledging their suzerainty in exchange for their 
military assistance if he is faced by a Persian invasion.  
1839 Egyptian Crisis of 1839. Egyptian forces of Muhammad Ali 
Pasha, Viceroy of Egypt, under the command of Khorshid 
Pasha installs his protégé Khalid bin Saud as new Saudi Emir 
in Najd. They proceed to Eastern Arabia and attempt to subdue 
Bahrain. Shaikh Abdullah naturally alarmed and seeks British 
advice. The PGPR first tells the Shaikh that it is the latter who 
will be best able to solve his own problem. Nevertheless, the 
British later ask Shaikh Abdullah to not place himself under 
Egyptian protection but are unwilling to afford him guaranteed 
protection on their part. This prompts the Shaikh to ignore 
their wishes and negotiate with the Egyptians and places 
himself under their protection. The British are angered by his 
decision. 
1842-1843 Civil War in Bahrain which ends with Shaikh Abdullah losing 
his throne and Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa becoming the 
new Ruler. 
1844 Siege of Dammam 
1847 Battle of Umm Suwayya 
1849 Shaikh Abdullah dies in Muscat. 
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DATE LOCATION NAME COMBATANTS RESULTS & 
IMPLICATONS 
c.1766 Sumaisma, 
Qatar 
Battle of 
Sumaisma 
Shaikh 
Muhammad bin 
Khalifa al-Kabir 
vs. al-Musallam 
Shaikh 
Muhammad 
victorious and 
consolidated his 
political power 
over Qatar. 
1770s Ruwais, 
Qatar 
Battle of 
Ruwais 
Shaikh 
Muhammad bin 
Khalifa al-Kabir 
vs. al-Jalahma 
Shaikh 
Muhammad 
victorious and the 
challenge of the 
al-Jalahma to his 
authority in Qatar. 
15 
November 
1782 
Zubarahh, 
Qatar 
Battle of 
Zubarahh 
Shaikh Ahmad 
al-Fatih, Utub, 
and people of 
Zubarahh vs. 
Shaikh NasrAl 
Mathkoor army 
Shaikh Ahmad 
victorious and 
invasion of Al 
Mathkoor to 
Zubarahh is 
repelled. Shaikh 
Nasr leaves 
Bahrain to Persia 
to seek assistance 
of Persian 
government to 
wage a 
counteroffensive 
on the Utub. 
March-May 
1783 
Bahrain Conquest of 
Bahrain 
Forces of the 
Utub vs. 
Garrison of Al 
Mathkoor 
Utub victorious 
and Bahrain 
comes under the 
possession of 
Shaikh Ahmad. 
September-
October 
1801 
Bahrain Omani 
Invasion of 
Bahrain 
Shaikh Salman 
vs. Sayyid 
Sultan bin 
Ahmad 
Shaikh Salman 
surrenders 
Bahrain to Sayyid 
Ahmad on the 
condition that the 
Utub property and 
fishing rights in 
remain intact. 
Utub relocate to 
Zubarahh. Shaikh 
Muhammad, 
brother of Shaikh 
Salman was taken 
hostage by the 
Omanis. 
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IMPLICATONS 
1809-1810 Bahrain Joint Saudi-
Utub 
invasion of 
Bahrain 
Saudis, Utub vs. 
Omanis 
Omanis ousted 
from Bahrain. 
Saudis refuse to 
surrender Bahrain 
to the Al Khalifa 
according to their 
prior agreement. 
1810 Zubarahh 
Qatar 
Saudi 
Invasion of 
Zubarahh 
Saudis vs. Utub Shaikhs Salman, 
Abdullah and their 
cousin Shaikh 
Abdullah bin 
Khalifa taken as 
hostages in 
Diriyah. Zubarahh 
comes under 
Saudi rule. 
1810 Zubarah, 
Qatar 
Shaikh 
Abdul 
Rahman's 
invasion of 
Zubarahh 
Shaikh Abdul 
Rahman bin 
Rashid Al 
Fadhil, Shaikh 
Khalifa bin 
Salman vs. 
Saudi Garrison 
under command 
of Ibn Touq 
Zubarahh 
liberated from the 
Saudis. Saudi 
garrison taken as 
hostages. 
1810 Bahrain Shaikh 
Abdul 
Rahman's 
invasion of 
Zubarahh 
Shaikh Abdul 
Rahman bin 
Rashid Al 
Fadhil vs. Saudi 
Garrison under 
command of Ibn 
Ufaisan 
Bahrain liberated 
from the Saudis. 
Saudi garrison 
taken as hostages. 
c.1811 Huwaila, 
Qatar 
First Battle 
of Huwaila  
Ibn Ufaisan, 
Rahma al-
Jalahma vs. 
Utub 
Utub victorious. 
Saudis repelled. 
1811 Akhakkira 
shoal, 
Bahrain 
Battle of 
Akhakkira 
Shaikh Abdullah 
bin Ahmad vs. 
fleet of Rahma 
al-Jalahma and 
Ibn Ufaisan 
Shaikh Abdullah 
victorious. Saudi 
fleet destroyed. 
1816 Sitrah, 
Bahrain 
Battle of 
Maqta'a 
Shaikhs Salman 
and Abdullah 
vs. Sayyid Said 
and Rahma al-
Jalahma 
Shaikhs of 
Bahrain 
victorious. 
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IMPLICATONS 
1826 Dammam, 
Saudi Arabia 
Showdown 
with Rahma 
al-Jalahma 
Utub and Bani 
Khalid vs. 
Rahma al-
Jalahma 
Rahma slain. 
1828 Juffair, 
Bahrain 
Battle of 
Gazgaz 
Shaikhs 
Abdullah and 
Khalifa vs. 
Sayyid Said of 
Oman 
Shaikhs of 
Bahrain 
victorious. 
1833-1834 Qatif, Saudi 
Arabia 
Qatif War Utub vs. Saudis Surrender of Qatif 
to Shaikh 
Abdullah 
1835 Huwaila, 
Qatar 
Second 
Battle of 
Huwaila 
Shaikh 
Muhammad bin 
Khalifa, his 
brother Shaikh 
Ali vs. Isa bin 
Tarif al-bin Ali 
and renegade 
sons of Shaikh 
Abdullah 
Shaikh 
Muhammad bin 
Khalifa victorious. 
Isa bin Tarif and 
al-bin Ali tribe 
expelled from 
Qatar. Doha 
destroyed. 
1842-1843 Bahrain and 
Qatar 
Bahrain 
Civil War 
Shaikh 
Muhammad bin 
Khalifa vs. 
Shaikh Abdullah 
bin Ahmad 
Shaikh 
Muhammad 
victorious. Shaikh 
Abdullah relocates 
to Dammam 
1844 Dammam Siege of 
Dammam 
Bahrain-Saudi 
coalition vs. 
Shaikh Abdullah 
bin Ahmad 
Shaikh Abdullah 
loses Dammam 
and relocates to 
Persian coast. He 
later relocates to 
Kuwait and then 
to Tarut Island 
opposite Qatif. 
1847 Umm 
Suwayya, 
Qatar 
Battle of 
Umm 
Suwayya 
Shaikh 
Muhammad bin 
Khalifa vs. Isa 
bin Tarif and 
sons of Shaikh 
Abdullah 
Shaikh 
Muhammad 
victorious. 
Appoints new 
governor in Doha. 
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Name Relation Significance to the story 
Al Fadhil, Shaikh 
Abdul Rahman bin 
Rashid  
Grandson of 
Shaikh Khalifa 
bin Fadhil bin 
Khalifa al-
Kabir. Nephew 
of Shaikhs 
Salman and 
Abdullah. His 
mother was 
Shaikha Amna 
bint Ahmad al-
Fatih. 
Managed with Omani help and the 
assistance of his cousin, Shaikh Khalifa 
bin Salman to Defeat the Saudis and oust 
them from Qatar and Bahrain. He took 
many of them as hostages and through 
such leverage managed to secure the 
release of the imprisoned three Al Khalifa 
Shaikhs in Najd. 
Al Fadhil, Shaikh Ali 
bin Khalifa  
Son of Shaikh 
Khalifa bin 
Fadhil bin 
Khalifa al-Kabir 
Governor in Bahrain in the winter months 
during 1783-1795, when Shaikh Ahmad 
al-Fatih resided in Zubarahh. 
Al Khalifa, Shaikh 
Abdullah bin Ahmad  
Son of Shaikh 
Ahmad al-Fatih 
Third Ruler of Bahrain and Fifth in 
Zubarahh, 1795-1843. His reign 
witnessed many violent battles and 
showdowns to protect his family domains. 
Those included challenges with the 
Omanis in the battles of Maqta'a and 
Gazgaz 1816 and 1828. With the Saudis 
in the battle of Akhakkira in 1811, and the 
Bahrain Saudi war 1833-1834 and Rahma 
bin Jabir al-Jalahma. He also had to face 
Persian encroachments, Internal rebellions 
in Qatar and in his family in addition to 
facing an Egyptian threat in 1839. He was 
overthrown by his grand nephew, Shaikh 
Muhammad bin Khalifa in 1843. He tried 
to regain his throne several times but with 
no avail and died in Masqat in 1849. 
Al Khalifa, Shaikh 
Abdullah bin Khalifa  
Son of the 
second Ruler of 
Zubarahh. First 
Cousin of 
Shaikhs Salman 
and Abdullah 
Was imprisoned with his cousins Shaikhs 
Salman and Abdullah in Diriyah, the 
Saudi capital in Najd by Imam Saud. 
Al Khalifa, Shaikh 
Abdul Rahman bin 
Abdul-Latif 
Great grandson 
of Shaikh 
Khalifa bin 
Muhammad, the 
second Ruler in 
Zubarahh 
Played an important role in organizing the 
rebellion of 1843 in Qatar and succeeded 
in making several tribes switch their 
allegiance to Shaikh Muhammad bin 
Khalifa. He led along with Shaikh 
Muhammad bin Ahmad the first part of 
the troops that left from Qatar to Bahrain 
and managed to takeover Riffa during the 
battle of al-Hunainya.  
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Al Khalifa, Shaikh 
Ahmad al-Fatih bin 
Muhammad  
Son of Shaikh 
Muhammad bin 
Khalifa al-
Kabir. 
Third Ruler in Zubarahh. Succeeded his 
brother Shaikh Khalifa. Defeated the 
forces of Shaikh Nasr Al Mathkoor in the 
Battle of Zubarahh. Waged a successful 
conquest of Bahrain at 1783 and added 
Bahrain to his domains. 
Al Khalifa, Shaikh 
Ahmad bin Salman  
Son of Shaikh 
Salman bin 
Ahmad  
Was the right hand of his brother Khalifa. 
Played an important role in the command 
of the battle of Maqta'a in 1816. Helped in 
negotiating a peace between the Al 
Khalifa and Sayyid Said of Oman. 
Commander of the navy during the final 
showdown with Rahma al-Jalahma in 
1826 and was personally responsible for 
the final assault in which Rahma was 
slain. He died in 1827. With his death the 
peace between the Al Khalifa and Sayyid 
Said ended. That in turn resulted in the 
battle of Maqta'a in 1828. 
Al Khalifa, Shaikh 
Ali bin Khalifa  
Son of Shaikh 
Khalifa bin 
Salman the 
Junior co-Ruler 
of Bahrain 
1825-1834. 
He assisted his brother, Shaikh 
Muhammad bin Khalifa, in overthrowing 
their uncle Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmad in 
1843. Later Governor of Manama, 1843-
68, and Fifth Ruler of Bahrain, 1868-69. 
 
Al Khalifa, Shaikh 
Khalifa bin Fadhil bin 
Khalifa al-Kabir 
Brother of 
Shaikh 
Muhammad. 
Founder of the Al Fadhil family in 
Bahrain. Some of his descendants would 
play a key role in supporting the Al 
Khalifa dynasty. 
Al Khalifa, Shaikh 
Khalifa bin 
Muhammad 
Son of Shaikh 
Muhammad bin 
Khalifa al-
Kabir. 
Second Ruler in Zubarahh. His reign 
witnessed a rise in the importance of 
Zubarah as a political, commercial, and 
cultural center.  
Al Khalifa, Shaikh 
Khalifa bin Salman  
Son of Shaikh 
Salman bin 
Ahmad 
Helped his cousin, Shaikh Abdul Rahman 
bin Rashid Al Fadhil in ousting the Saudis 
from Qatar and Bahrain in 1810. Later 
became the Junior co-Ruler with his 
uncle, Shaikh Abdullah who was the 
Senior co-Ruler. Was an important 
commander in the battles of Maqta'a in 
1816 and Gazgaz in 1828 and the 1833-
1834 war with the Saudis. He died in 
1834.  
Al Khalifa, Shaikh 
Muhammad bin 
Ahmad  
Son of Shaikh 
Ahmad bin 
Salman and 
nephew of 
Shaikh Khalifa 
bin Salman 
He assisted his cousin Shaikh Muhammad 
bin Khalifa in his rebellion. He led the 
first troops with Shaikh Abdul Rahman 
bin Abdul-Latif and was killed in the 
battle of al-Hunainya. 
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Al Khalifa, Shaikh 
Muhammad bin 
Khalifa  
Son of Shaikh 
Khalifa bin 
Salman the 
Junior co-Ruler 
of Bahrain 
1825-1834; 
grand nephew of 
Shaikh 
Abdullah. 
The Fourth Ruler in Bahrain and the Sixth 
in Zubarahh 1843-1868. He tried to 
succeed his father in his position being his 
eldest son. Nevertheless he was not given 
the same authority by his granduncle, 
Shaikh Abdullah. However in 1835 the 
Sons of Shaikh Abdullah started a 
rebellion in Qatar with the aid of the 
maternal uncle of three of them, Isa bin 
Tarif al-bin Ali. Shaikh Abdullah relied 
on Shaikh Muhammad to put down that 
rebellion. Shaikh Muhammad led his 
troops against the rebels in the 1835 battle 
of Huwaila and managed to defeat them. 
That achievement elevated his position in 
the family. Nonetheless his conflicts and 
tensions with the sons of Shaikh Abdullah 
continued to intensify until he managed to 
lead a revolt against Shaikh Abdullah in 
1842. His revolt was initially successful 
but he was ultimately defeated and had to 
flee to Najd and seek asylum in Riyadh. 
Notwithstanding he managed to weave 
another rebellion in 1843 with the help of 
his brother Shaikh Ali and his cousins 
Shaikhs Abdullah bin Abdul-Latif and 
Muhammad bin Ahmad. His second 
attempt was successful and he first 
managed to take over Qatar and then 
Bahrain in the same year and banished 
Shaikh Abdullah and his sons. Conflict 
continued between him and his grand 
uncle's family between 1843 and 1846. In 
1847, Isa bin Tarif, who became his ally 
and Shaikh Muhammad rewarded him by 
making him the governor of Qatar, 
conspired with Shaikh Abdullah and his 
sons against Shaikh Muhammad and led a 
rebellion against the latter. That rebellion 
came to a showdown in Umm Suwayya in 
Qatar where Shaikh Muhammad and his 
forces defeated the forces of Isa bin Tarif, 
who was slain, and the sons of Shaikh 
Abdullah.  
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Al Khalifa, Shaikh 
Muhammad bin 
Khalifa al-Kabir 
Founder and 
agnatic ancestor 
of all the Al 
Khalifa rulers in 
Qatar and 
Bahrain. 
Founder of the Al Khalifa dynasty's who 
established their rule in Zubarahh, Qatar. 
Al Khalifa, Shaikh 
Salman bin Ahmad  
Son of Shaikh 
Ahmad al-Fatih 
Second Ruler in Bahrain and Fourth in 
Zubarahh. His reign witnessed many 
violent battles and showdowns to protect 
his family domains. Those included 
challenges with the Omanis, Saudis and 
Rahma bin Jabir al-Jalahma 
Al Mathkoor, Shaikh 
Nasr  
Ruler of Bushire 
and Bahrain and 
vassal to Persia 
Attacked Zubarahh at 1782 but he was 
defeated and failed to capture it. Tried to 
solicit Persian aid against the Utub to 
avenge himself. However, the Utub 
launched a campaign against Bahrain in 
1783 and succeeded in capturing and 
ousted garrison of Shaikh Nasr 
Al Sabah, Shaikh 
Jabir  
Ruler of Kuwait He tried to reconcile Shaikh Abdullah and 
Shaikh Muhammad but to no avail. 
Al Said, Sayyid Said 
bin Sultan  
Sultan of Oman 
and Zanzibar 
Assisted Shaikh Abdul Rahman bin 
Rashid in ousting the Saudis. 
Nonetheless, he was later in conflict with 
the Al Khalifa which resulted in the 
battles of Maqta'a in 1816 and Gazgaz in 
1828. 
Al Said, Sayyid 
Sultan bin Ahmad  
Ruler of Oman 
and Zanzibar 
Led a successful Omani invasion against 
Bahrain in 1801 and included the islands 
into his domains. Was killed by the 
Qawasim in 1804. 
Al Saud, Emir 
Abdullah bin 
Thunayyan  
Third agnatic 
cousin of Emir 
Khalid bin Saud 
He overthrew the rule of Emir Khalid bin 
Saud. He gave asylum to Shaikh 
Muhammad bin Khalifa when the latter 
was defeated by Shaikh Abdullah and had 
to flee Bahrain. He was overthrown by 
Emir Faisal bin Turki in 1843. 
Abdulaziz Al Khalifa  Appendix III   
 
253 
 
Name Relation Significance to the story 
Al Saud, Emir Faisal 
bin Turki  
Son of Emir 
Turki bin 
Abdullah 
He stopped the War with the Al Khalifa in 
1834 and returned to Riyadh to avenge 
the death of his father by Mashari bin 
Abdul Rahman. He succeeded in his 
endeavor and became the new Saudi 
Emir. He was overthrown by the Egyptian 
forces of Muhammad Ali under the 
command of Khorshid Pasha and Emir 
Khalid bin Saud in 1838 and was taken as 
a prisoner in Egypt. He managed to 
escape Egypt in 1842/1843 and succeeded 
in overthrowing Emir Abdullah bin 
Thunayyan in 1843. He took the side of 
Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa in his 
conflict with Shaikh Abdullah and 
conducted a siege of Dammam in 1844 
which resulted in Shaikh Abdullah losing 
the aforementioned place on the Arabian 
littoral. Thus, Shaikh Abdullah was 
forced to relocate to the Persian littoral. 
His second rule as Emir lasted from 1843 
till his death in 1865. 
Al Saud, Emir Khalid 
bin Saud  
Son of Imam 
Saud bin 
Abdulaziz Al 
Saud 
He was taken as a captive by the 
Egyptians in 1818. Muhammad Ali Pasha 
sought to make him his vassal in Najd and 
sent him with an Egyptian army under the 
command of Khorshid Pasha to overthrow 
the rule of Emir Faisal bin Turki. Their 
mission was successful. Faisal was taken 
as a prisoner and Khalid was placed as the 
new Emir of Najd. Notwithstanding, 
Muhammad Ali needed to withdraw the 
Egyptian garrison in 1840 and Khalid was 
left alone to face challenging pretenders 
within his family. He was overthrown by 
Abdullah bin Thunayyan Al Saud in 
1841. 
Al Saud, Emir Turki 
bin Abdullah bin 
Muhammad  
Founder of the 
Second Saudi 
State. Second 
agnatic cousin to 
Imam Saud bin 
Abdulaziz Al 
Saud 
He managed to escape being captured by 
the troops of Muhammad Ali Pasha when 
they captured Diriyah in 1818.  In 1823 
he led a revolt which expelled the 
Egyptian forces from Najd, re-
establishing the Saudi dynasty and 
becoming the first Emir of the Second 
Saudi State. He was assassinated by his 
nephew Mashari bin Abdul Rahman in 
1834. He was succeeded by his son 
Faisal. 
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Al Saud, Imam Saud 
bin Abdulaziz bin 
Muhammad  
Wahhabi Imam 
and Ruler of the 
First Saudi state 
which 
comprised in his 
time Najd, 
Hejaz and 
Eastern Arabia 
Helped the Al Khalifa oust the Omanis 
from Bahrain in 1809/1810. Nevertheless, 
he overtook Bahrain and Qatar via his 
commanders Ibn Ufaisan and Ibn Touq. 
He imprisoned the Senior Al Khalifa 
Shaikhs, namely Shaikh Salman bin and 
Ahmad and his brother Shaikh Abdullah 
in addition to Shaikh Abdullah bin 
Khalifa Al Khalifa. 
al-bin Ali, Isa bin 
Tarif  
Shaikh of the al-
bin Ali tribe. 
Maternal Uncle 
of Shaikh Ali 
bin Khalifa and 
Shaikhs 
Muhammad, 
Ahmad and Ali, 
sons of Shaikh 
Abdullah bin 
Ahmad 
He led along with the sons of Shaikh 
Abdullah bin Ahmad a rebellion in Qatar 
in 1835 but was defeated and exiled with 
his tribe. In 1843 he took the side of 
Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa, under the 
instigation of the latter's brother Shaikh 
Ali bin Khalifa, against Shaikh Abdullah 
bin Ahmad. He became governor of Qatar 
for Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa in 
1844. In 1847 he conspired with Shaikh 
Abdullah and his sons and led a rebellion 
in Qatar in 1847 which resulted in the 
battle of Umm Suwayya. He was defeated 
and killed in it. 
al-Jalahma, Bishr bin 
Rahma  
Son of Rahma 
bin Jabir  
He was among the important allies of 
Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa in his 
takeover of Bahrain. 
al-Jalahma, Rahma 
bin Jabir  
Warlord and 
arch foe of the 
Al Khalifa 
He tried to topple the Al Khalifa several 
times and allied with the Saudis and the 
Omanis against them. He was killed in a 
Naval battle against them in 1826. 
Hennell, Lt. Col 
Samuel  
Political 
Resident in the 
Persian Gulf 
1838-1852  
His conflict with Shaikh Abdullah in 1839 
over the latter's handling of the Egyptian 
crisis of 1839 made him unsympathetic to 
the old Shaikh when he had to face the 
threat of Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa. 
Hennell allowed Isa bin Tarif and Bishr 
bin Rahma to join the cause of Shaikh 
Muhammad bin Khalifa. Hennell also 
tried to sabotage any alliance that Shaikh 
Abdullah tried to obtain from assistance 
from the Persians or the Shaikhs of the 
trucial coast in his attempt to regain his 
rulership from Shaikh Muhammad bin 
Khalifa.  
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Khorshid Pasha Egyptian 
General of 
Muhammad 
Ali's army in 
Arabia 
He established Emir Khalid bin Saud as 
the Egyptian vassal in Najd. He then 
proceeded to Hasa and added it to the 
Saudi domains and tried to takeover 
Bahrain and Qatar. That last action caused 
the Egyptian crisis of 1839. Shaikh 
Abdullah managed to avert his threat by 
negotiating a treaty where the Shaikh 
subjected himself to Egyptian protection 
in return for paying a small tribute. 
However that treaty angered the British 
and made them unsympathetic to the 
cause of Shaikh Abdullah when he was 
faced by the revolt of Shaikh Muhammad 
bin Khalifa. 
Kier, Major General 
W. Grant 
British Official He was the signatory on the British side 
of the 1820 Treaty. 
Stannus, Lt.-Col. E.G.  Political 
Resident in the 
Persian Gulf 
1823-1827 
He tried to broker a peace between Shaikh 
Abdullah and Rahman bin Jabir. His 
Efforts culminated in both men signing a 
treaty of reconciliation in 1824. 
Nonetheless, the short peace between 
them was short lived and hostilities soon 
returned. 
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A Family Tree of the Al Khalifa 
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Treaty Name Parties Treaty Key Features 
Friendship Treaty 1816 Bahrain/British India To Guarantee safe access 
for Bahraini ships to the 
ports of British India under 
the condition of reciprocal 
treatment for British ships 
visiting Bahrain. 
Placement of Native agent 
in Bahrain.  Never ratified 
by Britain. 
General Treaty 1820 Bahrain/British India Along with other Arab 
Shaikhs of the trucial coats 
the Shaikhs of Bahrain 
agreed to abstain from any 
naval warfare and 
depredation east of the 
Restrictive Line. Such an 
abstainment would have 
made it safe for British 
shipping to pass 
unmolested in the Gulf. 
Friendship Treaty 1824 Shaikh Abdullah bin 
Ahmad Al Khalifa/Rahma 
bin Jabir al-Jalahma 
The agreement was 
engineered by Lt.-Col. 
E.G. Stannus with the aim 
of bringing peace between 
Shaikh Abdullah and 
Rahma. Nonetheless that 
peace lasted for only a 
short time and hostilities 
resumed between both 
belligerents. 
Friendship Treaty 1829 Bahrain/Oman  The agreement brought 
peace between Bahrain 
and Oman after a long 
conflict. Oman recognized 
the independence of 
Bahrain and its Shaikhs 
and vowed not to demand 
any future annual tributes. 
Both parties also agreed to 
not intervene in the 
internal affairs of the other 
and to aid each other if 
they faced an external 
threat.  
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Treaty Name Parties Treaty Key Features 
Treaty with Saudis 1836 Shaikh Abdullah/Emir 
Faisal bin Turki of Najd 
Shaikh Abdullah to cease 
his warfare against the 
Saudi Emir and to pay him 
a small annual tribute. In 
return the Saudi Emir 
would assist Shaikh 
Abdullah with troops if the 
latter faces an invasion 
from the Persians.  
Egyptian Treaty 1839 Shaikh Abdullah/Khorshid 
Pasha 
Shaikh Abdullah agreed to 
enter himself and his 
domains of Bahrain, Qatar, 
and Dammam under 
Egyptian Protection in 
exchange for a small 
annual tribute and not 
having an Egyptian agent 
reside in Bahrain. 
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